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The purpose of this research has been to examine narrative and identity among the 
Hazara community in England and Hazara transnational connections. Within this thesis 
I study two Hazara-specific narratives: one on ‘marginality’ and the other about 
‘overcoming’ and how these narratives interact with Hazara conceptualisations of 
identity. These narratives both relate to Hazara history, in that the narrative of 
marginality relates to the subjugation of the community since the insurrection of 
Hazarajat and subsequent instances of discrimination and injustice, while the narrative 
of overcoming stems from the post-2001 gains of the community in Afghanistan. By 
engaging with these two very distinct community narratives this research allows for an 
exploration of individual self-identification, community articulations of what it means 
to ‘be Hazara’ and how the community chooses to present itself to the outside world. 
This is alongside showcasing an indigenous historiography of the community within the 
thesis, which is being documented by Hazaras online. Accordingly, this thesis begins 
with an introduction chapter which explains the rationale behind the research as well 
as contextualising the narratives of marginality and overcoming and their relevance to 
this research. This is followed by a literature review and a background chapter which 
details Afghan migration to Europe since the late 1970s, with a focus on Hazara 
migration to Britain, after which there are several findings chapters and a conclusion 
chapter. The findings chapters explore the contents of these narratives, how the 
community relates to them and the events which shape this historiography project, 
with various modes of communication and spaces forming the basis of these findings 
chapters. Therefore within this thesis these modes of communication and spaces can 
be understood as the following: oral history, religion, social media and community 
events. In turn this research contributes to the study of Hazaras in Europe, Hazara 
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On marginality and overcoming: Narrative, memory and identity 
among British Hazaras. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction:  
 
This research studies how narratives, lived experiences, social organisations and 
historiography interact to inform Hazara-specific narratives that the community 
articulate about themselves, as well as how these narratives engage with 
conceptualisations of identity, both on an individual and community level in England1, 
alongside transnational Hazara political mobilisation and collective action. This thesis 
will in turn map out the development of the Hazara-specific master narratives within 
this research, on ‘marginality’ and ‘overcoming’2, across various spaces (lived 
experiences, historical events, social organisations and historiography), in order to 
present an argument about historical identity formation among marginal communities 
more generally, and as a mechanism to link past events, present conceptualisations of 
the self and community, and future-oriented activism. It will also trace the ways that 
these Hazara-specific narratives have become interlinked, with time, to a more specific 
liberal framing. Literature on the Hazara community outside Afghanistan, namely in 
Australia, highlights the importance of social networks in relation to promoting or 
enhancing community engagement and cohesion, as well as preserving and 
maintaining Hazara culture. Thus, within this research a great emphasis has been 
placed on social networks given the significant role they play for migrant3 communities 
 
1 This research specifically focuses on the Hazara communities of London and the Midlands, as these 
regions were recommended as research sites by Hazara friends and acquaintances, given the large 
number of Hazaras based in these areas. 
2 These master narratives are discussed in-depth in the ‘master narratives’ section of this chapter. 
3 In reference to the term ‘migrant’ Dr Tazreena Sajjad notes that ‘[p]rimarily the term ‘migrant’ 
generates associations with invisibility, illegitimacy or dependency leading to the assumption that they 
can be found, enumerated and categorised. It speaks to an association of ‘choice’ and confers the idea 
of opportunistic decision-making that generates little sympathy when considering questions of the 
rights and dignity of the individual in question’ (2018: 46). Given that the current political climate in 
Europe and the US has meant that the term migrant now generally has negative connotations, it is 
important to explain and justify the use of the term within this research. Within this thesis the term 
‘migrant’ will be utilised in a literal sense, to denote a person who has moved from one place of 
residence to another. In turn, the emphasis here is on the movement of peoples. Furthermore, as the 
two main categories of research participants within this research are Hazaras who were born and 
brought up in Afghanistan (or in Iran and Pakistan), and Hazaras who have lived in the UK since 
childhood, migrant is used to differentiate the two groups within this research and define the 
generation who have had protracted lived experiences outside of Britain, unlike the younger 
respondents in this study, who are thus labelled as the Hazara diaspora. Therefore, the term migrant is 
used to distinguish older Hazara arrivals to Britain from the younger Hazara diasporic youth.   
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in a new ‘host’ country. Through the course of this research the aim has been to draw 
attention to the need to study how the themes noted above interconnect. This is 
because existing literature on Hazaras relating to migration, narratives and social 
networks predominantly focus on one or two of these themes, without assessing how 
collectively these themes impact identity among the Hazara community. In turn, this 
research will aim to highlight how these themes interact with, and inform, Hazara 
conceptualisations of identity, by engaging with the responses given during semi-
structured interviews by members of the Hazara community in England, as well as 
through examining existing literature on the Hazaras and Hazara social media. The 
additional element of Hazara social media positions this online space as another mode 
of social networks. While this research also analyses online Hazara historiography and 
other literature published by Hazaras as an additional avenue of data.   
 
This introduction chapter will present a brief history of the Hazara community, 
highlighting their troubled history and recent precarity in Afghanistan, in order to 
situate the master narratives within this research. As noted earlier these master 
narratives centre on the themes of marginality and overcoming, and are themselves 
informed by Hazara history and information propagated about the community 
regarding the values and ideals Hazaras espouse, both online on Hazara social media 
and at community gatherings. The following section will be a discussion as to the 
rationale and context behind this research, followed by a methodology section. This 
chapter will conclude by delving into the master narratives within this research, while 
also briefly introducing the subsequent chapters of this thesis, and their relevance to 
the master narratives within this research.  
 
1.1 Research rationale and context: 
The purpose of this research is to examine narrative and identity4 among the Hazara 
community in England, specifically in the city of London and the Midlands region of the 
country. This research studies two Hazara-specific master narratives: one of 
‘marginality’ and the other of ‘overcoming’, and how these narratives interact with 
Hazara conceptualisations of identity. Given how marginal histories are largely 
 
4 Various anthropological interpretations and understandings of the term ‘identity’ will be discussed 
further within this thesis in order to contextualise this research.    
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preserved by marginal groups themselves, this research engages with the Hazara 
community, in order to learn how their social networks impact narrative, ethnic 
consciousness and ethnic solidarity, through lived experiences of migration and 
historic, collective suppression in Afghanistan, and more recently in the neighbouring 
region. In turn, this research will highlight how the activities and engagement of the 
Hazara community in a Western context directly relates back to Hazaras in 
Afghanistan, and how the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and the neighbouring 
region is a focal point for action in Hazara diasporic spaces, as their activism is directly 
informed by Hazara communities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Hence this 
research aims to delve into these transnational linkages to show how British Hazaras 
are part of a global Hazara network. Thus, during the course of this research the 
experiences and observations of British Hazaras were explored in order to observe 
how the master narratives within this research are perceived, both on an individual 
and community level. 
 
Historical literature on Hazaras has primarily focused on the ‘origins’ of the community 
and the ‘political awakening’ of Hazaras in Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Formative writings on the history of the Hazaras and their culture have been 
undertaken by two prominent scholars, Hassan Poladi and Syed Askar Mousavi. 
However, their books on Hazaras date back to the late 1980s and 1990s respectively5. 
Most literature on Hazaras available in English examines Hazara history, with attempts 
to chronologise their persecution from the late 19th Century till the present times. 
Furthermore, although ethnographic research on the community does exist, a lot of 
this research is single-sited research, and largely focuses on the present.  As a result, 
there is limited literature on other aspects of Hazara life besides their history, on 
themes such as contemporary politics, culture, identity or transnational connections. 
In the European context research pertaining to Hazara migration, assimilation and 
identity is sparse, with Hazaras being studied alongside Afghans more generally, as 
opposed to focusing solely on their lived experiences, as distinct from other Afghans. 
There has not been an attempt to analyse Hazara migration to Europe and the unique 
issues and challenges it raises for the community. In the current global setting where 
 
5 An influential Hazara historian who should also be noted here is Faiz Mohammad Kateb Hazara. Kateb 
Hazara was commissioned to write an extensive history of Afghanistan for Emir Habibullah Khan. He 
produced a several volume book titled Siraj al-Tawarikh for the Emir.  
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there is increasing migration from predominately Muslim populated regions as a result 
of conflict, it warrants investigation how such communities once in Europe, navigate 
the issues of identity, integration and belonging in a new setting. Hence, this research 
is a holistic transnational study of how the past and present are interconnected 
through memory and narration, as well as exploring Hazara community activity on 
multiple scales, which is undertaken for the future betterment of the community.  
 
In the British context, we see passing reference made to the Hazaras when highlighting 
the various ethnic groups that come under the umbrella of ‘Afghan’, or when 
discussing ethnic tensions among Afghans. However, this is where the issue of Hazaras 
in the country both starts and finishes. In recent years Hazaras in England have taken 
to the streets to demonstrate against targeted attacks by terrorists, and discrimination 
by the government against Hazaras in Afghanistan. The community in Britain, and 
Europe more generally, has a very active social media presence which has been used 
to raise awareness about the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan, and also in Pakistan 
and Iran. Going by social media alone, it can be seen that demonstrations by the 
Hazara community outside Afghan embassies for example, have led to growing 
animosity between Hazara and non-Hazara Afghans, and this can be seen by the 
countless number of comments left on Hazara social media pages by non-Hazara 
Afghans when Hazaras demonstrate outside Afghan embassies worldwide. Hence, 
within this study social media is a key tool, as it is a virtual space for Hazaras to share 
information about their community, discuss Hazara current affairs and raise awareness 
about ‘Hazara issues’ with the wider Hazara community, and non-Hazaras. As a 
researcher from outside of the community, social media allows for non-Hazaras to 
understand community sentiments on a wide range of issues, as well as being a 
catalyst for highlighting the extent to which the master narratives within this research 
are propagated, while also being a platform where Hazara history is being written and 
documented in greater depth. Without engaging with Hazara social media it would 
have been difficult to accurately determine what are seen as the key issues within the 
transnational Hazara community, which further emphasises the importance of this 
form of media within this research.                  
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Through informal conversations with members of the Hazara community in London it 
has become apparent that the Hazara community, by and large, is segregated from 
other Afghan communities, and has its own community spaces, and in certain 
instances religious spaces. There are Hazara Nowruz (Persian New Year) and Eid 
celebrations, as well as Muharram events and Ashura commemorations. This is to be 
expected if the ethnic tensions that exist in Afghanistan are considered, which may 
have found their way overseas with various waves of Afghan migration to Europe, as 
well as literature on the Afghan diaspora highlighting that these tensions and issues 
also manifest outside Afghanistan. As noted earlier, in the limited literature available 
there is a general focus on ‘Afghans’, which in turn does not, or due to its narrow 
scope cannot, assess the internal community dynamics of the various Afghan ethnic 
communities in Britain. The only recent academic work specifically focusing on the 
Hazara community in Europe is a 2012 book chapter on religious and ethnic identity 
among Hazara Ismaili youth in the city of Essen in Germany, conducted by Hazara 
scholar Dr Yahia Baiza, a 2018 book by Dr Saideh Saidi, ‘Juggling between two worlds: 
sociocultural change in Afghan immigrant women’s identity in Germany’, which 
focuses on Hazara migrant women, and a 2019 PhD thesis by Dr Khadija Abbasi titled, 
‘”There is death in immobility” an auto-ethnography of the identification process of 
transnational young Hazaras’. However, there is sizeable literature which examines the 
reasons for Afghan migration to Europe, personal experiences of migration among 
Afghans and the social networks of Afghans. Yet, within these studies there has not 
been an attempt to bring these themes together in relation to identity focusing on 
minorities, such as the Hazara community.  
 
This research aims to assess the extent to which these internally constructed 
community narratives, on marginality and overcoming are employed and reproduced 
by the British Hazara migrant and diaspora community. While also seeking to 
understand to whether these narratives are deconstructed and critically engaged with 
by the community. This is in order to elucidate to what extent these narratives are 
perceived as accurate representations of transnational Hazara communities by Hazaras 
themselves, through engaging with various modes of communication: informal 
conversations, research interviews and social media.   
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1.2 Research methodology: 
The primary method used to collect data and information for this research was 
through semi-structured interviews. The following quote epitomises why on a personal 
level, within this research, semi-structured interviews were primarily used, as they 
allowed for the extrapolation of ‘…opinions of respondents regarding complex and 
sometimes sensitive issues and enable[d] probing for more information and 
clarification of answers’ (Barriball and While 1994: 330), which was very evident 
throughout my interviews with multiple research participants. Within this study the 
exponential non-discriminative snowball sampling method was used to get acquainted 
with, and locate willing research participants, given that as a researcher from outside 
of the community it was the fastest and most effective way to form ties with this 
particular minority community and allow for an adequate number of interviews to be 
conducted within the field research time allocated for this study. With regards to the 
snowball sampling method it is said that, ‘[This] technique offers real benefits for 
studies which seek to access difficult to reach or hidden populations’ (Atkinson and 
Flint 2001: 2), which in part applies to the Hazara community who have come to the 
UK as a persecuted minority from Afghanistan and the neighbouring region, and whose 
numbers in the UK are unknown6. While Dr Nissim Cohen and Dr Tamar Arieli note that 
this research method allows for greater trust to be established between research 
participants and the researcher as, ‘The knowledge that the researcher was referred 
by a trusted person increases the potential for trust and cooperation in providing data’ 
(2011: 428).  
 
In terms of the formal interviews, all research participants were asked to sign a 
consent form before commencing the interviews. The consent form detailed what the 
research entailed, information about who was conducting the research and who was 
supervising the study, as well as mentioning that there was a fixed retraction period in 
which some or all of the material provided by research participants during their 
interviews could be removed if participants so wished. Alongside this data collection 
method, some informal conversations also proved to be very fruitful for this research, 
so information provided through these interactions are also included within this thesis 
 
6 The community’s numbers in Britain can be assumed to be small given that their migration to the 
country only began in the 1990s and declined significantly in the last decade. 
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where necessary, but these sources have been kept anonymous. It should be noted 
that a significant shortcoming of using such a research method is demographics, as 
snowball sampling is not a random selection sampling method. Professor Douglas D. 
Heckathorn notes that ‘…in the contexts where chain-referral methods are used, the 
initial sample usually cannot be drawn randomly. Second, chain-referral samples tend 
to be biased toward the more cooperative subjects who agree to participate’ (1997: 
175).      
 
Initially, when reading the relevant literature and devising a research plan for this 
study a central aim had been to ensure that participants reflected a diverse cross-
section of the Hazara community in England. However, as someone from outside of 
the Hazara community who was relying on Hazara acquaintances to inform community 
members about the research, and to enquire as to whether people from within the 
community would be interested in participating in the study, meant that the 
overwhelming majority of interviewees were of the same socio-economic background 
and educational level of those community members who recommended the research 
to others within the community in the first instance. Although there was a desire to 
have an even distribution of representation across gender, age, education, migration 
history and country of birth (and this was expanded to include the country in which 
respondents had either grown up in or had lived the longest in), but as the research 
progressed it became apparent that this was an unrealistic expectation to have given 
the research method employed for this study. As a result this has meant that most 
interviewees have attained a high level of education, holding bachelor degrees or 
higher tertiary qualifications, or those currently studying towards obtaining university 
degrees, with only a couple of interviewees having had limited educational 
opportunities (both of whom are male and grew up in Afghanistan, with one 
respondent having living in Iran for several years for work). Furthermore, of the fifty 
research participants interviewed for this research, thirty-six interviewees had a direct 
connection to Afghanistan, having been born and brought up in the country, or as it 
was the country where they were born but left during their childhood due to turmoil in 
the country stemming from violence and instability.           
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In relation to Iran and Pakistan, eight respondents were born and brought up in Iran, 
while six were from Pakistan, with one research participant who acquired British 
citizenship in his youth choosing to divide his time between Quetta and London. 
Having enquired as to why it was hard to get acquainted with Hazaras who had grown 
up in Tehran, Mashhad and Quetta, multiple interviewees and acquaintances 
mentioned that the majority of Hazaras in the UK are from Afghanistan, and Hazaras 
from Iran and Pakistan are far fewer in number in the country, with Hazaras from the 
latter two countries also agreeing with this statement. Therefore, it is not simply the 
case that the sampling method chosen for this research limited the opportunity to 
interview an equal number of Hazaras from Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, as the 
community’s migration trajectory from these three countries differs7. While in terms 
of gender there were thirty-two male respondents and eighteen female respondents 
within this study, with female interviewees making up 36% of the total interviewees. 
Although the research does not have an equal representation of gender, every attempt 
was made early on in the interviewing process to highlight that a gender-balanced 
sample pool within this study would be allow for greater accuracy with regards to 
assessing divergent and corresponding views between the sexes, with acquaintances 
and initial research participants assisting wherever they could to enhance the number 
of female research participants for this research. However, given that there was a 
limited time frame within which the research interviews had to be conducted and 
completed, and as it was a study undertaken by one researcher, there were bound to 
be restrictions in achieving all of the research’s intended aims with regards to 
representation, as can be seen by the gender imbalance within this study. This 
imbalance is also reflected in the religious orientation of interviewees. Only two 
research participants interviewed for this study belonged to the Ismaili sect of Islam, 
and no Sunni Hazaras were interviewed for this study, although multiple attempts 
were made to locate potential Ismaili and Sunni Hazaras respondents. As a result, the 
overwhelming majority of interviewees either self-identified as Shia Muslims or were 
born into Shia families. Although, it was mentioned on multiple occasions by Hazara 
 
7 Given the lack of available data on Hazaras in Britain, it has not been possible to verify this 
information, but these claims were articulated by the vast majority of research participants who 
discussed Hazara migration to the UK, hence the value of incorporating such information within the 
research.   
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acquaintances and research participants with a very active community presence, that 
the number of Ismaili and Sunni Hazaras in Britain is extremely low.   
 
With regards to age there was a wide cross-section covered among research 
participants in relation to this category. The youngest respondent at the time of the 
interviews was eighteen, and the oldest respondent was in their sixties. Most 
interviewees were in their twenties and thirties, and only a handful were in their 
fifties, with there being no interviewee past the age of retirement taking part in the 
study (although several attempts were made to engage with this demographic, but 
there seemed to be a reluctance on the part of those contacted8). In terms of younger 
Hazaras, twenty-two research participants constituted the Hazara diaspora within this 
study, given that they either self-identified as such or had spent most of their lives in 
the UK. Of the diaspora respondents, all were born in Afghanistan and came to the UK 
as infants or during their childhood. None of the younger respondents had spent any 
time living in Iran prior to migrating to the UK, while several younger interviewees had 
briefly lived in Pakistan before migrating to the country. Additionally, younger 
respondents stated that they had only briefly visited Afghanistan, Iran, or both 
countries since settling in the UK. 
 
The semi-structured interviews began with research participants giving an introduction 
about themselves, primarily focusing on their age and occupation, as well as where 
they currently lived and where they grew up. These introductions varied vastly in 
length, with some research participants merely stating what their occupation was and 
where they were based, while for others it formed a larger part of their interview. The 
reason for this discrepancy was that the latter group of research participants took time 
to explain, in detail, their migration history and what brought them and their families 
to Britain. These lengthy introductions proved to be extremely insightful for the 
research, as they helped to piece together Hazara migration to the country, which has 
not been written about, to date. However, it should be noted that these migration 
timelines were compared to information about Afghan migration to Europe to ensure 
 
8 This reluctance could presumably and understandably stem from the fact that they were not well 
acquainted with myself, and also as the research was being conducted by a non-Hazara, which could 
make it harder for elder respondents to speak with ease about their life experiences to someone from 
outside of the community.     
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that a thorough and accurate timeline of Hazara migration to Britain was formulated 
within this study. Also as previously noted, limited literature on Afghan communities in 
Britain does exist, but these works rarely, if at all, mention the Hazara community. 
Hence why these protracted introductions were of great value to the research. In 
terms of the semi-structured interviews they consisted of ten questions. The themes of 
the questions varied but were in line with the topics that this research had envisioned 
to cover. For instance, there were questions which directly asked how research 
participants understood and perceived their identity, alongside questions about their 
perceptions and awareness of the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and the 
neighbouring region, as well as the role and significance, if any, of religion and more 
specifically Shi’ism9.        
 
Through the course of the field research year, several community events were also 
attended. The rationale behind attending such events was to conduct participant 
observation, and incorporate findings from these events into the research, as 
participant observation ‘…provides opportunities for viewing or participating in 
unscheduled events’ and as it ‘…improves the quality of data collection and 
interpretation and facilitates the development of new research questions or 
hypotheses’ (Kawulich 2005). However, just prior to, and early on, during the interview 
stage of this research multiple respondents mentioned that in recent years Hazara 
community activities and events have decreased significantly, with two main reasons 
given as to why community engagement was so low at the time when research 
interviews were being conducted for this study. This was either due to internal 
community conflicts which have prevented local Hazara communities from coming 
together to rent spaces for cultural gatherings, or due to a lack of motivation among 
community members to raise and spend money on cultural events given the growing 
number of attacks on Hazaras in Afghanistan, as such efforts were seen as frivolous at 




9 For Ismaili research participants this question was slightly altered to encapsulate their position as a 
minority sect within a minority community, in order to understand how religion shapes their 
engagement with and perceptions of Twelver Shia Hazaras.    
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Yet, in spite of the decline in community events it was possible to attend a few events 
during the field research period, which included a political event with Hazara 
politicians from Afghanistan in London about the TUTAP project10 and Hazara political 
mobilisation, the annual Baba Mazari commemoration in London, an event at the 
House of Commons with British and Hazara parliamentarians on the current situation 
of the Hazara community in Afghanistan, as well as a Hazara Nowruz celebration in the 
Midlands, and a Hazara demonstration outside Downing Street in London against 
attacks on Hazaras in Afghanistan. The first political event which was attended for this 
study was with Hazara parliamentarians who had visited the UK from Afghanistan, and 
the event was conducted in Persian which acted as a barrier in fully understanding the 
proceedings of the event. However, Hazara acquaintances at the event did roughly 
explain what the parliamentarians were discussing. Similarly, proceedings of the Baba 
Mazari commemoration were also conducted in Persian (bar a handful speeches from 
non-Hazara speakers in English), but live Persian to English translation was provided 
for most of the event. While the other events listed above were conducted in English. 
These events will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters, where relevant. 
 
Correspondence through social media with Hazara contacts in Europe again proved 
productive for this research, as multiple resources and information was shared online 
to assist with the research. Some of these contacts provided information they had 
about Hazara migration to Europe. These interactions were very useful at the early 
stages of this research given how difficult it was to find research and information 
about Hazaras in Europe, and more specifically on Hazaras in Britain. Such information 
was handled with caution, as academic references were not always provided to 
support certain assertions. Nonetheless, the information provided through such 
interactions allowed for further research into the information that had been shared, 
which helped to navigate the direction of this study, especially in terms of 
understanding Hazara migration to Britain, what questions would be of use as part of 
the semi-structured interviews, academic resources that would assist with the 
research, as well as cultural sensibilities to be aware of when conducting the research 
as someone from outside of the Hazara community.    
 
10 The TUTAP project is a regional electrical power project that has garnered a lot of controversy among 
the Hazara community, and is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.  
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As noted before, this research heavily relies on information provided through 
interviews and social media. This has invariably meant that the information engaged 
with may at times be subjective personal opinions on the topics of study within this 
research, as opposed to being reliable, objective facts, as Mohammad Yonus Entezar in 
a paper on Hazara online activism notes, when citing Professor Teun Adrianus van 
Dijk, who states that ‘…some issues will be emphasized by the writer and some issues 
will be deemphasized’ (2016: 51) with regards to discourse and ideology, and 
information propagated online. This is relevant and important to consider in relation 
to social media engagement more generally, and is also evident in the content found 
on Hazara social media pages. This is because this research is not claiming or aiming to 
bring to light unknown facts about the Hazara community and their history, but is 
instead seeking to understand the narratives the community constructs about itself 
and to what extent these narratives impact individual Hazara community members’ 
conceptualisations of themselves and their community.   
 
Hence, given that social media is a key component within the research it is important 
to engage with the issue of ethics in relation data collection through such online 
sources. Its primary use within this research was to engage with public online sources 
of information in order to understand and assess the information shared on Hazara-
specific online platforms and the perceptions of transnational Hazara communities in 
these spaces. In relation to this point an online social media research ethics paper 
produced by the University of Aberdeen notes that: 
 
Social media platforms are increasingly used by many as a means of 
communication, sharing information and…the sharing of attitudes and 
behaviours on a huge breadth of topics. It is this user-generated content that 
presents such a valuable opportunity to researchers. Whereas before, 
researchers gathered information on attitudes and behaviours through a 
variety of methods such as questionnaires, in-depth interviews and 
observation, such data is often now accessible at the mere ‘touch of a button’ 
(or more accurately, typing a few search terms into a platform’s search bar). 
Such data, found on social media platforms, online discussion forums and 
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blogs (to name a few) is typically rich, numerous and naturally occurring 
(Townsend and Wallace 2014: 4).  
 
Within this research any reference made to online information from Hazara sources 
are all public sources. An issue which does arise here is the factual validity of the 
information provided online. Although this is naturally an important issue to consider, 
given that this study primarily engages with people’s subjective opinions this issue in 
this specific research context is not of great concern. The reason being that the online 
information being sought within this study is solely being used to gauge community 
sentiments on community issues and to show what information, whether factual or 
not, is propagated online in Hazara historiographical sources. Hence, this issue of 
factual validity is not crucial here as it does not undermine the usefulness of online 
sources within this research, nor do problems arise in relation to using people’s private 
information, as only public webpages and social media sites have been consulted for 
this research.   
 
Of the fifty interviewees who participated in this research, forty agreed to having their 
names and biographical information shared within the thesis, if they were to be 
directly quoted. However, ten respondents requested anonymity after participating in 
the research interviews, as the answers shared were seen as controversial in some 
regard, and given some respondents’ standing in their local Hazara communities, 
which they naturally did not want to harm through participation in this research. 
Hence the preference to keep personal information concealed for these specific 
research participants. With the latter group of respondents, names are not used when 
directly quoting these individuals, but general information is given as to their 
occupation, age and place of residence.  
 
Lastly, it is important to also briefly discuss the issue of positionality within the 
research. For the purpose of this research positionality can be understood as ‘…the 
stance or positioning of the researcher in relation to the social and political context of 
the study—the community, the organization or the participant group’ (Rowe 2014: 
627). Since the beginning of this doctoral research I had been concerned that as 
someone from outside of the Hazara community, and as someone from a non-Shia 
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background, there may be reluctance for prospective Hazara interviewees to engage 
with myself and the research. Therefore, prior to formally starting the research 
interviews in October 2017, the summer of 2017 was spent inquiring as to whether 
there would be difficulties in conducting interviews as a researcher from outside of the 
Hazara community. Hazara acquaintances overwhelming stated that they believed that 
the response to the study being conducted by an external researcher would in fact be 
more compelling for some Hazara community members as the community feels that 
there is a great need to inform and educate others about the community and their 
history. Lastly, as with any qualitative study of this kind it can only be hoped that all 
information shared during the course of research interviews were genuine sentiments 
held by research participants regarding the issues discussed during the field research 
stage of this project. Thus, such a belief has been taken in good faith, as it is not my 
position as the researcher, with whom personal, and at times traumatic lived 
experiences were shared to doubt and undermine the veracity of the statements made 
by research participants, unless credible evidence were to present itself which may 
challenge certain statements. In this case of this research project such an issue did not 
occur. 
 
1.3 Master narratives:  
This research centres around two master narratives, relevant to the Hazara community 
of Afghanistan, the UK and worldwide, which will be analysed throughout the course 
of this thesis. The narratives, on marginality and overcoming, and the reason for 
choosing to evaluate them within this research will be elaborated on within this 
section. Before delving into the master narratives within this research it is important to 
provide some background information about the Hazara community in order to 
contextualise the master narratives within this research. The Hazaras are one of the 
largest ethnic and religious minorities in Afghanistan (Ibrahimi 2017: 6). The 
community has contested ‘origin stories’, with the most prevalent theory, and widely 
disputed theory, being that the Hazaras are descendants of Genghis Khan’s army who 
settled in the region in the 13th Century. However, through informal conversations and 
through formal research interviews with members of the Hazara community, it has 
become apparent that the prevalence given to this theory online and in the available 
literature is seen as problematic by Hazaras who believe the community to be 
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indigenous to Afghanistan, or as a Turkic-Mongol community who are not descendants 
of the Mongol army. This is premised on the belief held by multiple research 
participants that Hazaras fought Genghis Khan and his army when they entered the 
central highland regions of Afghanistan, which the community have historically 
inhabited. In recent years the validity of this heritage claim has been studied and 
dismissed by some anthropologists, but consensus still remains that Hazaras are most 
likely descendants of Mongols, and Central Asian Turkic people who settled in the 
region, as anthropologist Dr Alessandro Monsutti notes that:  
 
It is historically conceivable that Turkish and Mongol groups, progressively 
driven off the Hindu Kush (from Central Asia in the North, and from Iran in 
the West) between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, mixed with the 
local population and adopted their language. Since the sixteenth century, the 
term hazara has referred more to a socio-political position than to a 
homogeneous population, as it is used to designate groups that have little in 
common other than their situation of geographical isolation and political 
autonomy (2007: 175).  
 
Hazaras speak a dialect of Persian11 known as Hazaragi, which contains significant 
Turko-Mongolic vocabulary (Ibrahimi 2012: 4), and are the largest Shia Muslim 
community in Afghanistan, although, there are some Ismaili and Sunni Hazaras in the 
country (Thesiger 1955: 317). Hazaras adherence to Shia Islam in a predominantly 
Sunni Muslim state has seen them persecuted, massacred and enslaved12. Their 
 
11 Throughout this thesis the term ‘Persian’ will be used in reference to one of the two official languages 
spoken in Afghanistan, given the problems that arise with using either the terms ‘Dari’ or ‘Farsi’ to refer 
to the Persian language in the Afghan context. In Afghanistan and among Afghans issues arise with 
regards to the use the use of either the words ‘Dari’ or ‘Farsi’ because some Afghans who are adamant 
in using the term ‘Dari’ want to separate and distinguish Afghanistan from the cultural and historical 
links the country previously had with the Persian-speaking world (although it should be noted that 
Persian in Afghanistan is officially referred to as ‘Dari’ given that this is the term used in the country’s 
Constitution for the language). Whereas proponents of the term ‘Farsi’ want to highlight Afghanistan’s 
ties with its neighbours through a shared linguistic and cultural history. Personally, I have also 
encountered some mild hostility when using either of the terms ‘Dari’ and ‘Farsi’ when discussing 
language with some contacts prior to conducting the research interviews. However, the use of the term 
‘Persian’ was never problematic and appears to be seen as a ‘neutral’ term by research participants. 
Hence, given the contentious nature of language terminology in Afghanistan and as witnessed during 
interactions with some research participants, Persian will be used throughout the research to refer to 
‘Dari-Farsi’.  
12 Hazara slave ownership was officially outlawed by King Amanullah Khan in the 1920s, but some 
research participants have noted that the practice still persisted after his decree was issued. This was 
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persecution began in the late 19th Century when Emir Abdur Rahman Khan13, an ethnic 
Pashtun, declared the Hazara community ‘non-Muslim’ and used a religious decree to 
suppress and conquer central Afghanistan, an area also known as Hazarajat. This is in 
stark contrast to the fact that the Hazara community had lived in relative isolation in 
central Afghanistan for most of their history in the country. As a result, since the late 
19th Century there have been waves of Hazara migration to Iran and the city of Quetta, 
in modern-day Pakistan. Anthropologist Dr Fariba Adelkhah notes that the monarchs 
who succeeded Abdur Rahman Khan did work to undo some of the damage he had 
done during his reign, but that discrimination against Hazaras permeated once again 
during the reign of Nadir Shah and during the presidency of Daoud Khan, which is 
highlighted in the following quote:   
 
[Habibullah and Amanullah] abolished slavery, withdrew some of the 
measures discriminating against Hazaras, and restored to them some of their 
rights by granting titles to their leaders (amir)... Later, the reigns of Nadir 
Shah (1929–33) and Zahir Shah (1933–73) put the seal on the Pashtun and 
Sunni domination of Afghanistan and the relegation of Hazara Shi’ites to the 
position second-class subjects. The great famine of 1971–72, with its 
accompanying drought, was terrible. During the tenure of President Dawood 
(1973–78), the subjugation of the Hazaras was intensified; land-grabbing by 
the Kuchis was encouraged under cover of the 1970 law on pastures…(2017: 
145).     
 
Thus, Adelkhah’s statement indicates how even after the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan 
ended in 1901, Hazaras were still at the bottom of the country’s social hierarchy and 
were still marginalised, well into the 20th Century, with this history of subjugation 
continuing to impact Hazara transnational discourses in the 21st Century.         
     
Ascertaining the number of Hazaras in Afghanistan is difficult due to the fact that 
regular censuses are not conducted in the country, with political scientist Paul D. Miller 
 
also noted by Niamatullah Ibrahimi in his book ‘The Hazaras and the Afghan State. Rebellion, exclusion 
and the struggle for recognition (2017: 90).   
13 ‘Emir’ is a title reserved for nobility in the Arabic language, and is used in Afghanistan in reference to 
former monarchs. 
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noting that ‘There has still been no census in Afghanistan since 1979’ (2014: 5), (which 
was the first national census in the country)14. Although it should be noted that there 
was a mandate for a census to be conducted in the country in the original 2001 Bonn 
Agreement (ibid)15. Thus, it is hard to determine the population of Afghanistan let 
alone the size of the country’s various ethnic communities. Demographics of the 
country are an issue of contention that has been used to further political agendas 
across the country’s various ethnic groups. For instance, lack of reliable data on 
population sizes and ethnic groups in Afghanistan has been utilised by members of the 
Pashtun community to assert that they are the largest ethnic group in the country. 
Similarly, the lack of statistics is also used by some ethnic minorities to highlight that 
their numbers may be higher than previously assumed. This is noted by anthropologist 
Thomas Barfield who states that: 
 
In this absence of real data, Pashtun-dominated governments have always 
asserted that Pashtuns constitute an absolute majority in Afghanistan, 
although they probably comprise only its largest plurality. More recently, 
Hazaras have entered the numbers game to make themselves equal to the 
Tajiks. The Uzbeks have similarly inflated the number of Turkish speakers 
(2012: 24).   
It should be noted that Hazara political analyst Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi in his 2017 
book about Hazaras and the Afghan state cites 9% in relation to the ethnic 
composition of Hazaras in Afghanistan, with Hazaras and Uzbeks both constituting 9% 
of the population of Afghanistan (6). Nonetheless, as accurate information on the 
ethnic composition of Afghanistan is scarce, the reliability of such information is 
doubted by some. It should be noted that the figure cited above is disputed by Hazaras 
themselves who believe that it is not an accurate figure and that their community 
constitutes a higher percentage, as a larger ethnic group in Afghanistan, at (or just 
over) 20% of the population. The reason that this belief persists among members of 
 
14 Although it should be noted that the results of the census were never released, leading some people 
to believe that the start of the Soviet occupation in the country meant that the census was never 
actually completed. 
15 The Bonn Agreement was an accord which brought together multiple Afghan political factions to pass 
a set of conditions pertaining to governance in the country, after the fall of the Taliban regime, in order 
to allow for a smooth transition to democracy when the country’s first Presidential elections took place 
in October 2004.   
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the Hazara community is because in potentially deflating the number of ethnic 
minorities in Afghanistan, the country’s dominant ethnic group, the Pashtuns, can 
claim that they are the largest ethnic group in the country, taking again from Barfield’s 
work, a view that is also prevalent on Hazara social media.   
Within this context, Hazara historiography has cultivated two interconnected master 
narratives, one is that engrained in a legacy of subjugation and oppression, which also 
emerges in wider community discourses as well, both in print and in everyday 
understandings of Hazara selfhood, while the other relates to the recent gains of the 
community and their liberal ideals. In turn these master narratives can be understood 
as the following: on marginality and overcoming. These two master narratives - one 
focused on an inheritance from the past, and one focused on a future redemption - 
have been chosen for this research given the importance the Hazara community place 
on these narratives. Through informal conversations with members of the Hazara 
community it can be seen that reference to the persecution of the community since 
the late 19th Century is emphasised tremendously, especially when informing outsiders 
about the Hazara community and their past and present circumstances in Afghanistan, 
and the heavily ethnicised nature of Afghan politics, which are seen to disadvantage 
the community. While, within the narrative of overcoming the common self-narration 
of Hazaras as a liberal, ‘outward-looking’ and ‘forward-thinking’16 community is also 
highlighted as a means to distinguish the group from other Afghan communities, and 
accentuate the positive contribution of Hazaras within Afghan society more generally, 
namely in the sectors of education, women’s rights and sports. This is also hugely 
prevalent on Hazara websites and social media pages, as well in social media ‘posts’ by 
Hazara activists.      
 
Within this research these master narratives are not only central to the collective 
memory of Hazaras, but expand in scope with time, to encompass newer examples of 
 
16 Terms such as ‘open-minded’ and ‘forward-thinking’ are somewhat problematic when used to 
describe migrant communities in host countries, especially in political discourses, because they can be 
used as a means to convey that the values and norms of the host country are what one should aspire 
towards, and that the values and norms of migrants and their home countries and societies are 
regressive. However, I have purposely included these terms within this research as these are terms that 
members of the Hazara community have used to describe their community, especially as a means of 
distinguishing Hazaras from non-Hazara Afghan communities, and, at times, as a means of ‘othering’ 
non-Hazara Afghans.   
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marginality or instances of overcoming, in spite of the adversity endured. In turn 
individualised narratives are also discussed by research participants in order to 
articulate personalised Hazara conceptualisations of the community and ‘self’. 
Furthermore, throughout the course of this study, multiple sites, such as physical 
spaces, literature and the online domain, work to collectively establish, disseminate, 
proliferate, and engage with these master narratives. This then impacts how members 
of the community work to inform ‘Hazara identity’, which is, in part, evidenced by the 
interviews conducted with Hazara research participants for this study. In examining 
certain narratives, relative to the past, this project does not attempt to determine 
historical fact, but rather the prominence of the given narratives in relation to past 
events. Thus, within this research interviewing members of the Hazara community has 
been vital, as it has allowed for a greater comprehension of how Hazaras who have 
migrated to Europe, and how the diaspora community engage with, renegotiate, or 
critique these narratives, while also allowing for an analysis into whether, or to what 
extent, these narratives impact or influence conceptualisations of what it means to ‘be 
Hazara’ in the West.  
 
The master narrative of overcoming works in tandem with what it means to ‘be 
Hazara’ given the shared history, transnational connectivity and engagement of the 
community beyond borders, and these transnational links can allow for 
conceptualisations of being Hazara in the West, as well as in Afghanistan, Quetta and 
elsewhere, to intertwine in a digital age. In the online sphere such linkages can be seen 
through Hazara events and community achievements, such as the annual Dambora 
festival in Bamiyan, the annual Afghan Skiing Challenge which is also held in Bamiyan, 
and the numerous, trailblazing female Hazara musicians on the popular television 
show Afghan Star, such as Elaha Soroor and Zahra Elham. Information about these 
events and personalities, in and from Afghanistan, are circulated by the community in 
Europe and Australia. Similarly, in advocating for Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
in the diaspora, Hazaras in Afghanistan and the neighbouring region see how the 
community outside is still connecting to and maintaining ties with those ‘back home’. 
Therefore, in a more globalised world, in which there has been constant Afghan 
migration to the region and further afield, the dynamics of these Hazara narratives is 
that they both impact and relate to the regional and European Hazara communities. It 
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should also be noted that occasional participant observation and extensive 
engagement with Hazara social media has allowed for this research to further 
understand and establish the extent to which the master narratives of marginality and 
overcoming are reinforced or critically evaluated within the Hazara community.  
 
1.4 Individualised  narratives:     
This section will briefly discuss what have been conceptualised as individualised 
narratives within this study. At their core individualised narratives emphasise specific 
incidents that are unique in character, in the Hazara context, and relate to the master 
narratives of marginality and overcoming. In turn they constitute individualised 
narratives as particular events and personalities are presented as distinctive 
examples of the narratives within this study, and are thus tailored to embody 
marginality and overcoming in and of themselves. In relation to individualised 
narratives, two distinct examples will be drawn upon in this section in order to 
contextualise the use of this phrase within this research, and what constitutes 
individualised narratives within this study. Two individualised narratives which 
transmit the two master narratives of marginality and overcoming are that of the 
desecration of the Buddha statues of Bamiyan, and the life and legacy of the late 
Hazara political leader Abdul Ali Mazari. With regards to the first individualised 
narrative, marginality and oppression are at the core of understandings as to why the 
statues of the Buddha were destroyed, with multiple references being made to the 
prior disfiguring of the statues at the hands of Abdur Rahman Khan, the historical 
accuracy of which is debated, as well as to the more recent full-scale destruction of the 
statues by the Taliban in March 2001, during research interviews. In these discussions 
the destruction of the statues was directly linked to views of Hazaras as outsiders, 
pillagers or infidels, in relation to the claim of Mongol descent of Hazaras espoused by 
some individuals, and also due to the Shi’a inclination of most Hazaras in Afghanistan. 
This is because the backdrop for the acts of March 2001 stem from a claim of a long 
line of oppression that Hazaras have endured at the hand of the state and extremists.  
 
In contrast, in discussions with research participants about Mazari the master narrative 
of overcoming was generally insinuated and relayed. Since the passing of Mazari he 
has taken on an almost saint-like persona among the Hazara community. Accounts of 
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his life, key events in his political career and his advancements for the community are 
seen as the impetus for change which allowed the community to move away from 
being on the margins of society to being equal stakeholders in the future and 
development of Afghanistan, for all its people. Mazari’s contribution to the evolution 
of Hazara consciousness among the community is seen as central to the heightened 
self-worth which started to develop among Hazaras at the time. Similarly, it can also 
be seen that the significant progress of the community since the fall of the Taliban 
regime in 2001 has been bolstered by the growth of Hazara consciousness, as the 
community through succeeding in various sectors, particularly in education, predicated 
on the efforts of Mazari, links to the master narrative of overcoming, through their 
achievements in recent years. Even though Mazari was a military leader at a time of 
heightened instability and fragmentation in Afghanistan, with ideals which differ from 
those being espoused by liberal, progressive Hazaras today, he nonetheless paved the 
way for a new way of thinking among the community regarding their struggle in 
Afghanistan, and that the community could in fact work to change their circumstances 
in the country, which would have appeared as unimaginable before.   
 
At present, it can be seen that the way the community’s struggle is being dealt with, 
although different in its conception, namely through working to acquire education as 
opposed to being armed, Mazari is still seen as being the person who allowed for this 
progression to blossom in the first instance, albeit in an alternative manner. This is 
then central to the resultant experiences that led to the development of individualised 
narratives of advancement and progress among the community today. Hence, in 
working to strengthen the position and status of Hazaras in Afghanistan, Mazari has 
come to embody overcoming, both in a literal sense of him prevailing in accomplishing 
his objectives for the community, and with regards to the persistence of the 
community to prosper in spite of adversity suffered in Afghanistan. This in turn means 
that Mazari is perceived as the epitome of individualised narratives of overcoming.          
 
Given that these master narratives stem from past historical events, it is important to 
briefly delve into historiography and ‘history making’ here, and how this relates to the 
Hazara community and community narratives. This is because as can be seen from the 
narrative of marginality, it is heavily shaped by the events which took place in the late 
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19th Century in central Afghanistan, and subsequent, moderately minor events (in 
comparison to the insurrection of Hazarajat). While the narrative of overcoming draws 
from more recent, positive events and community achievements. Dr Allan Megill, 
Professor of History at the University of Virginia, notes that ‘…the relative 
solidity…grand narratives gave to historical writing a particular shape and feel. In 
general, commitment to such narratives tended to generate a history that was 
authoritative in tone and that was focussed on the actions and institutions of the state’ 
(2008: 25). However, in centring this research around master narratives that are 
formed and shaped by historically peripheral communities the inverse appears to 
taking place, as the state and state institutions are in fact themselves critiqued or 
pushed aside to allow for marginal communities to formulate narratives which bring to 
the fore information and perspectives about minorities themselves which get lost in 
articulations of masters narratives that are propagated by state agents and the elite. 
Thus, it can be argued in fact that such master narratives cannot be seen as being 
authoritative in relation to the wider-society given that they challenge dominant 
accounts of history and the whitewashing of historical events. In turn these counter-
narratives are viewed as being problematic and are dismissed by dominant 
communities. This can be seen through these Hazara master narratives, given that 
some non-Hazara Afghans dispute the extent to which the community suffered during 
the insurrection of Hazarajat, which is exemplified by the following quote from a 
journal paper by Dr Andrea Chiovenda and Dr Melissa Kerr Chiovenda on interethnic 
conflict in Afghanistan, recalling discussions with Pashtun interviewees about the past:           
 
Most Pashtuns with whom we tackled the issue [of the persecution of the 
Hazaras] did not seem to believe that any major “injustice” was ever brought 
upon Hazaras by the Afghan state, or by Pashtuns in particular (these 
concepts often overlap and become conflated in the narrative of many). The 
usual approach they maintained was that either Hazaras did not in fact suffer 
as much as they claim to have suffered, or that, if they did, after all they had 
probably deserved it… (2018: 177).  
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Similarly this wide-spread hostility also applies to the second master narrative of 
overcoming, as Annika Frantzell in her master’s dissertation on peace-building and the 
Hazara community notes that: 
 
Hazara successes have been breeding Hazara resentment, as Hazara 
migration to Afghanistan’s cities after the 2001 invasion has stirred up local 
resentment, particularly in [Herat]. Given their strong opposition to the 
Taliban due to the brutal treatment they received at their hands and their 
high profile as translators for NATO forces, the Hazara are now viewed by 
some as spies and informants…(2011: 40). 
 
Not only do the master narratives within this research give an insight as to how 
Hazaras view their own community and perceive their own history, it also allows for an 
understanding as to how the master narratives of marginal groups are viewed by 
dominant communities, and how they challenge prevalent accounts of history. Hence 
why these master narratives lend themselves to becoming sticking points between 
various communities, as the perpetually oppressed seek to see the ills of the past 
redressed but those who are in the majority, towards whom such articulations of the 
past are directed, will perceive admissions of wrong-doing as confessions of wrong-
doing, for which they are personally not responsible. And so a cycle continues in which 
certain marginal narratives are expressed, but are at the same time dismissed by those 
they are directed at. In turn, by engaging with narratives a holistic approach towards 
comprehending history can be developed, as Dr Eileen H. Tamura, a professor of 
education at the University of Hawai'i notes that, ‘Historical inquiry seeks to provide an 
understanding of events. The goal is to find the best ways to achieve this 
understanding. In integrating narrative and theory, educational historians can bring to 
bear new, different, and helpful perspectives’ (2011: 156). Therefore, in analysing 
these Hazara master narratives this research allows for an understanding as to how 
the community frames itself with regards to dominant accounts of Afghan history, 
given that the community believes that they have been neglected from having a voice 
within Afghan history. Thus in developing and promoting these master narratives the 
community can seek to rectify perceived past wrongs which have left them on the 
periphery within Afghan history.             
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As this research heavily engages with narratives it is also useful to note the work of the 
late Dr Marshall Gregory of Butler University, Indianapolis, who in a journal paper on 
narrative and memory stated that, ‘Much recent literary criticism and theory implicitly 
answers that narrative matters because it powerfully conveys ideology…, and recent 
work in the social sciences…explicitly answers that narrative matters because it plays a 
crucial role in the construction of knowledge and the development of societies’ (1995: 
35), which is extremely relevant in the context of this research given the limited 
contemporary literature available on Hazaras in the West, and Hazara history more 
generally. Furthermore, it is extremely pertinent in the case of the Hazaras who having 
endured over a century of marginalisation and are now promulgating specific 
narratives which document their community’s suffering and pursuit to improve their 
socio-economic status in Afghanistan, through working with Western NGOs and 
pursuing education, for instance. However, although the historical accuracy of any 
given narrative may be disputed, it cannot be denied that certain narratives are very 
important in a community’s conceptualisation of a collective identity and collective 
memory, which is evident with the Hazara community both in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. This has also been observed within this research and will be discussed in the 
subsequent chapters.  
 
1.5 On marginality and overcoming:    
As mentioned earlier, the first master narrative central to this research is one of 
marginality. This specific narrative has been the impetus for countless Hazara-led 
demonstrations in Europe and Australia, and more recently Afghanistan, where the 
subjugation of the past is paralleled with the current situation of Hazaras in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In relation to the Hazara community in Australia, Professor 
William Maley notes that, ‘Many Hazara refugees entered Australian territorial waters 
in boats [in 2010 due to increasing attacks by the Taliban], as they had earlier done 
following Taliban massacres in the 1990s’ (2011: 90). This in turn shows how 
marginality not only relates to the crimes of the late 19th Century against Hazaras, but 
also how this narrative is a more modern lived experience for certain members of the 
community. Furthermore, due to increasing ISIS and Taliban attacks against Hazaras in 
Afghanistan this narrative is widely propagated online in relation to contemporary 
events, and is done so in order to lobby parliamentarians and raise awareness of the 
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situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This narrative was proliferated most 
recently in relation to several issues including: the TUTAP project17, lack of 
development in the Hazarajat region, the targeted bombings of Shias in Afghanistan 
since 2015, the kidnappings of Hazaras in Zabul province, and the executions of 
Hazaras in Ghazni province18. Hence why social media is a key space within this 
research, because in proliferating these Hazara master narratives it can be seen that 
direct action is being undertaken by members of the Hazara community, to challenge 
and call out oppression.  
 
In a working paper on Hazara ethnic consciousness, Dr Naimatullah Ibrahimi adopts 
the narrative of marginality, as he states that the history of the insurrection of 
Hazarajat in the late 19th Century is a ‘central theme’ of Hazara collective 
consciousness (2012: 4). Firstly, due to the subjugation of the Hazaras as a result of 
political and military mobilisation by the Emir, through declaring jihad (a holy war) 
against the Hazaras due to their Shia beliefs, as opposed to his Sunni beliefs. Secondly, 
as the conquest of Hazarajat by the Emir resulted in ‘…the largest displacement and 
mass migration of the Hazaras from Afghanistan to date’, and lastly because the 
authority of the Emir as the head of state meant that Hazaras who remained in 
Afghanistan after the war began were then at the bottom of the socio-economic 
strata.  
 
Doctoral researcher Farzana Marie has also discussed Hazara narratives pertaining to 
marginality and subjugation. She states that the persecution of the community since 
the late 1800s is ‘…deeply engraved in the minds of Hazaras’ (2013: 91). While Dr 
Niamatullah Ibrahimi also emphasises that that ‘…the Afghan state is the main source 
of the added and imposed significance of ethnic difference and thus the main driver of 
ethnicisation of politics in Afghanistan’ (2017: 8), which is a sentiment that many 
research participants have echoed throughout the interviews for this study. While 
historian Dr Sayed Askar Mousavi who has written extensively on Hazaras goes further 
than Ibrahimi and claims that, ‘Afghan nationalism or Pashtunism as a mechanism for 
 
17 See for example: www.thediplomat.com/2016/08/tutap-power-project-reopens-old-wounds-in-
afghanistan/.  
18 On the marginalisation and persecution of Hazaras in Afghanistan  
see: www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/13/afghanistans-shia-hazara-suffer-latest-atrocity.  
and  www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/afghans-protest-killings-hazara-isil-151110135854342.html.  
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tribal domination and oppression has been enforced upon society and the people of 
Afghanistan for over a century’ (1998: 7), which again is a view shared by multiple 
research participants, and will be elaborated on in subsequent chapters. Furthermore, 
in a journal paper on the Wakhan Corridor, Dr Duncan Weaver states the following in 
relation to borders and identity, ‘Borders allow certain expressions of identity and 
memory to exist while blocking others…borders are open to contestation at the level 
of state and in everyday life…’ (2018:4), and this point is pertinent to note within this 
research in relation to the Hazara community, given the marginal status of Hazaras in 
the late 19th Century in Afghanistan and during certain periods of the 20th Century, as a 
result of the state and its policies.   
 
Marie has also noted that ‘ethnocentric’ policies of the mid-1900s in Afghanistan 
worked to heighten ethnic divisions, which led to a sense of continuing marginalisation 
among Hazaras. This culminated in the assassination of King Nadir Khan by a Hazara 
student. While, the formation of the of the Hezb-e Wahdat (Unity Party) in 1989 by 
Abdul Ali Mazari led to a shift in Hazara consciousness on an unprecedented level. 
Marie states that Mazari was, ‘…primarily responsible for transforming the party into a 
platform for the rights and political demands of the Hazaras in the early 1990s’ (2013: 
94). Dr Fariba Adelkhah mentions that Wahdat was also significant with regards to 
working towards establishing Hazara consciousness, stating that, ‘The Hizb-i Wahdat, 
more especially, had a decisive role in the ethnicisation of the social consciousness of 
the Hazara…’ (2017: 143).While anthropologist Alessandro Monsutti also notes that:  
 
The progressive politicisation of the Hazaras has thus gone hand in hand with 
a strengthening of their association with Shiism. In the 1980s most Hazara 
political leaders constantly associated themselves with the Iranian revolution, 
but it was only during the following decade that the ethnic dimension 
became really explicit. After a period of inner divisions, most Hazaras have 
become part of one movement, the Hezb-e Wahdat, the goal of which is to 
have the rights of Hazaras recognized at a national level and to ensure them a 




The reinforcement of identity in political speeches and its resonance among 
the population are the result of a social-historical process linked to past and 
recent conflicts. These have made an impression on people’s minds and given 
Hazaras a whole symbolic language based on past sufferings and injustices. In 
the migratory urban context of Quetta, inter-community relationships are not 
much better. In Pakistan, as in Afghanistan, political exclusion, social 
injustice, poverty, insecurity and the example of the Iranian revolution are so 
many factors favouring the rise of a political activism that combines religious 
and ethnic demands. Muharram and the celebration of ‘Ashura’ crystallize 
tensions and the Hazara construction of identity (2007: 189-190).  
 
It can therefore be seen that the community’s history of oppression became the 
impetus for change within the community, as an emphasis on religion, particularly 
Shi’ism, which had existed before was replaced with the positive affirmation of a 
Hazara ethnic identity.    
 
The second master narrative within this research is of overcoming, and relates to the 
progress Hazaras have made in Afghanistan, most notability since the fall of the Taliban 
regime in 2001, in spite of their historical marginality. Within this narrative Hazaras as a 
liberal, forward-thinking community is promulgated far and wide, both in Afghanistan, 
and among the diaspora in Europe and Australia. This self-identification as a liberal 
community can be demonstrated by following quote by Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi, ‘…the 
Hazaras more generally, offer the most potent example of a shift from violent conflict 
towards peaceful and civilian politics and as a result are one of the success stories of 
the post-2001 Afghanistan’ (2017: 223). Subsequently, it can be seen that there is a 
concerted effort being made by the Hazara community to appear as, and promote 
themselves as, a liberal and progressive community. Furthermore, numerous online 
news articles about the Hazaras also allude to Hazaras as being forward-thinking and in 
turn distinct from other Afghans, with Michael Semple a Visiting Professor at Queen's 
University Belfast noting that the ‘…modernizing project had significant appeal in 
Hazara intellectual circles’ (2012: 10). Many research participants have also alluded to 
such liberal traits as being prevalent among the Hazara community, with research 
participant Shokryah Mohammadi, who was born in Ghazni and came to England in 
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2008, stating that, ‘Being Hazara means being modern, being open-minded, being 
welcoming to other people and being unified together’. Hence, there was significant 
scope for investigating this master narrative within this research, as it is widely 
propagated from within the community, but is also reaffirmed by some non-Hazaras.     
 
In relation to the narrative of overcoming it is also worth noting some statistics from 
the annual Afghanistan Survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in 201819. Opinions 
of Afghans on a variety of topics, from all thirty-four provinces of the country, were 
gauged as part of the survey, representing the country’s diverse ethnic groups. 
Multiple topics were assessed within the survey, including security, governance and 
migration, with numerous statistics being provided about the perceptions of Afghans 
on these topics. In terms of voting the survey found that 95.4 % of respondents in the 
Hazara-dominated Hazarajat region stated that they planned to vote in the 2019 
presidential elections, while in Kabul that number decreased significantly to 63.9%20 
(2018: 137). The survey also noted that Hazaras are more likely to support women’s 
voting rights, which was at 92.9% in 2017 and 96.8% in 2018, while for Pashtuns it was 
at 81.7% in 2017, which was down to 79.0% in 2018, and for Tajiks it was at 93.0% in 
2017, which was down to 91.9% in 2018 (ibid: 182). While in terms of employment it 
was mentioned that:  
 
Ethnicity is a strong predictor of attitudes about certain types of 
employment. Hazaras (40.2%) are significantly more likely than Tajiks 
(20.5%), Pashtuns (15.3%), or Uzbeks (14.9%) to strongly agree with women 
working at a NGO, and Hazaras (51.4%) are also more likely to strongly or 
somewhat agree with women working in the army/police than Tajiks (36.5%), 
Uzbeks (34.4%), or Pashtuns (26.8%) (ibid: 191).   
 
These are just a handful of statistics chosen from the survey to illustrate why the 
narrative of overcoming is relevant to the research and why the notions of being open-
minded and forward-thinking are alluded to by members of the Hazara community. In 
 
19 The first Afghanistan survey was conducted in 2004. The Asia Foundation ‘…is a nonprofit 
international development organization committed to improving lives across a dynamic and developing 
Asia’. For more information about the organisation see: www.asiafoundation.org/about/.  
20 It should be noted that the general reluctance to vote in Kabul as opposed to in Hazarajat could also 
be influenced by the greater incidence of violence in the city, as compared to central Afghanistan.    
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turn, these statistics, in part, give credence to the assertion made by some members of 
the Hazara community about both their individual and collective liberal values and 
ideals. Furthermore, with regards to the narrative of overcoming it can be seen that 
there is a determination among the community to excel, in order to bring to an end 
the marginalisation Hazaras have endured in Afghanistan, Quetta and elsewhere. 
Farzana Marie notes that education is being utilised by Hazaras as a means to ‘[resist] 
against systematic ethnic and religious discrimination’ (2013: 97). According to Marie 
this process not only acts as a means of social mobility but that educated Hazaras can 
begin to ‘…articulate a shared history through stories of dispossession, mass migration, 
violence, and political marginalization’ (ibid), which is a quote that links both 
narratives together, and again further supports the first narrative’s significance for the 
purpose of this research21. The increasing trend of acquiring educational opportunities 
among the community was noted in the early 2000s by Professor Robert Canfield who 
mentions the following correspondence with Hazara acquaintances:  
 
One feature of the Hazara community that augurs well for their future is their 
avowed emphasis on education. As an educated Hazara wrote me in 2001, 
"This is probably where Hazaras are currently distinguishing themselves. 
There are more schools probably in the mountains today than ever, and if 
what we hear is correct it may be the only place technically under Taliban 
control that still has girls going to school. Beginning under the communists, 
Hazaras in particular saw education as the way off the bottom rung of the 
social ladder, and their pursuit of it ... has become only stronger in recent 
years. Resources are meager, but funds are raised both locally and 
internationally.... These are mostly more independent type schools, though 
Iran is weighing in a lot, as well. Curriculum is not like the Sunni Madrassahs, 
but much wider-a point even the Iranian schools pride themselves on-
including English and computers." According to another educated Hazara, 
"Even before the Taliban appeared a university had begun [via some] 
relationship with the university of Balkh in Mazar-i Sharif. Those involved 
 
21 On education as empowerment for Hazara girls in Quetta see: Changezi, Sofie Haug, and Heidi Biseth. 
“Education of Hazara Girls in a Diaspora: education as empowerment and an agent of change.” Research 
in Comparative and International Education, vol. 6, no. 1, 2011, pp. 79-89. 
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were Hazaras from Kabul who had fled to Mazar.... [Also] in the mountains 
schools have actually multiplied and may have been the only place where 
girls were attending classes. All are locally supported."22 
 
In studying these two master narratives in a Western context, it allows for a wider 
representation and understanding of how the Hazara community interacts with these 
narratives on a transnational level, building on the seminal scholarship of Dr 
Alessandro Monsutti and Dr Khadija Abbasi on Hazara transnational networks. leads 
the research to enunciate newer understandings of Hazara history which stress how 
the diaspora is inextricably linked to the communities in Afghanistan and the 
neighbouring region, as the narrative of marginality stems from historical and 
contemporary subjugation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and the neighbouring region, 
while the narrative of overcoming highlights how Hazaras globally are engaging with 
the process of democracy, either through voting, or lobbying their local 
parliamentarians regarding the human rights concerns of Hazaras in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, which in turn causes a shift in the demographic composition of Afghanistan’s 
intelligentsia. Lastly, by tracing the ways that these narratives develop and transmit 
across social space, from the individual’s personal lived experiences and through 
collective awareness and vice versa, this research draws out the ways in which 
narrative, identity, organisations, and socio-political action are all interrelated and 
embody each other. Therefore, what is ultimately shown is the production of 
individual and collective truth, in life and in history, which the narratives explore and 
express.   
  
1.6 Subsequent chapters:  
Having discussed the master narratives within this research in this chapter it is 
important to briefly explain the chapters leading on from this introduction, in order to 
further understand how these master narratives link to the research which has been 
undertaken for this study. It is firstly relevant to engage with literature on identity and 
the Hazara community, to allow for a greater understanding as to what extent these 
master narratives or other narratives have been investigated and researched within 
 
22 This quote was taken from a footnote in Canfield’s 2004 journal paper titled, “New Trends among the 
Hazaras: From "The Amity of Wolves" to "The Practice of Brotherhood".” Iranian Studies, vol. 37, no.2, 
2004, pp. 241-262.  
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the context of this particular Afghan minority community living in the West. It will then 
be essential to contextualise and understand how and why Hazara migration to 
Europe, and specifically to Britain, has occurred. The starting point here will be a 
concise history of mid-20th Century Afghanistan, focusing on key political moments 
which became the impetus for mass migration of Afghans, of all backgrounds, to the 
neighbouring region, and further afield to Europe, while also delving into the historical 
situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. This section then transitions into 
discussing Afghan migration to Europe and Hazara migration to Britain. In doing the 
chapter develops a timeline of Hazara migration to Britain, because at present, such a 
timeline has not been formulated within other research. This is also due to the fact 
that most literature on Afghan migration to Europe does not distinguish between the 
various ethnic groups and differentiate their migration histories, to show the diverging 
migration trajectories of different Afghan communities. This is especially important to 
note given that Hazara migration to Europe, en masse, started to occur a decade and a 
half after that of other Afghans, namely Pashtuns and Tajiks. Hence, there is a need to 
engage with Hazara migration specifically, in order to demonstrate how it differs from 
other Afghan migration to the continent. 
 
The next chapter will focus on an oral history of Hazara consciousness. The chapter 
takes as its focus both the narratives of marginality and overcoming to show how they 
interlink and change over time. Within this chapter there is a section on history and 
memory, given that they are at the core of the narratives of marginality and 
overcoming, and in turn this section looks at how both these themes interlink. A 
section on Hazara historiography then follows which shows how the political 
awakening of the Hazara community in the late 1980s and 1990s had a profound effect 
on the community and their sense of self. Alongside this, the chapter also discusses 
how the narratives of marginality and overcoming are connected, change with time, 
and are personalised by members of the Hazara community. The chapter ends with an 
analysis of the themes of experience, memory and narrative, as well as looking into the 
eminent Hazara political leader Abdul Ali Mazari and research participants’ 
perspectives of him in relation to the discourses the community projects about Mazari 
as a notable figure within the community.  
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The following chapter then looks topic of religion, as a source of the master narratives 
within this research, and as a collective activity that catalyses identity in numerous 
ways, which also reinforces the master narratives. The chapter first discusses the Shia 
orientation of the Hazara community and its historical implications for the community. 
The chapter then moves on to highlighting the responses given during research 
interviews in terms of personal perceptions of religion and religious identities among 
the community. Following on from this is a section on the genealogy of Hazara political 
theology from before and during the Soviet war, which details the various ideologies of 
Hazara groups during the war from Khomeinist, traditionalist and Maoist, to show how 
both religious and secular ideologies shaped these movements. The chapter then ends 
with a section on genealogies of secularism in contemporary Hazara life, which has 
examples of online and public community engagement and awareness, that has been 
undertaken in order to promote a secular and liberal identity within the community.  
 
The next chapter explores Hazara social media, and the use of online sites more 
generally, among transnational Hazaras as it is a space which is being utilised to 
document and preserve Hazara history, human rights issues and political mobilisation 
among the community. This chapter first details why social media is a research tool 
worth exploring within academic research, and then discusses the propagation of 
Hazara history online, which is centring this history around the insurrection of 
Hazarajat, massacres against the community in the 20th Century and successive 
migrations to the region and beyond. Here a couple of popular English-language 
Hazara websites and their content is explored, namely ‘Hazara.net’ and ‘Hazara 
International’. The chapter then highlights how social media is also being used by the 
Hazara community for collective action by the diaspora in relation to human rights 
violations. The chapter ends with an analysis of Hazara social media use and the 
importance of engaging with this online content, as it allows for a greater 
understanding of a marginal history from the perspective of the community, is also a 
space for the transnational community to connect, as well as providing a space to co-
ordinate effective community responses to acts of violence against the community in 




The final chapter before the conclusion chapter examines political mobilisation, 
collective action and community events among transnational Hazara communities, 
with a look at the local, national and transnational level, focusing on the city of Quetta, 
Afghanistan and the Hazara diaspora. This chapter highlights how the precarity of the 
Hazara community in both Pakistan and Afghanistan has led the community to engage 
in collective action in the form of protests to demand greater protection for the 
community and a respect of their right to life and the need for heightened security to 
be provided by the state to prevent the community from continually being attacked. 
However, the chapter also shows how these demands are constantly ignored and in 
turn more extreme forms of protest are undertaken by the community in order to 
provoke a government response. This chapter also discusses the resilience of the 
community in spite of targeted acts of violence, and how through community events 
the Hazara community is working to promote and showcase their culture. The final 
section of this chapter details collective action in the diaspora and how the 
circumstances of the Hazara community in Afghanistan and Pakistan greatly impacts 
the transnational Hazara community. This thesis then ends with a conclusion chapter, 


















Chapter 2: Literature Review: 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
The literature explored within the chapter primarily focuses on identity, memory and 
history, as well as ethnic consciousness, given that they are the core concepts being 
evaluated within this study. Furthermore, Hazara ethnic consciousness has been the 
impetus for the visibility the Hazaras now have in public spaces in Afghanistan, and 
their online presence, through the propagation of information relating to community 
issues such as human rights, political mobilisation and Hazara history. Therefore, it is 
important to assess literature on community narratives and community consciousness 
as they are fundamental concepts relating to how the Hazara community is choosing 
to present itself to the world, be it in Afghanistan, Europe or Australia. The literature 
examined in this chapter will show how contemporary examples of ‘accomplishment’ 
among the community are drawn upon to legitimate and proliferate the specific 
narrative of overcoming. Additionally, the community can be seen to rely on past 
negative experiences and religiously significant events to emphasise ‘marginality’, with 
this narrative guiding Hazara historiography. Hence, these narratives have been 
significant for this research in that through assessing community organisations and 
Hazara social networks the extent to which these narratives have impacted 
conceptualisations of identity among the Hazara community could and have been 
assessed.    
 
This literature review is divided into several sections. Given how limited the academic 
literature is on the Hazara migrant and diaspora community in Europe, in this chapter 
literature on Afghan migration, diasporas and identity will be engaged with more 
broadly, in order to highlight overlaps and divergences between Hazaras and other 
Afghan communities. The first section in this literature review focuses on ‘ethnicity, 
identity and diaspora’, given that central to this research is the investigation of identity 
and how individuals construct their identities. The term diaspora is also important to 
discuss here, as it elaborates on anthropological understandings of the term and its 
applicability to Hazara youth in Britain, and in order to justify the use of the term in 
relation to the Hazara community within this research. This is followed by a section on 
the seminal work of political scientist and historian Benedict Anderson on ‘imagined 
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communities’, given that at the core of this research are master narratives which work 
to construct an imagined community. This is followed by a section on ‘Hazara social 
networks’, given that one of the aims of the research has been to engage with local 
Hazara networks, which has allowed for a deeper understanding of what identity 
means to the community as a whole, as well as on a personal level for community 
members. Literature on ‘collective memory’ is then analysed as the shared memories 
of a Hazara past have been fundamental to the narratives constructed and propagated 
by the community. Finally, ‘narrative and history’ are also examined, given that Hazara 
historiography is discussed in this thesis, and as social media and Hazara institutions 
are actively working to promote an indigenous history of the community. However, it 
should be noted that given there is limited literature on Hazara migration and identity 
in Europe, there is instead an emphasis on research on Hazara migrants in Australia 
throughout this literature review, as there has been significant research conducted on 
the Hazara community in the country.         
 
2.2 Ethnicity, identity and diasporas: 
Given that this research assesses identity constructs stemming from indigenous 
community narratives, it is important to firstly engage with key concepts which 
communities and individuals use to identify and distinguish themselves from other 
groups within various societies. In relation to this research a significant concept worthy 
of discussion is the term ‘ethnicity’, given that most literature on Hazaras refers to the 
community as a distinct ethnic group. An essential text which examines ethnicity and 
identity is ‘Ethnic groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture 
Difference’, first published in 1969. The book was edited by social anthropologist 
Fredrik Barth, and in its introductory chapter Barth states that ‘…categorical ethnic 
distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and information, but do 
entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation whereby discrete categories are 
maintained despite changing participation and membership in the course of individual 
life histories’ (9). This quote is central to Barth’s theorising of the term ethnicity as he 
departs from essentialist understandings of the term, of a pre-determined ‘essence’ 
being at the core of different ethnic groups but instead highlights that ethnicity does 
not in fact have a pre-determined essence which distinguishes it from other categories 
of identification, but rather that it is defined against other communities. Barth’s 
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intervention here is pertinent to note as introductory interactions with members of 
the Hazara community have shown that there is at times a reliance on such a 
conceptualisation of ethnicity when community members are defining and 
constructing Hazara identity with reference to an ‘Afghan identity’ or community. In 
turn the research interviews within this study will help to shed light on the extent to 
which Barth’s definition of ethnicity is reproduced, or if essentialist definitions of 
ethnicity appear to be more relevant.    
 
In a paper on ethnic boundaries Professor Andreas Wimmer notes that ‘Barth and his 
collaborators observed how the boundaries between two ethnic groups are 
maintained, even though their cultures might be indistinguishable and even though 
individuals and groups might switch from one side of the boundary to the other’, and 
how ‘…ethnicity is the product of a social process rather than a cultural given, made 
and remade rather than taken for granted, chosen depending on circumstances rather 
than ascribed through birth’ (2008: 971), which further highlights Barth’s novel 
approach to ethnicity as being a relational process, defined in relation to other 
communities. However, in discussing the term ethnicity it is important to note that not 
all social scientists are comfortable with its usage in contemporary discourses on 
communities and society more generally, as Professor Rogers Brubaker contends that 
there is a need to critically engage with the term ‘ethnicity’ and not to solely perceive 
it as distinct unit, stating that:      
 
Ethnicity, race, and nation should be conceptualized not as substances or 
things or entities or organisms or collective individuals-as the imagery of 
discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring “groups” encourages us 
to do-but rather in relational, processual, dynamic, eventful, and 
disaggregated terms….It means thinking of ethnicization, racialization and 
nationalization as political, social, cultural , and psychological processes. And 
it means taking as a basic analytical category not the “group” as an entity by 
groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable (2004: 11).    
 
Brubaker’s critical approach has become more salient in contemporary discourses on 
ethnicity and race, and is relevant to note given that a few Hazara research 
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participants have raised questions about the label of ‘ethnic’ is relation to the term 
Hazara, stating that for them the most sound reason as to how they came to be known 
by the term would have been due to the shared religious beliefs of the various 
communities living in central Afghanistan, in the past as Shia Muslims who thus came 
be to known as Hazaras. Hence a rigid understanding of such a community based on 
ancestry does not adequately represent what it means to be Hazara and who is Hazara 
for these specific research participants. Similarly, a research participant from Quetta 
noted that the identity of Hazaras based on a claim of a shared heritage could be seen 
as exclusionary, given that in his city other communities have settled, over 
generations, in Hazara neighbourhoods, taking on Hazara customs and speaking 
Hazaragi as their mother tongue, and very much identify as Hazara even if they do not 
have a historic link to central Afghanistan. Who then has the right to dictate who is, 
and who is not, Hazara, if someone feels a connection to such a term, identity and 
community, was the question posed by this particular research participant. In drawing 
upon the two aforementioned theorists, who have studied ethnicity, it can be seen 
that the term and its usage is within a spectrum, with one understanding being more 
rigid, while the other is more fluid and critical. However, given that this research does 
not aim to delve into the discussions about deconstructing the notion of ethnicity, it is 
important to briefly drawn upon these influential studies for context, which has been 
concisely done in both this and the previous paragraph, without dismissing the use of 
the term, as identity among the Hazara community in England is a key component 
within this research.   
 
Dr Yahia Baiza, a research associate at the Institute of Ismaili Studies in London, 
conducted research with Ismaili Hazara youth in the city of Essen in Germany in 2012. 
His research found that for the Ismaili Hazara youth interviewed identity was 
‘hybridized’ (89), due to having grown up in Germany but being brought up in an 
Afghan household, and hence Baiza notes that identity is ‘complex and subjective’ 
(ibid: 79) and is ‘driven by the individual’s experience’ (ibid: 84). In Baiza’s research the 
Hazara Ismaili community did not espouse much ethnic solidarity and instead saw their 
Ismaili religious identity as most important. This was due to the fact that they had not 
experienced the persecution that other Hazaras in Afghanistan had, but a sense of 
ethnic consciousness did exist among the youth interviewed by Baiza. One interviewee 
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even stated that as they had never personally suffered any injustice for being a Hazara, 
ethnicity was less significant for that individual, instead religion and nationality had 
more of an influence on their conceptualisations of identity. Baiza states that 
historically Ismailis have been marginalised in Afghanistan. Therefore, a motivating 
factor for the centrality of a religious identity among German Ismaili Hazara youth 
could be tied to the history of their co-religionists as stated by a couple of Hazara 
research participants through the course of his study, in the same way that an ethnic 
Hazara identity was significant for Hazaras in Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s, 
when their political mobilisation heightened. In turn it can be seen that this particular 
Hazara community have articulated a substantive identity deriving from the religious 
beliefs that their community holds. Hence, given that Baiza’s research was conducted 
among a diasporic community, his findings are significant for the purposes of this 
study, as Baiza’s work was one of the first accounts drawn upon within this research 
which differs from other studies, in that the findings show a Hazara community which 
primarily associates with their religious identity as opposed to an ethnic Hazara 
identity.  
 
In master’s dissertation on ‘The religious identity of the Hazaras of Afghanistan in 
modern-day Pakistan’ Jennifer Creasy notes that the Hazara community in Quetta, 
although being present in the city for decades are ‘not entirely settled in Quetta’ 
(2009: 52) and that ‘…there is a sense that they do not permanently belong there’ 
(ibid). Creasy’s research states that this perception even manifests among third 
generation Hazaras, and in turn Quetta is seen as a ‘temporary home’. This notion of 
not being entirely settled in a location is significant to note for the purpose of this 
research given that just over half of the interviewees for this study had protracted 
lived experiences in either Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan, so it will be worth noting 
Creasy’s findings to see if they manifest among Hazaras who now live in Britain but 
were born and brought up in other countries. What is unusual about this research in 
comparison to other research on Hazara identity, is the fact that through self-
identification some Hazaras in Quetta refer to themselves as ‘Persian’ as opposed to 
‘Pakistani’ given their linguistic and religious connection with Iran.  
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Within literature on Hazaras it is not common to see that the community perceive 
themselves as Persian, which further highlights the subjective nature of identity, given 
that may scholars on Hazaras do not refer to the community as ‘Persian’. However, this 
identification as Persian is reinforced by the fact that some non-Hazaras in Quetta 
refer to Hazaras as Persians. Creasy notes that such an identification ‘…displays a lack 
of identification with Pakistan’ (ibid), as she had never come across a Hazara who 
referred to themselves as Pakistani. Additionally, ‘…the Hazara community appears 
form the outside well settled and permanent, their occupancy of Quetta is more 
temporary in their own self- understanding’ (ibid: 52-53). In turn, it can be seen here 
that identity is framed as relational, as Hazaras in Creasy’s research do not strong 
identify with the national identity of Pakistani, and are perceived as Persian-speaking 
Hazaras. While Dr Elaheh Rostami-Povey in her book on identity among Afghan women 
in Iran and Pakistan states that the idea that there are tensions between identities for 
diasporas communities has shifted, and now what is prevalent is transnationality 
among Afghan communities in the West (2013: 89). This therefore entails living dual 
political, economic and social lives, and moving between cultures in the different 
countries with which members of a diaspora have a link. This hybridity of identities is 
important to highlight, in order to assess to what extent this notion of transnationality 
is prevalent among British Hazara.      
 
Amy Elizabeth Neve in her master’s thesis on identity among newly arrived Hazara 
men in Australia found that they participate in Australian society, as well as within 
their home communities and the ‘international community of Hazara diaspora’. With 
Hazara men it was found that an ethnic Hazara identity is central to the community. 
Furthermore, Hazara identity is more important to the community ‘…than country of 
birth or where they grew up as these young men are from Iran, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan...and identify with a shared history of persecution’ (2014: 60-62). Neve’s 
work shows how a transnational Hazara identity has developed among a Hazara 
migrant community. These findings are pertinent to note in relation to this study given 
that her work covers a central theme that this study also seeks to understand, which is 
conceptualisations of identity among British Hazaras, through engaging with narratives 
of history (with both master narratives within this research also being narratives of 
history). Therefore, in this specific research it can be seen that a substantive identity, 
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based on an essentialist understanding of ethnicity has been espoused by new Hazara 
migrants in Australia. In turn by highlighting that younger Hazara men had a strong 
affinity to their ethnic identity as Hazaras, it will be a useful comparison to see 
whether Hazara men in England interviewed for this research share the same views 
with regards to identity as Neve’s interviewees in Australia, and to what extent a 
transnational Hazara identity manifests among this specific demographic, and also 
among female Hazara research participants, a demographic which was not studied 
within Neve’s research. Furthermore, Neve’s research also highlights how histories of 
the community are passed on and preserved over generations, given that Neve’s 
participants were younger Hazaras.   
 
In research on the Hazara community in Oxford Fatima Hashmi noted an observation 
that did not appear in other literature on migrant and diasporic Hazaras. The 
observation being that Afghan and Pakistani female Hazaras in Oxford did not interact 
with one another. Hazara women who had fled from Afghanistan to Pakistan during 
the Taliban regime associated and socialised with both groups of women at 
community gatherings but Afghan and Quetta Hazara women would only interact with 
Hazaras from their native countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is an educative 
discovery as it highlights a divide not noted in other research on Hazaras outside 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hashmi’s research states that there was a difference 
between Afghan and Pakistani Hazaras with regards to ‘dialect, dressing and culture’. 
Furthermore, Hazaras of Pakistani background are more ‘…accustomed to Pakistani 
culture and it seems that the national origin has more influence than ethnic affiliation’ 
(2016: 34). Thus, in turn, Hashmi’s findings state that national identity has more 
influence on Pakistani Hazaras than qawmiyat23, and is an outcome that one would not 
necessarily assume given the sectarian violence in Pakistan since the mid-2000s, 
leading to countless attacks on the Hazara community in Quetta.   
 
Within Hashmi’s research a possible reason as to why national identity may be of such 
importance could be due to the fact that for those among the Hazara community for 
whom national identity supersedes ethnic identity, the suffering inflicted on the 
Hazara people in their regional homelands may not have had a direct impact on 
 
23 Hazara ‘community-hood’.  
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Hazaras who moved away from home or were brought up abroad. Thus, ethnic 
consciousness may exist as Hazaras with a strong national identity still attend Hazara 
cultural gatherings, but ethnic solidarity is may be less prevalent among them as they 
themselves have not suffered persecution. This notion of ethnic consciousness existing 
without necessarily being tied to a sense of ethnic solidarity was mentioned by Baiza in 
his research on Ismaili Hazara youth in Essen, Germany from 2012. It should be noted 
that Hashmi specifically uses the word ‘influence’ meaning that national identity may 
have a greater impact on the cultural aspects of identity among Pakistani Hazaras, but 
this does not necessarily mean it supersedes the importance of a Hazara ethnic 
identity for the community.  
 
While in an undergraduate dissertation focusing on the integration of Muslims in 
Britain, for which the interviewees were of Afghan Hazara background, researcher 
Maneeha Ali found that the views discussed in relation to assimilation, belonging and 
home were multi-faceted among her research participants. Within Ali’s study one male 
respondent, Amir, noted how he had encountered multiple incidents of racism through 
his job as a taxi driver in Britain for almost two decades, with a number of physical 
attacks taking place, due to his Asian background. He also stated how the abuse he has 
suffered in Britain has not only been initiated by white British males but also by British 
Muslims. One incident mentioned in this interview was how the respondent was 
referred to as a heretic when a Muslim colleague became aware of the respondent’s 
Shia background, and this specific incident resulted ‘…in a physical altercation, near the 
cab office’, with Ali stating that Amir noted that ‘…he should have been more careful 
about how and to whom he vocalised his beliefs. However, he notes that in Britain he 
has almost no fear as there is religious freedom, in comparison to the danger he can 
face for his beliefs in Afghanistan or even Pakistan, where [S]hi’as face persecution’ 
(2018: 28 - 29). Although some of the literature discussed so far highlights the 
discrimination some Muslims face as a minority in Britain, Ali’s study brings to the fore 
another form of prejudice that may get lost in discussions on bigotry, that of inter-
Muslim relations. Although Amir had gone through a multitude of negative experiences 
while living in Britain, both from the native community and Sunni Muslims, he ended 
his interview with Ali by stating the following about Islam, citizenship and integration: 
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…being a good [M]uslim is synonymous to a good and ‘integrated’ citizen. 
[Amir] acknowledges the negative stereotypes perpetuated by the media OF 
Islam and asserts that Islam practices peace and coexistence. Amir also 
believes that racist mentalities of some of the white groups in society hinder 
some [M]uslims, from feeling accepted (ibid).  
 
While Dr Virinder S Kalra a senior lecturer in sociology at the University of Warwick 
notes that ‘…notions of ethnicity, immigration, settlement and race are all found to 
intersect and dissect conceptualizations of the diaspora’ (2005: 9). The fact that these 
notions intersect is significant for this research. Not only do these notions intersect, 
the multiple aspects that are commonly found to constitute identity, for example 
nationality, religion, ethnicity (among others) have a ‘complicated relationship’ with 
Hazaras. Although, the majority of Hazaras are Afghan nationals, by some sections of 
Afghan society they are perceived as ‘others’ due to the common Mongol heritage 
claim, which is at times both internally articulated or externally imposed, and also in 
relation to the historically low socio-economic status of Hazaras in Afghanistan. 
Additionally, this view is related to the Hazaras’ religious beliefs as Shia Muslims, which 
further complicates their relationship with their fellow Afghan co-nationals and their 
national identity, which due to fringe elements, deny that Shias ‘belong’ to the nation. 
Ethnicity is also linked to this, due to the fact that relations between Hazaras and 
Afghanistan’s dominant ethnic group, the Pashtuns, have been fraught for well-over 
over a century. Accordingly, the notions that Kalra states do indeed intersect in 
relation to the Hazara community, given their troubled relationship with the 
‘homeland’ and other ethnic groups. Subsequently we see a ‘double-intersection’ for 
Hazaras, with not only the notion of identity but also with the terms that constitute a 
given identity.    
 
Having discussed the notions of ethnicity and identity in this section, it is also relevant 
to briefly discuss the term ‘diaspora’ given that members of the Hazara diaspora also 
constitute a significant proportion of research participants within this study. Professor 
Robin Cohen, an eminent scholar within this field of diaspora studies has written 
extensively on the term and its core constituents. Cohen notes that the ‘…the classical 
term, usually capitalized as Diaspora and used only in the singular, was mainly 
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confined to the study of the Jewish experience…these peoples conceived their 
scattering as arising from a cataclysmic event that had traumatized the group as a 
whole, thereby creating the central historical experience of victimhood as the hands of 
a cruel oppressor’ (2008: 1). This classical notion of diaspora heavily emphasises an 
expulsion from the homeland as being central as to who the term can accurately apply 
to and represent. While Dr Virinder S Kalra notes how the ‘classical form of diaspora’ 
as mentioned by Cohen relates to forced exile and loss, and the underlining 
assumption is that there is a desire to for all who constitute a diaspora to return to a 
homeland whether real or imagined, and this is explicitly highlighted when Kalra states 
that ‘…forced exile becomes essential to the heightened a sense of longing for home 
and is central to this understanding of diaspora’ (2005: 10).  
 
A problem that emerges with this classical notion of diaspora is that it assumes that all 
the members of a diaspora community intend or want to eventually go back to the 
place from which they were displaced, and that only those who are victims of forced 
migration can refer to themselves as belonging to a diaspora. This very narrow view 
obviously excludes many groups who may refer to themselves as also constituting a 
given diaspora. What then becomes of those who self-identify as South Asian 
diasporas or Caribbean diasporas in Britain for example? In ascribing certain 
characteristics to a term understood differently by academics and the public it may be 
found that definitions of terms understood by researchers do not match how research 
participants conceptualisation these terms. In turn such rigidity does not necessarily 
assist with conducting research but may impede its depth and impact, and the ability 
to fully engage with respondents, especially in the case of a community like the 
Hazaras who have primarily come to Europe as refugees, hence their desire to go back 
and settle in Afghanistan may be limited.    
 
Arjun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge state that ‘Diasporas always leave a trail of 
collective memory about another place and time and create new maps of desire and of 
attachment’ (1989: i). This is a very important point to consider in light of what Dr 
Parvathi Raman has said about diasporic understandings of ‘home’. Primarily, that an 
ancestral land can be romanticised and imagined in a way which does not reflect its 
true nature. A well noted example of this was when a South African Indian anti-
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colonial activist, Yusuf Dadoo, who was subsequently involved in the anti-apartheid 
struggle, visited India for the first time. Raman writes that ‘…like many other Indian 
South Africans who had romantic images of an India that they had created from a 
distance, Dadoo became somewhat disillusioned after his arrival in the country. 
Reaching his village in the rainy season, he was to observe glumly, `[t]his place is full of 
mud and water. And it looks so grim and dismal. I don't think India is the paradise I 
thought it to be’24 (2003). However, given the contemporary dynamics of society and 
the political order in Afghanistan, marginal communities like the Hazaras may not 
prone to such assumptions. While, Dr Fiona Adamson conceptualises an innovative 
approach to the discussions on diasporas, and proposes that these communities can 
themselves also be transnational identity networks, defined by a ‘shared collective 
identity’, through the lens of transnational social movements, in that: 
 
…[D]iasporas are a particular form of transnationalism that emerge through 
the process of strategic social construction and framing with the aim of 
constructing a shared collective identity or “imagined community”. This 
connects with migration in that globalization, exile, migration, and boundary-
crossing from one political system to another all serve as impetuses for the 
creation of new identity categories and discourses, since these activities 
expose an individual to novel social and political conditions… (2012: 32- 33).   
 
This is very much apparent on Hazara social media, where borders are transcended in 
order to build a global Hazara community working to promote the community and its 
achievements. In doing so the community works to educate people, both within and 
outside of the community, of the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and in the 
neighbouring region, both past and present. This is primarily done through the online 
activism undertaken by members of the Hazara community in Europe and Australia.  
 
Therefore, it can be seen from the literature highlighted in this section that emerging 
scholarship on Hazara communities both in the East and West shows how identity is 
framed as both relational, so in opposition to other communities, for instance as 
Hazaras and not Pakistani, as found in Creasy’s study, but also as substantive, with 
 
24 See: www.himalmag.com/a-resting-place-for-the-imagination/.  
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reference to religious beliefs, Hazara history and nationality, such as in the work of 
Baiza, Neve and Ali. While, at the same time much of the literature also emphasises 
the formulation of a transitional Hazara identity, which depending on the Hazara 
communities being interviewed also oscillates between being a relational and 
substantive identity. Hence, the aforementioned literature will help situate the 
responses given within this study, in order to fully understand and contextualise how 
Britain Hazaras construct and articulate their identity.     
 
2.3 On ‘imagined communities’:   
As the foundation of this research is the engagement with a specific community, in this 
instance, the Hazara community, it is necessary to discuss and dissect one of the most 
seminal studies on the theme of communities written in the latter half of the 20th 
Century, which is Benedict Anderson’s book titled, ‘Imagined Communities: Reflections 
on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism’. Central to Anderson’s argument in the book 
is that print media or as he refers to it, ‘print capitalism’ has been the catalyst for the 
nationalisms taking shape since the 19th Century. It is claimed that the nation as a vast 
and populated region, partly manifests, through it being imagined and socially 
constructed, as it cannot be that every individual in any given landmass will be 
acquainted with all of his or her co-nationals. Therefore, the suggestion of an imagined 
community formulated through print media allows such co-nationals to bond, through 
engaging with the ritual of reading the daily newspaper, for example (1983: 35), as  
Anderson notes that ‘Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search (for a fraternity), 
nor made it more fruitful, than print-capitalism, which made it possible for rapidly 
growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to 
others, in profoundly new ways’ (ibid: 36). Furthermore, he goes on to state that:  
 
Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might 
find it difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, 
became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. In the 
process,  they gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even 
millions, of people in their particular language-field, and at the same time 
that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions so, so belonged…[in turn 
forming]…the embryo of the nationally imagined community’ (ibid: 44). 
 52 
This is a very narrow approach in seeking to understand national consciousness as it 
does not account for the myriad of ways, outside of print, in which views come to 
manifest or are propagated in societies. For instance, the ‘Epic of Manas’, an epic 
poem, originally transmitted orally, which is said to be from the 18th Century is as seen 
as the foundation of Kyrgyz national identity and the Kyrgyz nation, but its appeal and 
reach did not spread through society’s reliance on print capitalism as Anderson 
asserts. Therefore, although Anderson’s text provides interesting insights into how 
populations come together and circulate a given nationalism, it is not a holistic account 
or approach to nationalism and national identities. For example, the book on the 
whole does not account for the global south, bar reference to a few historical events in 
South East Asia during colonial times, nor does his reference to the Philippines (ibid: 26 
- 29) do much to prove Anderson’s assertions. This is because he is very much referring 
to Manila’s elite class, who were both literate and had access to print media, but by no 
means accurately represent the majority of Filipino society at the time. Hence, the 
assertions made in the book appear as generally quite Eurocentric, while only 
accounting for the literate classes of European societies which the text describes. In 
turn, a great emphasis is placed on print media’s influence on nationalism without 
thoroughly engaging with other modes of communication which also effect 
communities’ nationalistic tendencies.     
 
Another significant issue with Anderson’s text is the lack of an insight into minority 
communities, and in particular marginalised communities. This is pertinent to note in 
relation to this thesis given that the community being studied were formally, and 
generally, currently perceive themselves as a marginalised community in Afghanistan 
and the neighbouring region. Furthermore, given the information accessible online, on 
Hazara websites and social media pages, it can be seen that growing access to print 
media and even online informational sources in recent has not lead to a formation of a 
national consciousness as Afghans, but has in fact worked to partly highlight the 
fragmentation stemming from a national identity among some of Afghanistan’s 
minority communities, which goes against Anderson’s claim that ‘Print-language is 
what invents nationalism, not a particular language per se (ibid: 134)’. He further 
writes about ‘the imaginative power of nationalism’ (ibid: 158) when describing how 
the Vietnamese came to defend their nation when an external name was imposed on 
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them. However, this again does not accurately represent all those who belong within 
the territorial borders of a given nation, as in the specific case of the Hazaras it can be 
seen that the name of the nation is in itself contentious and a reason as to why certain 
members of the community actively choose to disassociate with labelling themselves 
in relation to the name of a nation which they feel excludes their community. Hence, 
Anderson’s assertion here naturally lends itself to majority populations within nations, 
which again does not account for marginalised communities, that are seeking 
integration into a wider national polity as opposed to creating their own.  
 
In the case of the Hazaras, Abdul Ali Mazari was central to the proliferation of Hazara 
ethnic consciousness, which was not being done through the national print media, as 
his community’s political aspirations would not have been accurately represented in 
these sources of information and communication, as they would have been perceived 
by the ruling class as undermining national unity. Rather it was his lived experiences 
and the circumstances of his community which internally propelled this view of 
promoting an ethnic consciousness. This internal shift in consciousness within Mazari 
was broadcast to his followers, primarily through his speeches and rallies, which in 
present times have become the foundation of an emerging Hazara nationalism. Such 
modes of propagating ethnic consciousness and localised nationalisms are not 
adequately captured by Anderson, as Mazari’s words and subsequent Hazara 
community action played a major role in formulating a new imagined Hazara 
community. While in the context of contemporary Hazaras, the dominant national 
media infrastructure in Afghanistan excludes Hazaras, so the Hazara community does 
not rely as heavily on print capitalism, hence the importance of, and reliance on the 
internet, social media and even mobile phones, in order to circulate Hazara discourses 
about the nation, society at large, and their specific community. In turn these newer 
modes of communication become an outlet for the dissemination of narratives which 
seek to unite a marginalised community.    
 
In Afghanistan specifically, telecommunication statistics show that in 2013 just under 
90% of the country mobile telephone coverage25, while alternative statistics from a 
 
25 These statistics can be accessed from the following link: 
www.web.archive.org/web/20140407123229/http://atra.gov.af/en/page/telecom-statistics-2013.   
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New York Magazine article from 2018 highlight that ‘…only about a tenth of its 
population, or 3.5 million people, was online in 2016, and yet, that low rate of 
penetration belies a society that is increasingly digitally connected’ and that ‘This is 
thanks to the widespread availability of the mobile phone (as of early 2018, 
countrywide mobile-phone penetration was an estimated 80 percent)… ’26, while a 
paper by the United States Agency for International Development from 2017 states 
that ‘95% of social media users have a Facebook account’ and are a ‘…homogenous 
group of mostly young and educated individuals’27. Thus, within this research Hazara 
social media pages and informational community webpages are engaged with in order 
to partially gauge an understanding of internal community dynamics and sentiments 
on community issues.  
 
This section on Anderson’s eminent scholarship has shown the scope of his hypothesis 
on print capitalism (print media) in relation to a marginal community. Although print 
media does indeed play a pivotal role in the spread of information and ideas, its target 
audience by-and-large will be the dominant groups within societies, which in many 
instances are large ethnic communities. Consequently, the content found in these 
sources may not seek to include or may be ambivalent towards promoting the ideas or 
cause of minor ethnic groups or marginal communities. In turn, this has meant that 
Hazaras have utilised other means of information sharing and communication to 
promote an ethnic Hazara identity, transnationally, and these novel modes of 
communication are investigated within this research to thoroughly account for Hazara 
narratives and sentiments on community issues. Accordingly, if print media is only 
partially useful in the context of a marginal community, then it becomes clear as to 
why it is necessary to pay attention to other forms and means of information sharing. 
Therefore, it helpful to consider how social network theories can contribute to 





26 This information is from the following article: www.nymag.com/developing/2018/10/afghanistan-
sneakernet-internet-physical-file-sharing.html.  




2.4 Hazara social networks: 
Having delved into Anderson’s seminal study on print capitalism, it is crucial to discuss 
social networks more generally, of which print capitalism is a segment, as in certain 
instances, social networks can help to define and shape people’s ethnic consciousness 
and identity.  
 
Taking from the work of Dr Kristian Berg Harpviken on social networks in Afghanistan, 
the most important aspects of social networks with regards to this research are the 
following, namely that, ‘Actors and their actions are viewed as interdependent rather 
than independent, autonomous units…’ and ‘Network models conceptualize structure 
(social, economic, political, etc.) as lasting patterns of relations among actors’ (2009: 
14-15). Formal and informal Hazara social networks are vital for this research as they 
have acted as the starting point from which it became possible to decide which specific 
research sites were to be incorporated within this research. As a result, it was 
envisaged that it would be more conducive to establishing a greater number of 
contacts within the Hazara community at various research sites, and in turn be 
introduced to potential interviewees for the research. Harpviken also notes that with 
regards to social networks, the natural association people tend to have is with ‘…the 
ties that exist between people who are close to each other’, which is the most 
prevalent conceptualisation referred to in social science literature. He elaborates on a 
specific feature of social networks, in that they are forms of ‘bounded solidarity’ which 
he refers to as ‘…the existence and potential enhancement of cultural markers (dress 
style, language, customs etc.)’ (ibid: 30), which are also a feature of Hazara social 
networks.        
 
A recent and valuable study on Hazara social networks was conducted by Mackenzie 
and Guntarik, who studied Hazaras in the Dandenong suburb of Melbourne in 2015. 
Among the community it was noted that Hazara social networks allowed for 
community members to interact and engage with others in the community, and for the 
‘…capacity to develop a strong sense of community belonging’ (2015: 70). These social 
networks were considered to be important as they provided ‘social structures’ 
enabling recent migrants to ‘…actively participate in community and social life’ (ibid). 
The suburb was chosen by newly arrived Hazaras to settle as their established social 
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networks informed them that the area was an ‘ideal place’ for them to settle, and once 
settled they themselves worked to assist new Hazara community members (ibid). 
These findings have been the impetus for incorporating asking Hazara research 
participants whether community institutions exist in their areas and what role they 
play for the community and what services they offer the local Hazara community. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this research it has been important to assess the Hazara 
social networks that exist in the cities chosen as sites for this research, in order to see 
if they can further assist this research with an analysis of local Hazara demographics 
and community dynamics, in the various research sites.    
 
Diana Glazebrook in her study on the use of mobile phones among Hazaras in the 
same Melbourne suburb of Dandenong, notes that, ‘The bases of a Hazara social 
network might be traced to shared village of origin, shared school or university in 
Afghanistan, shared boat journey, shared detention center, or shared region of 
resettlement or workplace in Australia’ (2004: 46). She also notes that some Hazaras 
came to Australia as a Pashtun community association offered to provide Hazara 
asylum seekers ‘limited support’. Here we see an example of support and solidarity 
among the broader Afghan migrant community. This is very significant to note, 
because based on informal conversations that have taken place with Hazaras and non-
Hazara Afghans in London prior to this research, it appears that the Afghan community 
in the UK is very fragmented and segregated on ethnic lines. Thus, learning that there 
are positive interactions between Hazaras and non-Hazaras outside of Afghanistan is 
very illuminating.  
 
Similarly, Fatima Hashmi notes that areas with larger Hazara communities have seen 
the formation of structured community organisations which act as both religious and 
cultural spaces. These spaces naturally allow for increased interaction between 
Hazaras, which previously may have been limited if there were no Hazara social 
spaces, or access to information for new Hazara arrivals. In turn ethnic solidarity 
among the Hazara community in Oxford is demonstrated by the fact that settled 
community members help to provide practical support to newly arrived asylum 
seekers through providing information on visas, ‘…[helping to fill] application forms 
and correspondence with the Home Office’ for instance (2016: 48). With Hashmi’s 
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findings in mind, throughout the course of this study active Hazara community 
members were asked about the community spaces available for Hazaras, in the cities 
where this research was being conducted, and their functions.     
 
While in his work on social networks among Hazaras in Afghanistan and Quetta, 
Alessandro Monsutti notes that as the number of Hazaras grew in any given location it 
became hard for them to solely stay among groups from their locality and as a result 
they developed a ‘…complementary set of mutual support structures, especially qawm 
and neighbourhood associations’. Monsutti details how through social networks the 
heads of Hazara qawms collect money from the families they govern and that the 
money goes towards schools and roads, among other things. Monsutti also notes how 
religious meeting places also act as a ‘community structure’, and that these spaces are 
known as imâmbâras28 whose committees organise Muharram processions (2005: 
113-114).  
 
Therefore, it can be seen that research on Hazara social networks highlights how 
ethnic solidarity is a motivating factor for settled Hazaras when it comes to providing 
assistance to recent Hazara arrivals, given their shared migration struggles and 
collective history. Such help then enhances one’s attachment to a given community, 
and as a result newly arrived Hazaras become active participants within a given 
community. Once settled these migrants then also help newer Hazara arrivals within 
the community. Furthermore, in areas with larger Hazara populations, formal 
community organisations form as means for interaction between the community. In 
turn it can be seen that Hazara social networks are central in aiding the social 
integration of newly arrived Hazaras, as well as providing them with practical 
information about their new home. Given that these social networks help with 
community cohesion and the establishment of formal community institutions, it has 
been important to engage with Hazara social networks for the purpose of this 
research. This it because they are sites that will help to inform how lived experiences 
of migration impact narrative, historiography and identity among the Hazara 
 
28 For the rest of this research imâmbâras will be referred to as Hussainiyas, using the Arabic term for 
these specific religious spaces, as there are several different words used to denote Hussainiyas in 
Central and South Asia.   
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community. In the context of the Hazara community, these networks are also central 
to the preservation and revitalisation of Hazara consciousness.         
 
The literature examined in this section highlights the central role that Hazara social 
networks play in assisting community members in practical ways in host societies, 
showing solidarity and support to vulnerable co-ethnics and preserving, maintaining 
and promoting community harmony. The spaces where these networks manifest can 
be community institutions, both religious and cultural, online Hazara social media 
pages and forums, and informal community gatherings. In turn all these spaces 
alongside the aforementioned practical community needs also become spaces where 
substantive identities are promoted and performed. For instance, the global, annual 
Baba Mazari events become spaces where Hazara ethnic consciousness is 
promulgated, Hazara social media becomes a space which promotes Hazara culture, 
and informal gatherings such as family Nawroz events can become forums where 
traditional Hazara clothes, instruments and music are visible. Thus, these sites go 
further in broadcasting a given narrative than sole reliance on print media would be 
able to achieve. Furthermore, as this section has featured some of the means through 
which narratives are communicated, it is then also important to consider the processes 
which influence narratives, by looking at how past experiences are perceived and are 
categorised into distinct sets of memories which inform the contents of specific 
narratives. Hence, in the next section literature pertaining to collective memory is 
discussed.  
 
2.5 Collective memory:   
Having discussed print media and Hazara social networks it is important to also discuss 
collective memory, as collective memory is also a site which accounts for community 
narratives, which both Anderson and Barth neglect in their own work.  
 
The term collective memory is most often attributed to French philosopher and 
sociologist Maurice Halbwachs who pioneered the term and its study in the latter half 
of the 20th Century. Therefore in discussing the term collective memory it is necessary 
to first examine Halbwachs’ work and findings. In discussing the subject of memory, 
Halbwachs in his book ‘On collective memory’ states that, ‘…the mind reconstructs its 
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memories under the pressure of society’ (1992: 52), and this is extremely relevant in 
relation to Afghanistan. This reconstruction can be seen to be happening on a national 
level, in Afghanistan, in how figures such as Abdul Ali Mazari and Ahmad Shah 
Massoud who both fought during the civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s are seen by 
their respective communities, the Hazaras and Tajiks, as national heroes who worked 
to protect their community’s interests. This is in spite of the fact that both men and 
their factions picked up arms during the war, and have been accused of human rights 
violations during the war. Even with such claims present, the favourable images 
constructed of these two figures are still maintained and memorialised by these 
communities, with Massoud officially having an annual national holiday in Afghanistan 
in his memory since 2012, on the 9th of September, known as ‘Martyr’s Day’ or 
‘Massoud Day’. While in relation to Halbwachs’ previous quote and the collective 
memories that communities choose to propagate or reconstruct, be they in 
Afghanistan or elsewhere, they are further scrutinised by Halbwachs who notes that, 
‘Society from time to time obligates people not just to reproduce in thought previous 
events of their lives, but also to touch them up, to shorten them, or to complete them 
so that, however convinced we are that our memories are exact, we give them 
prestige that reality did not possess’ (ibid).   
 
For Halbwachs what brings communal recollections together as a collective memories 
is the fact that they are ‘…part of a totality of thoughts common to a group, the group 
of people with whom we have a relation…To recall them it is hence sufficient that we 
place ourselves in the perspective of this group, that we adopt its interests…’ (ibid: 52). 
Here the point of ‘placing ourselves’ is important to note as that can be seen to be 
happening with various Afghan communities in how they associate themselves with 
competing narratives of the past about the nation, and who is viewed as a hero of the 
people or enemy of the nation, as touched upon in the previous paragraph on Mazari 
and Massoud. In a diasporic context, in relation to the research interviews conducted 
for this study, it can be seen that some younger Hazaras make reference to memories 
of relatives or stories told by other community members in order to align themselves 
with the history of Hazaras in Afghanistan and the neighbouring region, and the 
narratives of marginalisation and persecution that are regularly alluded to by senior 
members of the community, which are also present on Hazara social media. Therefore, 
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what can be seen to be taking place, to a certain extent, is a recollection of the past 
that fits with an overarching narrative of the community, which works to reinforce the 
belief that Hazaras in Afghanistan still suffer disproportionate levels of discrimination.           
 
Having touched upon the work of Halbwachs another French philosopher whose work 
is also pertinent to note is Paul Ricoeur. In Ricoeur’s book titled ‘Memory, History, 
Forgetting’ it is stated that:         
 
…in relation to individual consciousness and its memory, that collective 
memory is held to be a collection of traces left by the events that have 
affected the course of history of the groups concerned, and that it is 
accorded the power to place on stage these common memories, on the 
occasion of holidays, rites, and public celebrations (2004: 119).      
 
Here Ricoeur states the potency of collective memory with regards to shared histories, 
and the influence they have on communities and the specific events they engage in as 
a means to remember the past. This is also relevant in the case of the Hazaras where 
the 19th of May is has now become a day for annual celebrations of Hazara culture, 
which is generally referred to online as ‘Hazara Culture Day’. On this day images are 
shared on social media of traditional Hazara dress, videos of Hazaragi music are also 
proliferated online and informational resources about the community and their history 
are also shared. In 2019 specifically, multiple Hazara cultural events were organised in 
Australia by various local Hazara communities in the country. While in a similar vein, 
with regards to informing the public about the community and their history, the 25th of 
September is marked as a ‘Black Day’ where the massacres of Hazaras under Abdur 
Rahman Khan’s reign are remembered. This is mostly done online and is a 
transnational event where Hazara activists and community members highlight the 
atrocities which were enacted against the community on social media, while others 
choose to share online resources about the massacre in order to raise awareness 
about the events which took place at the time. Additionally, more recent events 
relating to attacks in Afghanistan and Quetta are also commemorated through vigils, 
talks and online information sharing, but these are to a much lesser extent than the 
25th of September commemorations. Therefore, it can be seen that these events are 
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‘accorded the power’ to allow for their continued presence in community gatherings 
and the collective memories the community chooses to share about itself and its past. 
While, in a paper on collective memory Dr Nicholas Russell of the University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee underlines how Paul Ricoeur perceives collective and individual 
memory, stating that:  
 
Ricoeur observes that in everyday discourse memories can be attributed to 
one person or to more than one person: we can say "my memory of a given 
event" (attributing a memory to one person) or we can say "our memory of a 
given event" (attributing a memory to more than one person). Memories 
attributed to a single person, according to this definition, are personal 
memories; whereas, memories attributed to more than one person are 
collective memories (2006: 792-793).    
 
Through initial background readings, informal conversations with Hazara community 
members and an exploration of Hazara social media it has become apparent that this 
notion of collective memory is very salient among the community, hence the need to 
delve into the work of Ricoeur. Although Ricoeur distinguishes been individual and 
collective memories, another layer that could be added, which has been observed 
among the Hazara community, is how events of the past, even if not personally 
experienced, are framed in the language of collective memory. Meaning that even if 
knowledge of certain events are only known as a result of what has been read in books 
and other publications or through assertions made about the past, which have been 
proliferated between generations, in relation to significant historic events, the factual 
underpinnings of these assertions are at times dubious. An example of such is the 
information shared in relation to the insurrection of Hazarajat in terms of how many 
members of the community were killed at the time, with 60%, 62% and 65% being 
common percentages articulated in conversations and in the online content of some 
Hazara social media pages, with limited credible information being provided to actually 
prove the accuracy of these numbers. This in turn adds another dimension to both the 
lived collective and individual memories that Ricoeur discusses in his work.        
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While Dr James E. Young a Professor of English and Judaic Studies makes use of the 
term ‘collected memory’, and in his book titled ‘The texture of memory: Holocaust 
memorials and meaning’, Young states that:    
 
…I prefer to examine “collected memory”, the many discrete memories that 
are gathered into common memorial spaces and assigned common meaning. 
A society’s memory, in this context, might be regarded as an aggregate 
collection of its members’ many, often competing memories. If societies 
remember, it is only insofar as their institutions and rituals organize, share 
and even inspire their constituents’ memories. For a society’s memory 
cannot exist outside of those people who do the remembering-even if such 
memory happens to be at the society’s bidding, in its name (1993: xi).   
 
Young’s comments are important to note given the reference made to institutions and 
rituals. These are significant for the Hazara community in so much as local institutions, 
most prominently community spaces and religious spaces, play a huge role as to what 
historic events and leading figures are commemorated and deemed noteworthy to 
remember on a local, national and transnational level. This then plays into who is and 
what are transmitted in narrations about the community’s past. For instance, annual 
commemorations are held globally in memory of the Hazara political leader Abdul Ali 
Mazari, to remember his commitment and service to his community. While at the 
same time a figure such as Faiz Mohammad Kateb Hazara is less well-known among 
younger Hazaras, and comparatively little is done to educate the community about his 
work and achievements, given that he was the court historian under King Habibullah 
Khan and compiled the aforementioned seminal study on 18th and 19th Century Afghan 
history for the King, known as the Siraj al-Tawarikh. Here Kateb Hazara is used as an 
example to highlight Young’s assertion about institutions ‘inspir[ing] their constituents’ 
memories’. And based on the fifty interviews conducted for this study it seems that 
this claim is extremely pertinent with regards to what was discussed by Hazara 
research participants in research interviews, especially Hazara youth, whose 
knowledge about their community and past was relatively limited in comparison to the 
stories articulated by Hazaras who had protracted lived experiences in Afghanistan, 
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Pakistan and Iran29. This is due to the fact that younger research participants relied, 
more on, and felt that they had the opportunity to learn about their community and 
their past through institutionalised events, even though such events only present 
limited aspects of Hazara history, as opposed to presenting a more holistic timeline of 
the community’s presence and history in Afghanistan and the neighbouring region. 
Therefore, reference to the term collected memory is relevant for the purpose of this 
study, as it appears that there is indeed an element of institutions informing the 
memories of the members of a given community, and in this particular instance, the 
memories of diasporic Hazaras.    
 
Hence, in discussing and incorporating literature on collective memory within this 
research, another layer is added to this study, which is how certain collective 
memories become institutionalised by communities, in order to construct a certain 
narrative of the past which in turn fuels collective action in the present. However, 
without such an exercise in institutionalising and revisiting these collective memories, 
and without constant remembrance, such memories will cease to exist as collective 
memories, with time. These collective memories are then passed on through 
generations at formal and informal gatherings, as a means of preserving the past. 
These collective memories then impact articulations of the self, as a shared history of 
persecution, in the case of the Hazaras, becomes the foundation for a collective, 
substantive, transnational, community identity.     
 
2.6 Narrative and history:  
As with the previous section on collective memory, narratives and history are 
pertinent to discuss in the context of marginal communities, as they allow for under-
represented accounts of the past to gain greater exposure, while also allowing for 
engagement with alternative discourses on how historical events are framed, and how 
they shape the perceptions marginal communities hold of themselves. In relation to 
historical narratives historian Alun Munslow states that:  
 
 
29 These stories, collective memories and knowledge of the past, among research participants, will be 
discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.   
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…historical narratives are not ‘in fact’ lived the first time around. Reality may 
not possess a given narrative structure to be described as ‘the story’ of the 
actions of people in the past. If there is any benefit in this epistemological 
scepticism, it is the realisation that written history is not automatically 
coincident with the meaning of the past even though we may wish it 
were…The reason why history is not truthful in the epistemological sense (of 
truth being the correspondence or correlation of word and world) is because 
all we have of our past reality is that which is known to us through its 
representation (2003: 138). 
 
In the quote cited above, Munslow highlights how narratives of the past are framed 
through the viewpoint of individuals themselves, which means that what may be 
presented as representations of past events may at times not be factually accurate 
accounts of history. Munslow’s insight here is important to note given how some 
members of the Hazara community perceive dominant historical narratives about the 
history of Afghanistan. Going by Hazara social media alone, it can be seen that there is 
a belief among some segments of Hazara society that accounts of Afghan history which 
have gained traction over the last few decades are in fact only histories of one part of 
Afghan society, that of the Pashtuns. Whether the prevailing accounts of Afghan 
history do indeed solely represent Pashtun history is a question that would be most 
accurately and adequately answered by historians with in-depth knowledge of the 
county and historical literature, but it is intriguing to see that some non-Pashtun 
Afghans feel that what is presented as national history is not holistic or representative 
of all Afghan communities within the country. This in turn is leading to a greater 
reliance on the internet and social media, with these online spaces being utilised to 
construct and propagate a history of the Hazaras of Afghanistan, from within the 
community. This again links to Munslow’s statement regarding the veracity of 
historical narratives. Furthermore, in relation to the previous point Munslow highlights 
the issue of the objective nature of a historian that has for some time been assumed 
and not critiqued given how it is seen to undermine the discipline of history 
completely, if those that have contributed to its knowledge are seen as being complicit 
in undermining the foundation and sanctity of the field. This is something to be 
mindful of when studying both the prominent accounts of Afghan history and also the 
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newer Hazara historiography being documented online, and here Munslow states how 
such a perspective is flawed as: 
 
…the epistemological position…insists [that] we can represent the reality of 
the past results from not fully appreciating the nature of representation and 
its most essential characteristic, that of the unavoidable overlap of subject 
(historian) and object (the past) and the indeterminative nature of history 
(bid: 140).    
 
While the late historian Michael Stanford in his book titled ‘A companion to the study 
of history’ notes that: 
 
Any history, of course, has to be selective, for not every event can be 
described. Yet there remains the doubt that this may be done at the expense 
of strict truth. Are there not relevant facts which the narrator has, perhaps 
half-consciously, omitted because they would bend the direction of halt the 
flow of his tale? And even the most scrupulous historian may, with a good 
conscience, omit details which she thinks unimportant or irrelevant but which 
we, if we knew of them, would not (1994: 93 - 94). 
 
Again, Stanford’s quote relates to the points made by Munslow, but appears to take on 
a more lenient tone as to why incomplete historical narratives are sometimes 
presented to the public. Although the point about pragmatism should be noted it does 
not take away from the fact that the ‘objectiveness’ of historical accounts of the past 
being presented are then at stake, if personal preference is used to dictate what is 
deemed as important to keep and transmit as knowledge, and what can in turn be 
dismissed. This inevitably means that caution must be taken when engaging with 
historical narratives if the author has taken the liberty to omit certain information, 
which only goes to further justify Munslow’s critical approach to history writing and 
the narratives historians choose to share with readers. Therefore, it comes as no 
surprise that Hazaras and other minorities in Afghanistan may feel that their histories 
have deliberately been omitted from the national history writing project, especially if 
such discretion is afforded to the chroniclers of history, to highlight or remove 
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information based on whether they think it is meaningful or not. To afford such 
authority to historians inevitably means that their biases, whether overt or not, may 
inform the decisions they make as to what they feel should be propagated as a 
narrative history of any given historical event, and may further alienate marginal 
communities from the history that is presented to them as the history of the nation. 
This can be seen with the Hazara community and their attempts to document a history 
of Afghanistan which equally represents their community’s past. This act of 
reconstructing history does not in itself mean that there have not and will not be 
instances where some Hazara historians may themselves choose to engage in the 
same tactics that have been used to omit their community from certain accounts of 
Afghan history. Here it is pertinent to note the following quote by historian Geoffrey 
Roberts who notes that, ‘Since the past is gone it is, of course, impossible to assess the 
accuracy of the picture (or unity) presented in the historian’s narrative’ (2001: 11). 
 
In a similar vein to Munslow, Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot states that:  
 
Human beings participant in history both as actors and as narrators…in 
vernacular use, history means both the facts of the matter and a narrative of 
those facts, both “what happened” and “that which is said to have 
happened.” The first meaning places the emphasis on the sociohistorical 
process, the second on our knowledge of that recess or on a story about that 
process (1995: 2).  
 
The aforementioned quote is taken from chapter one of Trouillot’s book, ‘Silencing the 
past: power and the production of history’ where he discusses how the way in which 
historical narratives are situated greatly affects the way in which readers seek to 
understand the past. Here Trouillot gives a ‘simplistic and controversial’ example to 
further explain his statement. The example given is that the landing of the Mayflower 
in North America was when the history of the United States began. This specific 
example does indeed correlate with the claims of ‘what happened’ and ‘what is said to 
have happened’, but it can easily be seen how the event in question has been taken 
out of context when it is proclaimed that this specific event was in essence the birth of 
a country’s history. It is also an example which verifies the statement made by 
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Trouillot in relation to sociohistorical processes and knowledge. Going by the work of 
Trouillot, it can be seen that what constitutes our knowledge of history does not 
necessarily mean that such information is factual. It could be that a certain narrative 
gains prominence over time and as a result is widely propagated as being situated in 
fact, when it could just be a case of ‘that which is said to have happened’ which over a 
lengthy period of time can be hard to entirely prove as verifiable. As a result, 
competing narratives may come to the fore with time if it appears that events of the 
past have indeed been fabricated or omitted.   
 
Trouillot also delves into what he refers to as the constructivist view of history and 
states that, ‘Narratives are necessarily emplotted in a way that life is not. Thus they 
necessarily distort life whether or not the evidence upon which they are based could 
be proved correct. Within that viewpoint, history becomes one among many types of 
narratives with no particular distinction expect for its pretense of truth’ (ibid: 6). With 
the aforementioned quotes in mind it is unsurprising to see the antipathy with which 
certain discourses on Afghanistan are treated by members of the country’s ethnic and 
religious minorities. However, it should be noted that Trouillot’s assertion does it part 
also apply to this new and innovative approach being taken by members of the Hazara 
community to document their history online, most prominently in relation to the 
insurrection of Hazarajat. As noted in the ‘collective memory’ section of this chapter, 
countless references are made online to 60%, 62% and 65% in accounts about the 
massacres of the Hazaras at the time. Although such numbers become hard to verify 
with time, they have come to be known as ‘that which is said to have happened’, in the 
words of Trouillot. Most importantly Trouillot’s work considers marginal narratives in 
relation to dominant discourses of history and how they are employed, which again is 
central to Hazara historiography. Lastly, Trouillot also delves into historical narration, 
especially that of marginal histories and marginalised communities, and how it 
emerges and circulates in constructive dialogue with spaces that are largely outside of 
the professional academy. This approach of Trouillot’s is of great relevance to this 
thesis, and underpins why this research has attempted to trace the process of history 
formation in conversation with the everyday, and individual, self-produced and 
emergent, personalised community narratives about the Hazara community’s past, 
present and future.  
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In discussing literature on narratives and history in this section of this literature 
review, the aim has been to the underline the importance of, and need to include 
Hazara historiography within this research. In deconstructing and critically engaging 
with the discipline of history it becomes more apparent as to why marginal 
communities such as the Hazaras are taking it upon themselves to write and 
disseminate their history, and the role it plays with regards to collective memory and 
identity. Furthermore, in relation to identity, history can be seen to take on a myriad of 
forms, as the historical subjugation of the Hazaras in Afghanistan in the late 19th 
century becomes a core element of a substantive identity based on a shared history of 
oppression. While at the same time, recent Hazara history since the fall of the Taliban 
regime becomes the impetus for constructions of relational identities of Hazaras as 
supporters of democracy, human rights and women’s rights, as opposed to other 
communities in Afghanistan, as articulated in some research interviews.    
 
2.7 Conclusion:   
This literature review has attempted to delve into both anthropological literature on 
identity, diasporas and memory, while also engaging with discussion on history in 
relation to deconstructing the field, the role of historians and the accuracy of historical 
narratives, given the interdisciplinary nature of this research project. In highlighting a 
wide variety of literature across disciplines, this chapter has shown where seminal 
studies and research within anthropology and history situate themselves in relation 
this research on narrative, memory and identity among British Hazaras. Given the 
limited literature available on Hazaras in Europe, reference was made to contemporary 
research on Hazaras in Australia, in order to contextualise this study. Memory was also 
explored in this literature review given that multiple research participants took it upon 
themselves to document their migration histories during interviews, and highlight both 
their negative and positive experiences of life in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. During 
these conversations memories of research participants’ youth were shared, and these 
interviewees also made reference to the collective history and suffering that their 
community had endured in Afghanistan and the region, both historically and at 
present. In these discussions the conversation would regularly flow between narrating 
personal histories and memories of the past, to invoking collective memories of the 
community, hence the need to examine memory within this literature review.   
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The study of history has also been examined within this chapter, given that this 
research also looks to partially analyse Hazara historiography. The literature engaged 
within the ‘narrative and history’ section of this chapter critically engages with the 
discipline of history and history writing. This is due to the fact that prior to conducting 
the formal research interviews for this study multiple informal conversations took 
place with Hazara acquaintances, where many contacts stated that they were very 
critical of what is frequently propagated as Afghan history, as a common perception 
among research participants was that the Hazara community has largely been omitted 
from this national history. These conversations became the impetus for seeking to 
explore literature which does not take for granted the role of the historian, nor assume 
that they are always objective and reliable individuals, who do not bring their biases 






















Chapter 3: The political backdrop of Afghanistan from the 1960s onwards and Hazara 
migration to Europe: 
 
3.1 Introduction:  
This chapter aims to give a backdrop to the latter 20th Century history of Afghanistan, 
focusing on key political events which became the impetus for four decades of Afghan 
migration, both to the neighbouring region, and further afield to Europe. Having 
engaged with literature available on Afghan migration to Europe, the objective of the 
second half of this chapter is to document a timeline of Hazara migration to Britain, 
which at the time of writing does not currently exist. This is done so through the 
information gathered from research interviews, as well as reference to research on 
Afghan migration to Europe and policy reports on migration trends among the 
community.       
 
3.2 Governance in Afghanistan from the 1960s to the 1980s:  
Afghanistan was ruled by an absolute monarchy until the early 1960s, but in 1964 a 
new Constitution was drafted for the country which resulted in a constitutional 
monarchy (Saikal 2004: 148). In 1973 Afghanistan’s last King Zahir Shah was ousted in a 
coup orchestrated by his cousin and former Prime Minister Daoud Khan (ibid: 174), 
with the support of the country’s communist party, the People's Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA). Khan wanted to form stronger ties with the Soviet Union and 
minimise Afghanistan's reliance on Pakistan. He then became the country’s first 
President as a result of the coup, which at the time simultaneously led to the 
abolishment of the monarchy. The next several years saw intense Soviet engagement 
with the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA at a time when Khan’s relations with 
the party had become fraught. 1978 was the year in which the ‘Saur Revolution’ took 
place, leading to the assassination of Daoud Khan by PDPA members (ibid: 185). This 
subsequently led to the installment of a PDPA government under the leadership of Nur 
Muhammad Taraki. Once in power Taraki and his party implemented a new 
constitution, and instigated a process which dismantled Islamic institutions in the 
country, a move designed to undermine the Islamic law framework of Afghanistan, in 
order to pave the way for more a secular system. Less than eighteen months after the 
coup that killed Daoud Khan, Taraki was also assassinated (ibid: 195). Here it should be 
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noted that during the rule of the PDPA, and for the first time in the country’s history, a 
Hazara, Sultan Ali Keshtmand, become the party’s longest serving head of state, from 
1981 to 1989. However, Taraki’s death was not well received in the Soviet Union, and 
as a result Afghanistan was invaded in December 1979 (ibid: 196). The Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan lasted for just under ten years, officially ending in February 1989. The 
end of the war signaled the defeat of the Soviet Union and victory for the Mujahedeen 
(Afghan freedom fighters). In relation to the Soviet invasion, it is pertinent to note the 
following with regards to Afghan migration abroad:  
 
In their scale and duration, the series of conflicts that have been tearing 
Afghanistan apart since the Communist coup in April 1978 and the Soviet 
invasion in December 1979 have provoked one of the largest forced 
displacements of population and protracted refugee situations since World 
War II. At the beginning of the 1990s Afghans constituted 6.22 million - more 
than a third of the country’s population - the largest group of displaced 
persons in the world under the responsibility of the UNHCR, accounting for 
40% of the total (Donini et al. 2016: 2).   
 
3.3 From the Mujahedeen to the Taliban: 
The Taliban movement, which gained prominence in the 1990s, developed from 
Mujahedeen fighters of the Soviet war period. Although the Soviet Union had been 
defeated in 1989, the 1990s was a tumultuous time for Afghanistan as the country was 
in the midst of a civil war. The first phase of the civil war lasted until 1992 which saw 
the resignation of Afghanistan's then Communist President Mohammad Najibullah. 
During this time many political factions began forming alongside the Taliban, mainly on 
ethnic lines, such as the Hazara dominated Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, the 
Uzbek controlled National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, the predominantly Tajik 
Northern Alliance, (which later became a wider non-Pashtun alliance), and the hardline 
Islamic group of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar known as the Hezb-e Islami (Party of Islam), 
among others.  
 
Dr Kristian Berg Harpviken states that, ‘Since the fall of the communists in April 1992, 
Afghanistan has continued to be the scene of massive military conflict, primarily about 
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control over central power, between groups with various ethnic or religious affiliations’ 
(1997: 271). However, at this time, in 1992, the Peshawar Accord was also signed, 
which was a peace agreement that established the Islamic State of Afghanistan30. All 
the major post-Soviet factions agreed to the terms of the accord, bar Hekmatyar, who 
wanted to govern the country exclusively, despite the fact that he had been offered the 
role of Prime Minister as a result of the accord (Saikal 2004: 217). Hekmatyar had in 
fact previously been Prime Minister for two years, in 1993 and again in 1996. From 
1992 to 1996 various factions began fighting in order to gain control of Kabul. As a 
result, Kabul was continually bombed and many civilians were killed and maimed in the 
cross-fire31. In September 1996 the Taliban became the de facto government of 
Afghanistan, as some warring factions had retreated from Kabul, although it should be 
noted that the Taliban government was only recognised by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates32. Subsequently, after the end of this phase of the civil war, 
the Taliban were in power for just under five years, until the start of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization's (NATO) combat mission in Afghanistan in 2001.   
 
3.4 NATO in Afghanistan and the 2001 Bonn Conference: 
The NATO intervention in Afghanistan, officially referred to by the United States 
government as, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, began on the 7th of October 2001. The 
United States government stated that it was necessary to intervene in Afghanistan in 
order to defeat Al Qaeda and end terrorist activities in the country. At the time of the 
attacks no terrorist organisations had claimed responsibility for the attacks, with the 
Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, saying at the time that, ‘We 
want to tell the American children that Afghanistan feels your pain. We hope the courts 
find justice’, as did the foreign minister of the Taliban government at the time of the 
attacks, Wakeel Ahmed Mutawakel 33. In December 2001 the Bonn Conference took 
place with the aim of installing a new government in Afghanistan, supported by the 
country’s major warring factions. The conference also stipulated the need for a new 
Constitution to be drafted for the country, which was approved in 2004.        
 
30 See: Jayakumar, Kirthi. “Conflict in Afghanistan. ”TransConflict, www.transconflict.com/gcct/gcct-
members/asia/afghanistan/conflict-in-afghanistan.   
31 See: “Afghanistan’s Civil Wars.” Human Rights Watch, 2001, 
www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-01.htm.    
32 See: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11451718.    
33 See: www.edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/11/afghan.taliban/. 
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The Bonn Agreement resulting from the conference laid out the measures agreed upon 
at the conference. Some of the measures to be established through the agreement 
were, 'An Interim Authority…upon the official transfer of power on 22 December 
2001’, as well as, ‘…a Judicial Commission to rebuild the domestic justice system in 
accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan 
legal traditions’34 and a Central Bank of Afghanistan. While at the same time a new 
governing loya jirga (grand assembly) was established. Hamid Karzai was first elected 
to head this loya jirga for two years in 2002, and then elected President of Afghanistan 
in 2004. It is important to note that the Bonn Agreement '…was not an agreement 
among the warring groups to lay down their arms and build a new society' (Rubin 
2013: 136). In spite of this fact a major development for the country, as a result of the 
agreement, was the establishment of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 
Commission (AIHRC) in 2002. The AIHRC is defined as being a '…constitutionalised, 
national and independent human rights body in Afghanistan'35, with the commission 
publishing reports on a various domestic issues, such as social and economic rights, 
women's rights and minority rights.  
 
The NATO intervention in the country lasted just over thirteen years, with the combat 
mission in Afghanistan officially ending on the 31st of December 2014. Some troops 
remained in Afghanistan to assist with training the Afghan National Army (ANA). As a 
result of the troop withdrawal, 2015 was one of the worst years for civilian casualties in 
the country36, and saw the Taliban gain traction in areas they had previously not 
controlled, due to a fragile central government and ill-equipped army. Subsequently, 
four decades of war have now devastated Afghanistan: from the Soviet invasion, the 
civil war and the NATO assault against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. However, in the midst 
of such anguish there is hope for academic research on the country and its people, as 
Angela Schlenkhoff notes that:   
 
Since 2001, after almost two decades of virtual standstill, research on 
Afghanistan and the Afghans has been on the rise again. There is a desire to 
 
34 For a full list of the measures established through the Bonn Agreement see: 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/384/1120507.htm.  
35 For more information on the AIHRC see: www.aihrc.org.af/home/law/360.  
          36 See: www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/afghan-civilian-casualties-hit-record-11000-2015-
160214071436972.html. 
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close the gaps in information and understanding that were left open by 
decades of war and destruction, and in many ways the country almost has to 
be researched anew due to the lack of continuous information based on in-
depth knowledge (2010: 9). 
 
Having discussed the political backdrop of Afghanistan from the 1960s to the early 
2000s, it is also it is important to briefly discuss the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan 
and the neighbouring region, in order to fully understand the Hazara community’s 
precarity in the region and migratory flows. Until the late nineteenth century Hazaras 
had minimal interaction with the Kabul regime. As mentioned earlier, they resided in 
the mountainous and isolated areas of central Afghanistan, Hazarajat. However, this 
isolation came to an end in the 1890s with the invasion Hazarajat, under the command 
of the Emir at that time, Abdur Rahman Khan (Kakar 1979: 4). The Emir wanted to 
consolidate his power, and one means of doing so was through gaining control of 
Hazara lands (Ibrahimi 2009), as at this time the Hazara community was at the bottom 
of the country’s social hierarchy (Emadi 2005: 9-10). Khan’s siege of Hazarajat 
significantly decreased the Hazara population and the size of Hazarajat region, and led 
to the massacre and enslavement of the Hazara people. Dr Yahia Baiza notes that, 
‘…[Hazara] men and women, were taken as war captives and sold as slaves. The Amir 
put taxes on each Hazara slave. Consequently, the Amir destroyed and closed the Shia 
congregation centres, known as takya-khanahs, banned the commemoration of 
Hussain ibn Ali bin Talib’s martyrdom on the 10th of Muharram, and forced the Shia 
population of the country to perform Sunni religious rituals’ (2013: 41). As a result, 
since the capture of Hazarajat, there have multiple migrations of Hazaras to 
neighbouring countries.  
 
3.5 Hazaras in Afghanistan:  
As this section will be discussing the historic and current circumstances of Hazaras in 
Afghanistan, it is important to start by exploring a key moment in Hazara history, the 
insurrection of Hazarajat in the late 1800s. Therefore, a key text to consider here is the 
Siraj-al Tawarikh by the court historian Faiz Mohammad Kateb Hazara, written under 
the reign of Habibullah Khan, the son of Abdur Rahman Khan, (the title of which is 
translated as ‘the history of Afghanistan’ in Professor Robert D McChesney’s 2013 
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translation of the text). In the section of the text, which details incidents in Hazarajat in 
the late 19th Century, the rape of the wife of a Hazara mir, Yazdan Bakhsh, by a 
cavalryman of the Emir in 1891 is discussed (681). This incident appears to be the first 
major event that resulted in a fallout between the region’s Hazaras and the King. Due 
to the outrage felt in the Hazara regions as a result of this criminal act some Hazara 
leaders came to Kabul in order to be ‘reassured’ that something similar would not 
occur again at the hands of any other soldiers (ibid: 682). Instead these men were put 
under house arrest in the city (ibid). However, soon after this incident some Hazara 
leaders did submit to the King and it is mentioned in a written statement by the King 
from August 1891 that:   
 
‘…no signs of duplicity or hostility should appear on the face of the situation of 
all of you people, and as long as I live, I will view you with the eyes of love and 
kindness. After me, my children and grandchildren will be your close friends 
just like me’ (ibid: 684), and subsequently in ‘September-October 1891, all the 
people of the Hazarahjat peacefully placed their heads beneath the writ of the 
farman and submitted to the commands and prohibitions of the regime…’ 
(ibid: 689).  
 
Although, it is noted how there were still Hazara militias present in various parts of 
Hazarajat at this time who had not submitted to the King (ibid: 691-693), so Hazara 
loyalties were not so clear-cut at this time. This was followed by a confiscation of 
weapons from Hazaras throughout Hazarajat during which time many Hazaras were 
killed, robbed or enslaved, supposedly unbeknown to the King or sanctioned by him 
(ibid: 703-704). While in discussing the circumstances of 1892 Kateb notes how regular 
soldiers had begun to act ‘tyrannically and oppressively’, in turn imprisoning Hazaras at 
their own volition (ibid: 732). This was soon followed by the rape of another Hazara 
woman by some soliders in Uruzgan (ibid), which became the impetus for mass Hazara 
revolts against the Emir’s rule, with Kateb stating that local Hazara men took an oath 
declaring that, ‘Death 100 times over is preferable to enduring such things, which 
should never occur in a humane world and one in which the excellent Shariʿah  
prevails. Should we simply excise the sighs of grief and regret from our hearts, wrap 
the foot in the skirt of disgrace, and suffer patiently?’ (ibid: 732-733). This resulted in 
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farmans and proclamations being issued ‘declaring jihad against [Hazaras] to the 
governors’ (ibid: 772) and consequently Hazaras were ‘plundered, killed, and enslaved’ 
(ibid).   
 
Here it is also worth examining seminal studies on the anthropology of Hazaras from 
20th Century scholars, as they detail the aftermath of the insurrection of Hazarajat and 
the community’s socio-economic status during the previous century. The Danish 
ethnographer Klaus Ferdinand notes how the landmass which comprised Hazarajat 
had shrunk since the late 19th Century onwards, ‘Formerly the southern border [of 
Hazarajat] was very close to Qandahár, but during these 60—70 years it has become 
very indistinct, as a large contingent of Afghan tribes has settled there and wholly or in 
part taken over the land from the Hazaras…’ (1959: 12), and this is something which 
has been relayed to me by Hazara acquaintances who state that Hazarajat was much 
larger in size before the war instigated by Abdur Rahman Khan against the Hazaras in 
the late 1800s. In another book by Ferdinand, written almost half a century after his 
informative research on Hazara culture in the 1950s, on Afghans nomads, he mentions 
how the insurrection of Hazarajat was central to the change in relationship between 
the Hazaras and the central government:  
 
The Hazara political relations with the outside world, be it through war or the 
obligation to pay taxes, as described for the 18th and 19th centuries, were 
marked by the common factor that they did not change the local political 
structure and organisation. There were thus no fundamental changes until the 
reign of Abdur Rahman Khan in the 1890s’ (Ferdinand 2006: 174)…In 1893 the 
independent status of the Hazara had ended, crushed by the forces of the 
Amir, which advanced on Hazarajat from all sides. All the Hazara leaders were 
captured and taken to Kabul (ibid: 185-186). 
 
Similarly, an insightful extract from the Emir’s memoirs is also shared by Ferdinand, 
where it is stated that:  
 
…Afghan chiefs had applied several times to raise a force of country people at 
their own expense to fight against the Hazaras, whom they looked upon as 
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enemies to their country and religion. I had not given them permission to do 
this heretofore, but now [spring 1892] I gave a general order that everybody 
would be allowed to go and help in the punishment of the rebels’ (ibid: 185). 
 
Unsurprisingly, in this excerpt no reference is made to the indiscretions of the Emir’s 
army in Hazarajat which fuelled Hazara resentment towards the establishment. 
Kateb’s work notes soliders’ problematic behaviour in Hazarajat on multiple occasions 
and dishonourable acts carried out against Hazara women, but the Emir disregards 
Hazara grievances in his statement. Rather he uses the common tropes used to 
disparage the Hazara community, in relation to religion and loyalty to the state, to 
further justify causing them harm and weakening their defences. While anthropologist 
Elizabeth Bacon in a book on social structures in Eurasia notes how Hazaras revolted 
against Abdur Rahman Khan, who is referred to as being ‘…the first ruler to bring the 
country of Afghanistan under a centralized Afghan government’ (1958: 5). In turn, the 
defeat of Hazaras during the insurrection resulted in many fleeing to ‘…Quetta in 
Baluchistan and to the area around Meshed in northeastern Iran’ (ibid). Here it is also 
important to note the work of anthropologist Robert Canfield who wrote about 
Hazaras in the 1970s. His paper for the Afghanistan Committee of the Asia Society 
mentions the following: 
 
The hostilities of war of course crystalized the social separation of the Hazaras 
and Afghans…The war against the Shiite Hazaras therefore brought a state 
which was being shaped by a Sunni Muslim polity against a Shiite 
confederation, and as a consequence, more firmly solidified each side as a 
sectarian polity (1970: 4).  
 
Canfield further notes that the war exacerbated sectarian ideology and that these 
‘differences and hostilities’ were still present in Afghan society at the time of 
writing, in the year 1970, and resulted in the continued ‘social isolation’ of 
Hazaras from their co-nationals and the Sunni government (Ibid: 5). Furthermore, 
he states that there is limited Hazara representation in the Afghan government 
(ibid: 6), which is a claim backed by multiple research participants within my 
study, conducted almost five decades after Canfield’s work. Around the same time 
 78 
as Canfield, archaeologist and anthropologist Louis Dupree notes the following 
about the social standing of Hazaras, a decade and a half prior to the formation of 
the Hezb-e Wahdat, in the early 1970s: 
 
Most Hazara…work at coolie labor, gathering each morning at specific points 
in Kabul, to which labor foremen come to enlist their day’s requirement of 
workmen. In the city as well as the countryside, the Hazara are low men in the 
ethnic peck-order. Man must always find a rational reason for his 
discrimination against men, and non-Hazara Afghans use two counts against 
the Hazara: 1) they are physically Mongoloid and, by tradition, descendants of 
the destructive army of Genghis Khan; 2) most are Shi’a Muslims  (1973: 161).  
 
In turn Dupree’s quote highlights why Hazara consciousness had not taken hold among 
the community at the time of writing, as Hazaras were at the bottom of Afghanistan’s 
social hierarchy, well into the 20th Century, eighty years after the insurrection of 
Hazarajat.  
 
In terms of the more recent history of Hazaras in Afghanistan, since the fall of the 
Taliban in 2001, the situation for the community in the country has vastly improved in 
terms of access to education, as well as partially in public sector recruitment. Through 
the course of research interviews for this study multiple respondents have noted the 
achievements of Hazaras in Afghanistan since the NATO mission in the country began. 
Despite the educational opportunities presented to Hazaras since the overthrow of 
the Taliban regime and the better socio-economic status of Hazaras in urban centres 
in recent years, attacks on Hazaras in Afghanistan have also increased, and this has led 
to growing resentment of the government by members of the community, and a lack 
of trust of the ruling elite. In relation to these points, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the 
International Protection needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan published in 
August 2018 noted that, ‘While [Hazaras] were reported to have made significant 
economic and political advances since the 2001 fall of the Taliban regime, in recent 
years there has reportedly been a significant increase in harassment, intimidation, 
kidnappings and killings at the hands of Taliban, Islamic State and other [Anti-
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Government Elements]’ (93-94). These attacks are inevitable given how weak the post-
Karzai, central government currently is. A stark reminder of the government’s 
inefficiency is the fact that since the start of the Ghani administration the Taliban has 
had an increased presence in the north of Afghanistan, particularly in Kunduz province, 
an area they were unable to penetrate before, as well as the fact that in a news report 
from the BBC from January 2018, it was stated that ‘Taliban fighters…are now openly 
active in 70% of Afghanistan…’.37    
 
There are now also mounting claims that the extremist group ISIS is also present in the 
country38. For instance, in 2016, over one-hundred Hazaras were killed in attacks for 
which ISIS claimed responsibility39, and in 2017 there were multiple attacks on Shia 
Mosques and on Shia religious processions40, as well as growing attacks in the Dasht-e 
Barchi neighbourhood of west Kabul, a predominately Hazara district. While the 
annual Afghanistan Survey conducted by the Asia Foundation found that, ‘Examining 
the [survey] data by ethnicity…the tendency of Daesh/ISIS to mount sectarian attacks 
is reflected in the 30.3% of Hazaras who identify them as the biggest threat to local 
security (in the country)’ (2018: 60). Furthermore, as a result of the growing attacks in 
the Barchi area it was reported in September 2018 by TOLO News (one of 
Afghanistan’s most prominent independent news networks) that over 500 residents of 
the area had taken up arms in the run up to Muharram, thus further adding to the 
precarity of the security situation in Kabul, although the Ministry of Interior had stated 
that arming residents was ‘not possible’41. However, in a report by the Afghanistan 
Analysts Network published around the same time it was stated that for Muharram, 
‘No distribution of arms by the government [had] taken place, but volunteer guards, 
some armed, including with Kalashnikov rifles, other not, [had] been stood up. This 
 
37 See: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-42863116.  
38 The presence of ISIS in Afghanistan is discussed later in this thesis.  
39 For information on attacks on Hazaras in Afghanistan see: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
39031000.   
40 For news articles on attacks on Shia religious spaces in Afghanistan see: 
1) www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/world/asia/mosque-kabul-attack.html.  
2) www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-afghanistan-shiites-20171021-story.html.  




[was] with Ministry of Interior permission’.42 In relation to the fraught relationship 
between the Hazara community and the government, another issue to consider is the 
contentious Central Asian electrical project (TUTAP), which has seen the rerouting of a 
section of the project in Afghanistan, from the predominately Hazara province of 
Bamiyan to the Pashtun-Tajik region of Salang, which has substantially contributed to 
the belief among the Hazara community that they are again being discriminated 
against, as their region is being deprived of electricity and development. Thus, as a 
result of this perceived discrimination there were a number of protests in 2016 and 
2017, outside Afghan embassies in multiple European cities, with social media being a 
key tool through which information about these protests was circulated, among the 
Hazara community and beyond.   
 
In terms of growing attacks by extremists on Hazara religious spaces, the 2018 Country 
Report on Human Rights Practices in Afghanistan by the US Department of State 
mentions that, ‘Ethnic tensions between various groups continued to result in conflict 
and killings. Societal discrimination against Shia Hazaras continued along class, race, 
and religious lines in the form of extortion of money through illegal taxation, forced 
recruitment and forced labour, physical abuse, and detention’ (36) and the report also 
states that: 
 
According to NGOs, the government frequently assigned Hazara ANP (Afghan 
National Police) officers to symbolic positions with little authority within the 
Ministry of Interior. NGOs also reported Hazara ANDSF (Afghan National 
Defence and Security Forces) officers were more likely than non-Hazara 
officers to be posted to insecure areas of the country. During the year ISIS-K 
continued escalating attacks against the Hazara community. Attacks against 
the Shia, predominantly Hazara, population, resulted in 705 civilian 
casualties, including 211 deaths between January 1 and September 30 (ibid).  
 
While Dr Amin Tarzi, the Director of Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University 





Hazara Enlightenment Movement43 demonstration in Kabul the Taliban did in fact 
condemn the attack, but according to Tarzi, ISIS responded by, ‘…issu[ing] a fatwa (a 
religious decree) claiming that the Shiites were indisputably infidels, adding that any 
Sunni religious scholar that rejects this understanding and [ISIS]’s right to kill them is 
himself an apostate’ (2018: 135). 
  
In relation to government representation, the 2017 International Religious Freedom 
Report on Afghanistan by the US Department of State mentions that, ‘Shia Muslims 
[have] held some major government positions; however, Shia leaders continued to 
state the number of positions did not reflect their demographics’ (1). While Akram 
Gizabi, a former Voice of America journalist and current chairman of the World Hazara 
Council, stated in a tweet from July 2018 that, within Afghanistan’s Ministry of 
Interior, of the ministry’s six deputy ministers, none are Hazara, and of the thirty -
four provincial police chiefs, only one is Hazara44. The lack of Hazara political 
representation has been widely criticised in many research interviews, with 
Assadullah Shafai, a journalist and researcher based in London, who is the Director 
General of the Hazara Encyclopaedia Foundation, stating that:  
 
Well Hazara people in Afghanistan they still I mean the feeling that they have 
is that they believe and I agree with some part of that there is still huge 
discrimination against Hazaras in Afghanistan. For example in government 
structure they don't represent Hazaras has are as believe that they are 
around 25% of the population at least. But for example in many ministries, in 
many government departments, there are between 2% to 4%, maximum 5%, 
Hazaras, especially in in foreign ministry. For example, in many embassies 
with 15 to 20 people, for some, there are no Hazaras at all and in some there 
are some Hazaras. We have, for example, more than 50 embassies, and in 
some periods there were no Hazara ambassadors, and in some periods they 
 
43 The Enlightenment Movement refers to the mobilisation that occurred in the aftermath of the TUTAP 
route change, and in an article published on the Hazara International website, it is stated that the 
movement came about from a desire ‘…to obtain the right to electricity and to an equal development 
for the entire population, the Enlightening Movement gradually evolved into a movement against 
corruption, against the lack of security and the ethnic and gender discrimination’.  
See: www.hazarapeople.com/2017/01/30/where-is-the-enlightening-movement/.   
The Enlightenment Movement is discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters. 
44 See: www.twitter.com/AGizabi/status/1013436194468884480.  
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were just say 2 to 3 in some countries, which were not important (countries) 
at all. 
 
These statistics and reports are part of a more systemic belief among Hazaras that 
they have not in the past, and are not at present, appropriately represented in 
ministries and the government more generally. When, within research interviews 
for this study, it has been highlighted that there are in fact several high-profile 
Hazara ministers in the government at present, namely Muhammad Mohaqiq, 
Karim Khalili and Sarwar Danish, the unanimous response from Hazara research 
participants is that these are superficial appointments, as these men have not done 
anything for the Hazara community, and only serve their own personal interests. This 
is also a sentiment shared by a vast number of ‘Hazara activists’ on social media who 
are heavily critical of high-profile Hazara politicians.        
 
3.6 Hazaras in Pakistan:  
Having discussed the historic and current position of Hazaras in Afghanistan, it is also 
pertinent to explore the history and daily lives of Hazaras in Pakistan. Hazaras who 
settled in Quetta had initially moved to the city during the insurrection of Hazarajat in 
the late 19th Century. Subsequently, when the partition of India occurred, the 
community were no longer subjects of British India, but were now citizens of the newly 
established state of Pakistan. In Pakistan the community was welcomed and excelled 
in the country, where their religious beliefs and ethnicity did not act as a barrier in 
becoming part of the social fabric of the country (Lieven 2011: 346 – 347), as can be 
seen by the appointment of Muhammad Musa Khan as the Commander in Chief of the 
Pakistan Army in the late 1950s and 1960s. The community also ‘…achieved a legal 
status as Pakistani citizens’ (Changezi & Biseth 2011: 80) and did not face legal 
uncertainty and precarity (in the way same way that Hazaras in Iran do) , and this in 
turn has meant that the community has been ‘[provided with] access to the formal 
systems of…education, health, and politics’ (ibid). Syed Askar Mousavi notes that, 
‘…Hazaras living in what had become Pakistan were among the first groups to accept 
and endorse the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and to send representatives to 
Karachi, then capital of Pakistan, as a sign of their support’ (1998: 145), but that, 
‘…although well integrated into Pakistan society, it was not until 10 May 1962, that 
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their status [as citizens] was formally first declared by the government of Pakistan…’ 
(ibid). However, in relation to the 1990s onwards, Dr Paolo Novak notes the following 
in a paper on Afghans in Pakistan:  
 
The 1990s saw, in addition to diminishing levels of assistance for those 
residing in [refugee villages]…,a progressive erosion of protection for Afghans 
in Pakistan. In 1998 the [Government of Pakistan] stopped recognizing 
Afghan migrants as prima facie refugees, requiring them to produce a travel 
document. In 1999, the [Government of Pakistan’s] increasingly negative 
attitude towards Afghans translated into specific forms of harassment of the 
refugee population, with traders’ stalls destroyed, Afghans forcibly relocated 
to RVs and deportations of those without a valid passport and Pakistani visa 
(2007: 567).  
 
Although Hazaras who had settled in the country since the insurrection of Hazarajat 
were not at the risk from the policy shift of the 1990s, Hazaras who came to the 
country in the midst of Afghanistan’s civil war, subsequent Taliban governance and 
NATO intervention were inevitably vulnerable in Pakistan, due to the aforementioned 
hostile schemes enacted by the government, causing economic uncertainty and 
making the threat of deportation a daily reality. While in terms of growing insecurity 
for Hazaras in Quetta, one research participant based in London who is originally from 
Quetta stated that: 
 
…[I]n Pakistan, we were fine. Our literacy rate is about between 85%-90% and 
we are progressive people, but for the last 10-15 years due to these proxy 
wars and politics and may be elements of jealously as well, they (terrorists) 
started killing us. And to be honest we are just confined in our two areas, 
Hazara Town and Alamdar Road (in Mariabad) basically [because of the 
targeted killings of Hazaras in Quetta].       
 
In more recent years, as a result of growing religious extremism in the country after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, and the NATO intervention in Afghanistan, the 
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situation of Hazaras in Quetta has become perilous45. This is highlighted in a journal 
paper by Frédéric Grare, a non-resident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace’s South Asia Programme, titled ‘The evolution of sectarian conflicts 
in Pakistan and the ever-changing face of Islamic Violence', which states that, ‘…the 
link-up between sectarian and jihadi groups, as well as between local and 
internationalist organisations, first established during the Afghan conflict, has grown 
dramatically in recent years’ (2007: 127). As a result of this growing sectarian violence 
the Hazara community has become ghettoised and is concentrated in a two different 
areas within the city (in areas known as ‘Hazara Town’ and ‘Mariabad’), with a Human 
Rights Watch article from April 2018 stating that, ‘At least 509 members of the Hazara 
community have been killed and 627 injured in militant attacks in Quetta, the capital 
of Balochistan province, over the last five years’46. Increased attacks towards the 
community by various extremist groups, and the inability of the local and national 
government to counter the targeted attacks against Hazaras has meant that some 
Hazaras have left the city.        
 
3.7 Hazaras in Iran:  
It is also important to examine the situation of Hazaras in Iran within this chapter, 
having previously discussed the past and present circumstances of Hazaras in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. As noted earlier, Iran was a likely destination for Hazaras 
given the common religious beliefs and language the Hazaras share with the Iranian 
people (Leimsidor 2014: 137), as both Shias and Persian speakers47 (albeit with vastly 
distinct Persian dialects). However, these similarities have not been enough for 
Hazaras to be fully accepted within Iranian society. Although the situation for Hazaras 
is markedly better in Iran than in Afghanistan or Pakistan at present, in terms of 
diminished threats to life, both localised and institutional racism has meant that many 
Hazaras are stuck in low paid menial jobs, and their children are denied access to 
 
45 For information on attacks against the Hazara community in Quetta see: 
www.hrw.org/report/2014/06/29/we-are-walking-dead/killings-shia-hazara-balochistan-pakistan.  
46 This quote was taken from the following article: www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/30/pakistans-hazara-
community-under-attack.   
47 This can be seen from the following quote from a journal paper by Diane Tober, a Research 
Anthropologist at the University of California, San Francisco Institute for Health and Aging, on Afghan 
refugees in Iran, ‘Reasons Afghans gave for going to Iran rather than other neighbouring countries like 
Pakistan include:… (3) it is an Islamic country (Hazara Shi’as also emphasized because it was a Shi’a 
country and, therefore, felt that they would experience less discrimination here); (4) they felt it was 
culturally more similar to their own culture and language…’ (2007: 267).  
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education (Kamal 2010: 189), and citizenship. This in turn has led to both social and 
economic stagnation of the Hazara community in Iran; with many seeing little 
prospects for their families in the country. Additionally, Mamiko Saito states that, 
‘Since the mid-1990s access to education has only been provided for documented 
refugee children. In 2002, the Iranian government declared Afghan self-run schools 
illegal, on the grounds that they encouraged Afghans to remain in Iran. Among those 
who did attend school, it was acknowledged that there were limitations on access to 
higher education…especially in recent years’ (2009:5). This is also highlighted in a 
report by Minority Rights Group International which states that, ‘…maltreatment, 
ranging from limited access to education and employment to summary arrests and 
denial of many basic rights, was the direct result of policies that perpetuated hardship 
and insecurity (for Hazaras). Many [Hazaras], despite living in Iran for decades, still lack 
legal status and documentation – a situation that leaves them vulnerable to 
deportation at any time’ (2017: 17). Furthermore, Dr Zuzanna Olszweska notes that 
despite the increased literacy among Afghans in Iran compared to those in 
Afghanistan, ‘…the rising expectations of those educated to high school or even 
university level are thwarted by the fact that [Afghans in Iran] cannot legally work in 
anything but menial professions in Iran-and, as of 2004, cannot attend university 
without paying fees that few can afford’ (2007: 214).    
 
In interviews with Hazaras who have had lived experiences in Iran, reference was 
made to the term Iranigak a pejorative term used by Afghans towards ‘Iranian 
Afghans’, which Alessandro Monsutti translates as ‘little Iranian’48. The term was used 
by research participants to show that once ‘home’ in Afghanistan they were not fully 
accepted into Afghan society, just as they had not been in Iran. One research 
participant, who is a research student in her 30s based in London, recalled that when 
visiting Afghanistan after having lived in Iran she also encountered use of the term 
towards her: 
 
I started hearing people say Iranigak, Iranigak (when visiting Afghanistan). 
They (Afghans in Afghanistan) use this term, it means little Iranian. It’s a 
 
48 Monsutti’s translation can be accessed via the following video, just past the 1 hour and 8 minutes 
mark: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aoc0Td2zyyY&t=1676s. 
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derogatory term, and for me that sums up how they perceive us (Afghans 
who have grown up in Iran). So for me, it was a slap in the face, because in 
Iran I knew that I have to go back to my country and feel at home, and go and 
build my country, and then when I was there I was labelled (Iranigak), it was 
like slap in the face, and that actually you are not home. It’s another exile.  
 
While Zuzanna Olszewska also notes that, ‘[The young generation of Afghans in Iran] 
have drifted so far from their own culture that they find it difficult to adjust to life in 
Afghanistan and indeed are often harassed there for being too “Iranian”. In Kabul, 
every nuance gives returnees away, from the way they dress to the way they close taxi 
doors, to their accent or the particular phrase they use to tell a bus driver they would 
like to get off.’ (2007: 214). This quote exemplifies some of the tensions that exist for 
Afghans, and more specifically in the case of this research Hazaras, those who grew up 
in Iran and visited Afghanistan for the first time in their teens, and how acceptance 
among Afghans was not forthcoming in the way one might assume. Hence, reference 
was made to the term Iranigak in research interviews for this study to show that a 
form of othering occurred to distinguish Afghans who had been born and brought up 
in Afghanistan from those in who had lived in Iran, with an emphasis on the Iranian 
accent native to Hazaras who grew up in Iran, when trying to discredit or dismiss their 
‘Afghanness’. Furthermore, identity among Hazaras who grew up in Iran is an 
intriguing topic, given the perception of the country that had previously existed among 
the community. Iran was seen as the bastion of Shi’ism by the community; however 
lived realities of life for Hazaras in Iran show that a notion of Shia brotherhood does 
not necessarily translate into embracing a refugee Shia community like the Hazaras, 
who suffer from widespread discrimination and institutional racism in the country, 
even at present.  
 
3.8 Hazara migration to Britain:     
In terms of Hazara migration, Dr David Radford, a lecturer in Sociology at the 
University of South Australia, notes that, ‘…a historical context of conflict and 
migration has significantly shaped both the diaspora’s and the individual Hazara’s 
sense of self’ (2016: 15), while Dr Khadija Abbasi states that, ‘…the persecution by the 
Emir of Afghanistan Abdur Rahman Khan in late 19
th Century...is still vivid in the 
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collective memory of Hazaras’49. The Emir’s infiltration of Hazarajat, the deportation of 
thousands of Hazaras to Kabul in bondage, and the continued marginalisation of 
Hazaras has resulted in multiple migrations of the community to the neighbouring 
region since the 1890s onwards, and in the 20th Century, with Craig Loschmann et al. 
noting that, ‘The pull from stronger neighbouring labour markets along with close 
social and cultural ties helped establish robust social networks across locations’ and 
that, ‘These networks were utilised and strengthened in the subsequent years of 
conflict…’ (2017: 80). However, migrations back to Afghanistan have also occurred in 
instances when it was perceived that it was safe for Hazaras to return back to 
Hazarajat (Harpviken 2009: 7). In terms of the Afghan migration of the 1980s and 
1990s it is pertinent to note the following:   
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the overwhelming majority of Afghan refugees 
went to Pakistan or Iran. For them, exile was neither definitive nor 
temporary, it was more appropriate to speak of recurrent multidirectional 
movements, Few Afghans refugees never returned to their place of origin at 
least once for a brief visit after their initial flight and most households in 
Afghanistan have at least one family member in a neighbouring country 
(Donini et al. 2016: 4). 
 
In turn, these regional migrations, as well as migrations further afield may add to the 
complexity of understanding Hazara identity and the community’s ‘sense of self’. 
Therefore, in this section of the chapter Hazara migration to Britain and Afghan 
migration to Europe will be discussed, in order to produce a preliminary timeline of 
Hazara migration to the continent.     
 
Afghans currently constitute one of the largest migrant groups entering the European 
Union (EU). In 2015 ‘…the number of asylum applicants from Afghanistan rose to 
176,000 in the European Union…, which was 14 percent of the overall total’ (İçduygu 
and Karadağ 2018: 483) and in 2016 Afghans were the, ‘…largest group of first-time 
asylum seekers in the EU’, (Quie and Hakimi 2018: 28) with a total of 183,000 Afghans 
 
49 This is an extract from a speech delivered by anthropologist Dr Khadjia Abbasi at a conference held in 
Vienna, Austria in January 2016 on Afghan migration to Europe. For a brief overview of the conference 
and access to Abbasi’s direct quote see: www.hazara.net/2016/02/afghanistan-the-lost-paradise/.  
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applying for asylum (ibid). War and violence have plagued Afghanistan for over four 
decades, and still continues to do so at present, despite the withdrawal of NATO 
combat troops in December 2014. In a report from 2018 by Thomas Ruttig, the co-
founder and co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, it was noted that ‘Afghan 
communities in several European countries have grown as a result of the refugee crisis. 
…Germany, for example, had registered 48,622 Afghan asylum seekers in 2015 and 
154,046 in 2016… In total, it hosted almost 255,000 Afghan nationals in 2017’50. While 
at the same time mentioning that ‘…it can be assumed that only a small proportion of 
those Afghans still leaving the country have been able to move into Europe, as entry 
has become more hazardous’.  
 
Many Hazaras fled Afghanistan as refugees when the civil war of the 1990s was coming 
to an end, as the community had been the target of massacres during the post-Soviet 
civil war period51. This again resulted in many Hazaras fleeing east to the city of Quetta 
in Pakistan and Mashhad in Iran (Monsutti 2004: 219-220), as they had previously 
done during the siege of Hazarajat in the late 19th Century. Hazara persecution also 
heightened due to the growth of the Taliban in the aftermath of the country’s civil war. 
Furthermore, according to the 2018 annual Afghanistan Survey conducted by the Asia 
Foundation it is stated that, ‘Hazaras, a predominantly Shi’a minority who continue to 
face disproportionate harassment and attacks by armed groups in Afghanistan, 
consistently express greater willingness to leave the country than other ethnic groups’ 
(204). However, it should be noted that as of the end of 2018 the Special Inspector 
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) quarterly report noted that Afghan 
migration to Europe has reduced, noting that: 
 
Eurostat…reported 19,640 -first-time Afghan asylum seekers in the EU in the 
first eight months of 2018…[T]he number of first-time Afghan asylum seekers 
to the EU has decreased significantly since the high point in 2015/2016. The 
Afghanistan Analysts Network said that stronger border controls and 
 






tightened asylum laws in Europe are the primary cause for the decrease in 
the number of Afghan asylum seekers (2018: 129).  
 
According to the most recent census conducted in the United Kingdom, in 2011, there 
are just over 72,000 Afghans living in England and Wales52. This number is not broken 
down further into the various Afghan ethnic groups, so it is not possible to know how 
many of these approximately 72,000 Afghans are of Hazara background. Since the mid-
1990s Hazaras from Afghanistan have been arriving to Britain in waves. This contrasts 
with research which states that Afghans first started arriving to Europe during the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, at the end of the 1970s, and throughout the 1980s, 
with Mir Hekmatullah Sadat noting that Afghan migration to Europe and the United 
States directly correlates with political instability in Afghanistan at the time, such as, 
‘The Soviet Union invasion and later civil war between the Afghan government and 
Mujahidin’, ‘The sectarian wars between the former Mujahidin’ and, ‘The start of US-
led invasion against the Taliban and Al- Qaida’ (2008: 334). Similarly, in a journal paper 
on ‘Afghan migration through Turkey to Europe’, Ahmet İçduygu and Sibel Karadağ 
note that: 
 
…the formation of Afghan diaspora communities in Europe came through 
several phases over the last four decades. In the first phase, the pioneer 
settlers were students, business people and government officials. Then, the 
first large wave of Afghan immigrants to Europe was composed of refugees 
fleeing from the 1980s communist regime, followed by many others coming 
in the early 1990s escaping from the regime of mujahideen. The number rose 
in the latter half of that decade due to the rise of the Taliban in the country. 
The period of 2000s saw the rising arrival of irregular migrants together with 
the asylum seekers (2018: 495). 
 
However, through interviews and informal interactions with members of the Hazara 
community in England, it appears that Hazaras during the time of the Soviet invasion 
chose to migrate to areas closer to home, to Iran and Pakistan, where there were 
 
52 The exact figure is 72,238 which was deduced through public access to the England & Wales 2011 
census data. 
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already Hazara communities residing, who had migrated to these countries since the 
insurrection of Hazarajat in the late 19th Century, as opposed to migrating more 
westward towards Europe, as other Afghans had chosen to do at this time. It can be 
presumed that this was because historic Hazara networks already existed in these 
areas, as established networks play a key factor in where some refugees chose to 
migrate to53. Hazara migration to Britain and Europe, more generally, occurred at a 
much later stage than that of other Afghan communities54. Given the difficulties in 
obtaining accurate information on Hazara migration to Europe, it is essential to engage 
with information provided by Hazara research participants about their community’s 
migration, within this research.  
 
Hazara research participants have mentioned that the migration trajectory of their 
community does not mirror that of other Afghan communities, yet it is problematic 
that literature on Afghan migration to Europe does not distinguish or highlight the fact 
that Hazaras were not part of the first wave of Afghan migration to Europe, during the 
Soviet occupation in the late 1970s and 1980s. Through interviews and informal 
conversations with Hazara research participants it has become apparent that Hazara 
migration to Europe started to occur from the mid-1990s to late-1990s, over a decade 
after the migration of other Afghan communities to Europe, as prior to this time, 
Hazaras migrated to neighbouring countries where Hazara social networks had existed 
for almost a century. Research participants have stated that the mid-1990s, when 
Afghanistan was grappling with a civil war, which decimated large parts of the country, 
especially Kabul, was when Hazaras started to migrate en masse to Europe. This is 
reaffirmed by Dr Carolin Fischer when she notes that, ‘It was not until the mid-1990s 
that Afghans came to the UK in greater numbers, which have been continuously rising 
since then’ (2017: 21). Furthermore, according to Fischer’s informants ‘…this is 
because of the UK’s liberal labour market and peoples’ personal networks’ (ibid). 
Fischer’s reference to ‘personal networks’ is significant to note, because even though 
Afghan migrants will be in an unfamiliar environment once in the UK, the destination 
itself was chosen for practical reasons. From Fischer’s informants’ comments we learn 
 
53 For more information on Hazara social networks and settlement see: Monsutti, Alessandro. 
“Cooperation, remittances, and kinship among the Hazaras.” Iranian studies, vol. 37, issue 2, 2004, pp 
219-240. 
54 The oral histories of interviewees within this research show that the mid-1990s, late 1990s, early 
2000s and the years 2007-2008 were key migration periods for Hazaras to the UK.  
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that Afghan social networks have been around in the UK since the 1990s, if not before, 
and given that Hazaras are among the Afghans that have left Afghanistan for the UK it 
can reasonably be assumed that Hazara social networks also exist in the country55.      
 
Having briefly discussed Afghan migration to Britain, it should be noted that the way in 
which the Afghan migration to Europe is covered is itself problematic. Dr Marieke van 
Houte in her book on return migration to Afghanistan states that ‘…what is often 
overlooked is that the group of Afghan migrants in Europe is also heterogeneous in 
terms of background skills and reasons for migration…’ (2016: 55). She goes on to 
provide statistics on Afghan asylum claims in EU member states, showing a stark 
increase in asylum claims from 2005 which stood at 6,780 compared to 2015 when the 
number drastically increased to 178,230. However, these statistics are not broken 
down into the ethnic composition of arrivals, so it is difficult to determine how many of 
the asylum applicants in 2015 were of a Hazara background. Given the limited 
information available on Afghan migration to Britain, and the lack of information 
specifically on Hazara migration to the country, oral accounts of Hazara migration to 
Britain have assisted in drawing a timeline of when the community began to settle in 
the country. Alongside this, the social and political situation in the country at the time 
of these migrations, as well as reports on Afghan migration have been drawn upon and 
discussed in this section, in order to verify claims made about the waves of Hazara 
migration to Britain.  
 
The late 1990s saw an increase in Hazara migration to Europe during the Taliban rule 
in Afghanistan and also during and after the earlier civil war period. Multiple research 
participants interviewed have stated that they themselves, (and some their family 
members) migrated to Britain at this time, and recalled a small but sizable Hazara 
community emerging in the country at this period in time. And this would correlate 
with instances of growing violence and ethnic tensions in Afghanistan. There were 
 
55 In relation to Afghan migration to the West, Alessandro Monsutti notes that those who migrated in 
the 1980s and 1990s were of a slightly higher social standing than some of the Afghans who have 
migrated since the 2000s. He states that, ‘[a] growing number of Afghans also went in Europe, North 
America or Australia. In the 1980s and early 1990s, most of them were from upper and middle urban 
classes. But many rural people found their way to the West during the time of the Taliban. For instance, 
some Hazaras are now present in Washington, DC, New York and New Jersey, where they are taxi 
drivers or are active in the catering industry (several have a pushcart or even a fried chicken shop)’ 
(2008: 68).  
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countless massacres carried out during the country’s civil war period, and some were 
directed at the Hazara community. Several major massacres include the mass 
bombardment of Kabul carried out by Hezb-i-Islami from 1992 to 1993 which killed 
thousands of Hazaras and non-Hazara civilians, as did another mass bombardment in 
Kabul jointly coordinated by Pashtun leader Abdul Rasoul Sayyaf and Tajik leader 
Ahmad Shah Massoud in 1995 (known as the Afshar Massacre), as well as the 1998 
massacre of eight-thousand Hazara civilians in Mazar-e Sharif by the Taliban.  
 
The massacre in Mazar-e Sharif is important to note given that many research 
participants mentioned that there was a surge in Hazara migration from Afghanistan to 
Britain at that time. A Human Rights Watch report mentions that the massacres in the 
city were in part due to the Hazaras religious beliefs as Shia Muslims,56 as a Taliban 
commander at the time of the attack, Mullah Niazi, stated that, ‘Hazaras are not 
Muslim, they are Shi’a. They are kofr [infidels]. The Hazaras killed our forces here, and 
now we have to kill Hazaras…If you do not show your loyalty, we will burn your 
houses, and we will kill you. You either accept to be Muslims or leave Afghanistan’57. 
While Jon Armajani in his book on modern Islamist movements states that ‘…according 
to the Taliban’s interpretation of the Quran and Hadith their killing of the Hazara 
Shiites was justified because, in the Taliban’s view, the Shiites are heretics.’ (2012: 
207).  
 
Migration to Britain in the early 2000s was a logical choice for Hazaras leaving 
Afghanistan given that some small Hazara social networks had started to emerge 
among members of the community in the country who had settled years prior. 
However, since the latter part of the 2000s Hazara migration to the UK has decreased, 
this is in part due to asylum procedures becoming more stringent, and a reluctance to 
accept Afghan migrants in Britain and several EU states. This has not meant that 
Hazara migration, and more generally Afghan migration, to Europe has significantly 
decreased, but rather that these refugees are less likely to try and attempt to seek 
asylum in the UK. Instead Hazaras and other Afghans are being processed in regions 
 
56 Taliban commander Maulawi Mohammed Hanif is reported to have told a crowd in the mid-1990s 
that ‘Hazaras are not Muslims, you can kill them’.  
See: www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/06/afghanistan-hazaras-160623093601127.html.  
57 See: www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/afghan/Afrepor0-03.htm#P186_38364.  
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such as the Mediterranean58, their first entry points into Europe from the land routes 
taken from Afghanistan, through Iran and then Turkey, onto Greece, Italy or Nordic 
countries, where there has been a steady increase in Afghan migration, and thus there 
is a growth in Hazara social networks emerging in these states.  
 
Dr Angeliki Dimitriadi, a Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and 
Foreign Policy, notes that migration from Afghanistan can be linked to ‘multiple 
factors’, including searching for ‘…protection or security or even for financial reasons’ 
(2017: 60), with second generation Afghans from Iran and Pakistan who can no longer 
stay in these countries or return to Afghanistan, also migrating to Europe. In relation to 
the pecuniary motivations for mobility and westward migration to Europe, in a 2018 
online blog post for the Refugee Outreach & Research Network, Abbasi and Monsutti 
note that the, ‘Migration of young Afghan to Europe is structured by a moral 
economy…[implying a] social system of exchange and redistribution between young 
migrants and their relatives who stayed behind’. Similarly, in a chapter by Dr Ignacio 
Correa-Velez et al. on irregular migration it was noted that there were multiple factors 
which act as catalysts for irregular migration alongside seeking protection, such as 
‘…widespread poverty, economic hardship, political instability…’ (2017: 143). Thus 
reaffirming the economic motivations for migration, alongside fears of persecution or 
threats to life.    
 
In the aforementioned journal paper on Afghans in Greece, Dimitriadi further notes 
that asylum is a central factor in Afghan mobility to the continent, and that this move 
was ‘permanent’ for those migrating (in so much as it could be permanent when 
asylum procedures are a prerequisite to enable certainty and residency in a new host 
country for refugees). Her own respondents, 50% of whom were Hazara Afghans, 
stated that their destinations of choice in Europe were Germany and Sweden, followed 
by Britain (2017: 59 - 64). Similarly, Hazara research participants in England59 have 
mentioned that Britain and Sweden have the highest number of Hazara residents in 
Europe (which is reaffirmed by unpublished statistics provided by the World Hazara 
 
58 The following CBC report has further information on the growing number of asylum applications being 
processed in Greece:  
www.cbc.ca/news/world/greece-asylum-applications-1.3531714.   
59 These are research participants who have participated in my research interviews, as Dimitriadi’s work 
focuses on Afghans in Greece.  
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Council), with many Afghans also residing in Germany, although mostly non-Hazara 
Afghans. Dimitriadi’s observations here are noteworthy as they show that what are 
perceived as ideal migration destinations in Europe for Hazaras since the mid-1990s 
have been constant. While in a journal paper titled, ‘Turning refugees into ‘illegal 
migrants’: Afghan asylum seekers in Europe’, Dr Liza Schuster, a Reader in the 
Department of Sociology, City University London, notes that ‘moving on’ through 
Europe is also seen as a way out of ‘illegality’:  
 
Most of the Afghans seem to have mixed motives for moving on - negative 
experiences in Greece plus stories from contacts further afield, from contacts 
in other EU Member States that promise things will be better. A significant 
number know, or know of, members of their extended families or friends 
around Europe who have received papers and who are working, or who are 
working without papers. In some cases, they are expected and encouraged to 
come and join them (2011: 1398).    
 
A 2010 report published by the Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR) 
on ‘Afghans in the UK’ states that the, ‘…number of applicants for asylum by Afghans in 
the UK has consistently increased in number between 1997 and 2001, and since then 
asylum applications have remained high’ (1). This information correlates with what 
Hazara research participants have mentioned during the course of research interviews, 
namely that the late 1990s saw an increase in Hazara migration to the UK, as did the 
early 2000s. This was firstly due to Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and subsequently when 
the NATO intervention began after the 9/11 attacks. The same report also states that, 
‘The number of [Afghan asylum] applications has fallen since 2001 when a record 
9,000 applications were made’ (ibid: 4). Which again also falls in line with another time 
period mentioned by Hazara research participants as a key period in Hazara migration 
to Britain. It was stated by multiple research participants that after a lull in migration to 
Britain from the early 2000s there was a brief resurgence in Hazaras migrating to the 
country in 2007-2008, when there was heightened violence Afghanistan60.    
 
60 The desire to migrate abroad from Afghanistan still persists given the heightened instability and lack 
of security in Afghanistan. The 2017 annual survey of the Asia Foundation stated that there has been an 
increase in the desire to migrate from Afghanistan from 30% in 2016 to 39% in 2017. The study 
specifically states that, ‘38.8% of Afghans would leave the country if afforded the opportunity—the 
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Given that Hazara migration to Britain has been occurring for just over two decades 
the demographics of the community has altered sharply from what it was during the 
first wave of migration to the country. This can been seen from the beginning of what 
has been termed the ‘refugee crisis’ since 2015, in reference to refugees from the 
Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Afghanistan arriving in Europe, fleeing war, 
violence and persecution, with many of these migrants young males. The same was 
the case for Hazaras who arrived in Britain from the mid-1990s onwards. Some 
research participants have noted that families were brought over once there was more 
certainty regarding their residence in the country, while for others they married in 
Britain but still had extended families in Afghanistan, Iran or Pakistan. In a journal 
article by Lange et al. on Hazara refugees in Australia it was stated that, ‘Generally, the 
men left their families behind (in Afghanistan) in the hope they would be able to 
organize reunion once they have arrived in a safe place’ (2007: 34). Furthermore, in 
the small town where the research for the paper was conducted there were, ‘85 
Hazaras in Albany - 65 men…7 women and 13 children. Most of the men were married 
and either had a wife (in Australia) or a wife and children in Afghanistan or a transit 
country’ (ibid: 35). In turn Lange’s observations validate the pattern of migration seen 
in Britain too, with young Hazara men coming to the country and only once settled in 
terms of residency and work, did the majority bring their extended families over. 
However, having noted the continuing Afghan migration to Europe, how states have 
responded to such movement is also pertinent to briefly note. In a paper on Afghan 
asylum seekers and the European Union, Dr Tazreena Sajjad, a senior professorial 
lecturer at the American University in Washington DC states the following, which 
summarises the growing hostility European governments are showing towards Afghan 
asylum seekers: 
 
Europe has been receiving large numbers of Afghans for several years; since 
the beginning of the 2015 ‘crisis’, they have consistently represented one of 
the largest refugee clusters to reach the continent’s shores. However the rate 
 
second-highest level recorded in Survey history’ (14). Whether such ambitions will materialise can only 
be assessed with time. Nonetheless, dependable surveys conducted such as the Afghanistan annual 
survey allow for researchers to cautiously predict that there may be an increase in the number of 
asylum seekers to Europe, if violence, lack of security and governance have increased in asylum 
applicants’ countries of origin.  
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of granting them asylum in various EU countries has depreciated significantly 
over time, with acceptance numbers being particularly low since at least 
2010. Between 2015 and 2016 when the EU-Afghan deal61 was signed, the 
number of deported Afghans nearly tripled from 3,290 to 9,460 
corresponding to a marked fall in recognition of asylum applications, from 68 
per cent in September 2015 to 33 per cent in December 2016. In 2016 almost 
10,000 Afghan applicants had their asylum cases rejected. In 2017, there was 
a marked fall in Afghan asylum applications to Germany, Sweden and Finland, 
with Germany granting asylum to less than half of Afghan applicants during 
the first nine months of 2017 (2018: 49).  
 
Problems that have occurred in policy making in the EU were highlighted in a 
publication by the British-based institute of international affairs, Chatham House from 
late 2017, early 2018. The publication stated that the current German President Frank-
Walter Steinmeier said that aid to Afghanistan ‘…was conditional on the government’s 
ability to accept the return of migrants’, and that, ‘The deal made aid and 
development contingent on repatriation’ (Quie and Hakimi 2018: 28). This is a 
significant declaration, because the same publication stated that the EU claimed that, 
‘There is never, never a link between our development aid and whatever we do with 
migration’ (ibid), according to comments made by Federica Mogherini, the current 
Vice-President of the European Commission. Steinmeier’s and Mogherini’s comments 
are in direct contention with one another, yet Germany’s deportation policy of 
Afghans still continues unchallenged (as well as that of the UK, Sweden and other 
European states that deem Afghanistan a ‘safe-country’ for return). While post-
doctoral researcher Dr Admir Sdoko notes that: 
 
The arrival of 178,200 Afghan asylum seekers to EU countries in 2015 led to 
an agreement between the EU and Afghanistan on the return of rejected 
asylum seekers, and an agreement between the EU and Turkey which aimed 
to halt the transit of Afghans to Europe. In one leaked draft of the EU-
 




Afghanistan agreement, the EU threatened to withdraw aid in the case of 
non-compliance (2018: 4). 
 
Such a questionable migration policy can directly be challenged by documenting the 
vast instances of security lapses in Afghanistan and how an inefficient Afghan 
government is unable to prevent high-level attacks in Kabul and other major cities in 
Afghanistan. Furthermore, Germany’s position on Afghan migrants can be viewed as 
problematic in light of the decision taken after the May 2017 attack in the diplomatic 
quarter of Kabul, when deportations of Afghans from Germany were only temporarily 
halted62. Thomas Ruttig specifically dealt with the issue of Afghan migrants in Germany 
as part of an Afghanistan Analysts Network report on migration to Europe. Ruttig 
highlights that a major consequence of Germany’s policy on Afghan migrants is that 
the policy ‘…has contributed to a political climate in which Afghans are increasingly 
seen as not fully entitled to protection and as economic migrants, not refugees fleeing 
from war’63.  
 
It is important to highlight the general trend of viewing Afghans as ‘economic 
migrants’, due to the fact that NATO combat troops officially withdrew in December 
2014, and as a result of political manoeuvring to prevent states from being obliged to 
grant asylum to Afghans has occurred64, given the growing ‘refugee fatigue’, and more 
favourable immigration policies towards other refugee communities65. However, in 
spite of this growing trend in treating Afghans as second tier asylum seekers, Italy has 
in fact constantly accepted Afghan asylums seekers, unlike many other European 
states. In a 2017 report for the Afghanistan Analysts Network it was stated that, ‘Italy 
has consistently had one of the highest rates for recognising Afghans as asylum 
seekers in Europe. In 2015-2016, the rate was stable at 97 per cent of all asylum 
requests, much higher than Germany (55 per cent), Sweden (46 per cent) and the UK 
(35 per cent)’66. This is important to note, in that despite the mounting violence and 
 
62  See: www.ecre.org/germany-temporary-suspension-of-asylum-procedures-for-afghan-nationals/.  
63 See: www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghan-exodus-afghan-asylum-seekers-in-europe-3-case-study-
germany/.  
64 ibid.  
65 See: www.independent.co.uk/news/how-afghans-became-second-class-asylum-seekers-
a7591121.html.  
66 See: www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghan-asylum-seekers-in-italy-a-place-of-temporary-respite/.  
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instability in Afghanistan, with heightened Taliban presence in various provinces of the 
country, many European states are still not aligning their domestic policies on Afghan 
asylum seekers with the ground realities in the country, which are forcing these 
vulnerable people to flee Afghanistan. This in turn is impacting the ‘destination of 
choice’ for Afghans making the journey to Europe. While in a 2013 report on 
‘Migration from Afghanistan to third countries and Greece’, a member of the ‘United 
Afghans in Greece’ organisation relayed to Dr Angeliki Dimitriadi the countries Afghans 
seek to migrate to, and claim asylum, in Europe, which is still relevant, albeit even if 
the destinations have slightly altered in the last several years due to harsher 
immigration policies towards Afghans being enacted by some European states: 
 
People move to certain places. For example the Pashtun tribe and those from 
Kandahar and Logar all want to go London and England. Those from the 
[Herat] and especially the Tajiks, primarily wish to migrate to Germany. The 
Hazaras prefer Sweden and Austria. For example, in 2009 almost everyone 
wanted to go to England. When England changed its policy, the Afghans 
turned to Sweden but mostly Norway and Finland. Once these countries 
reduced asylum recognition, they turned to Germany, Switzerland and 
Sweden. Families go to Sweden because within two months they know if 
their asylum claim has been accepted or rejected. Secondly, they receive 
benefits (2013: 14).       
 
The point made in relation to England (and the UK more generally) is pertinent to note 
as it reaffirms what many research participants have said during the interviewees for 
this study, which is, that Hazara migration to the UK has decreased significantly given 
that the likelihood of asylum applications being accepted in the country severely 
declining in recent years. A statistic which confirms this assertion can be found in the 
2018 UK Home Office ‘Country Policy and Information Note’ on Afghanistan. It states 
that, ‘…since 2008 nearly 40,000 Afghan nationals were returned to Afghanistan by 
European countries, including Norway; over 10,000 of those returns occurred in 2016. 
Since 2004, over 10,000 Afghans have voluntarily left or been removed from the UK’ 




In initially documenting a brief history of significant political events in latter 20th 
Century Afghanistan this chapter has sought to contextualise the waves of Afghan 
migration that have been taking place regionally, more further afield to Europe since 
the late 1970s, and Hazara migration to the UK since the 1990s. Within this historic 
timeline key political events and their aftermath were explored, in order give a 
backdrop as to why Afghans were forced to seek refuge abroad. In relation to this 
protracted history of migration, now stemming over four decades, there appears to be 
limited literature on Hazara migration to Europe and specifically Britain. Therefore the 
task of creating an introductory migration timeline of the Hazara community in the UK 
has been undertaken within this chapter. In documenting this history of migration, 
Hazara research participants shared information about when they and their families 
migrated to the country (although it should be noted that several interviewees arrived 
as unaccompanied minors), and the motivations behind the decision to migrate. The 
limited literature available on Afghan migration to the continent was also referenced, 
where needed, to ensure that an accurate timeline was constructed. Here policy 
papers contextualising Afghan migration to Europe and research papers on Afghans in 
Europe were consulted to see what information was available regarding Afghan 
migration to Europe.          
 
A significant takeaway from the timeline drawn up in this chapter is that the Hazara 
community migrated to the country almost a decade and a half after Afghans of other 
ethnicities had started to make their way to Europe, which literature on Afghan 
migration to Europe fails to distinguish. The migration timeline of the community falls 
in line with key events in Afghanistan which saw increased violence against the 
Hazaras such as the Afshar massacre and Mazar massacre, or when there was 
heightened insecurity and instability in the country. However, as the literature and 
interviews highlight, the last decade has seen a severe decline in Hazara and non-
Hazara Afghan migration to the UK given the growing number of failed asylum 
applications for Afghans. This has not meant that Afghans are not arriving in Europe, 
even if one of their desired destinations is off-limits, instead they are choosing to 
migrate to other European states where the likelihood of positive asylum outcomes 
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are higher. As a result, based on the insights provided by research participants it 

































Chapter 4: An oral history of Hazara consciousness:      
 
4.1 Introduction:  
This chapter traces the historic collective consciousness of the Hazara community. 
Drawing on French philosopher Michel Foucault’s discussions on genealogy, it seeks to 
contextualise continuity and change within this collective consciousness over time, 
both in fixed locations and shared transnational space. In turn this chapter charts how 
members of the Hazara community demonstrate change within the community 
through time in relation to the narratives of marginality and overcoming, from being 
subjugated, peripheral subjects to active citizens who have made multiple collective 
gains in recent years. In terms of genealogy Foucault states that: 
 
The role of genealogy is to record its history: the history of morals, ideals, and 
metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty or of the ascetic 
life; as they stand for the emergence of different interpretations, they must 
be made to appear as events on the stage of historical process (1977: 86). 
 
He also adds that, ‘The world we know is not this ultimately simple configuration 
where events are reduced to accentuate their essential traits, their final meaning, or 
their initial and final value. On the contrary, it is a profusion of entangled events’ (ibid: 
89). Therefore, this chapter seeks to engage with formal research interviews 
conducted with members of the Hazara community in London, Birmingham and 
Nottingham, in order to detail and discuss personal accounts about the self in relation 
to Hazara history, and how self-identification among the community has altered with 
time. It also seeks to understand how a historic consciousness was formed in the first 
instance and its impact on research participants. This chapter additionally analyses 
how a historic consciousness is dispersed among the community and the content of 
this historic consciousness. In turn the basis of this chapter is not exclusively restricted 
to written, documented information about Hazara consciousness but rather personal 
oral histories of members of the Hazara community in relation to this historic 
consciousness, which is not accessible in printed material. Here it is pertinent to also 
note the following quote from Professor Michael Rothberg of UCLA in relation to the 
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narratives of marginality and overcoming, given how memories of events, both 
personal and collective, impact these narratives and what they constitute:    
 
…acts of memory are rhizomatic networks of temporality and cultural 
reference that exceed attempts at territorialization (whether at the local or 
national level) and identitarian reduction. Performances of memory may well 
have territorializing or identity-forming effects, but those effects will always 
be contingent and open to resignification (2010: 7). 
   
Subsequently, this chapter has two aims: to show how fragments of memories become 
organised into narratives. This in turn links to a consciousness of a history seen as 
marginal in relation to dominant historical narratives, which merge through observable 
processes, as this chapter will be documenting a community history of past events, 
given that this thesis at its core is a genealogy of self-identification. Additionally, this 
chapter will also highlight how these memories come together in unpredictable, new 
ways, in line with Rothberg’s remarks.  
 
Given that this chapter will be documenting a genealogy of Hazara consciousness a 
pivotal quote to consider is the following from anthropologist Dr Melissa Kerr 
Chiovenda, in relation to the lack of incorporation of Hazara history within Afghan 
history writing, with Chiovenda noting that, ‘One of the most common refrains I heard 
from Hazaras in Bamyan was “Pashtuns have stolen our history.” When asked to 
elaborate, I was told that most (although not all) historians form Afghanistan had been 
Pashtun, and they had, according to my informants, written histories that entirely left 
out the Hazara point of view’ (2018: 262). These power dynamics have prevented 
peripheral histories such as that of the Hazaras from being formally documented in 
Afghanistan as a continued timeline of marginalisation. Constructing an indigenous 
history from within the Hazara community has been extremely important, as it has 
given the community an opportunity to expand on dominant accounts of Afghan 
history. Hence, the creation of an indigenous historiography in the case of the Hazaras 
allows for a marginal community to narrate their past on their own terms, and push for 
their community’s history to not be side-lined, and further document the growth of 
Hazara consciousness among the community with time.   
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As highlighted in the previous chapters, the narratives of marginality and overcoming 
are now widely circulated among the transnational Hazara community, and in this 
chapter these narratives will be explored through discussing the formal research 
interviews conducted for this research, and this will be done in order to assess the 
extent to which these narratives are reproduced in conversational spaces, as well as to 
highlight how these conversations have become conduits through which various 
thoughts about these narratives come together in private homes and community 
spaces. In turn by engaging with these internally constructed community narratives it 
becomes easier to distinguish to what extent these narratives impact individual 
perspectives on Hazara consciousness and to what extent these narratives have 
penetrated individual community member’s awareness of their community and past, 
alongside social media and history-writing for example. Additionally, this chapter will 
also examine how the individuals interviewed for this research see themselves in 
relation to these community histories, and how they perceive their own lived 
experiences through these histories in order to construct a Hazara community history. 
Therefore, before engaging with the contents of the semi-structured interviews 
conducted for this research it is important to briefly look at the themes of history and 
memory, the extent to which they are interconnected, relate to Hazara self-
identification, and the narratives of marginality and overcoming more broadly.       
 
4.2 History and memory: 
At the core of the narratives of marginality and overcoming are community history and 
collective memory. These narratives relate to history in so much as what is being 
propagated within these narratives are a protracted timeline of oppression against the 
Hazaras, followed by a more recent timeline of civic accomplishments and gains within 
the community. Memory is also central to these narratives in so far as recollections of 
the past help to contextualise and personalise these narratives and become the 
impetus for Hazara community action, worldwide. Here it is important to briefly 
engage with relevant literature on history and memory, and to understand the 
interrelatedness of both these themes. In relation to memory, historian Pierre Nora 
notes that, ‘Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in 
permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, 
unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and 
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appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived’ (1989: 8). 
Here dormancy and revival are important to note as it can be seen that the 
insurrection of Hazarajat as part of a timeline of historic oppression against the 
Hazaras is not chronologised as protracted marginality within dominant discourses on 
Afghan history, for example, but that these memories have instead been revived since 
the political mobilisation of the Hazara community from the 1980s onwards, and are 
now permanently documented in online spaces. While Professor Michael Rothberg 
mentions that, ‘…memory emerges from unexpected, multidirectional encounters- 
encounters between diverse pasts and a conflictual present, to be sure, but also 
between different agents or catalysts of memory’ (2010: 9), with quotes from several 
research participants in the remainder of this chapter substantiating this point. While 
at the same the quotes selected from the research interviews in the subsequent 
sections of this chapter will underscore the intersection of history and memory within 
this chapter and their significance within this research, given that they are vital tools 
for minority communities to relate to, and preserve their past. Here it is pertinent to 
note the work of Maurice Halbwachs who is credited with developing the concept of 
collective memory, and whose work is discussed in the literature review chapter, with 
Halbwachs stating that:  
 
What makes recent memories hang together is not that they are continuous 
in time: it is rather that they are part of a totality of thoughts common to a 
group, the group of people with whom we have a relation at this moment, or 
with whom we have had a relation on the preceding day or days (1992: 52). 
 
Maurice Halbwachs also states that through the preservation of memory a sense of 
‘…our identity is perpetuated’ (1992: 47). This is a vital concept to note, given that 
Hazara narratives about the past are very much collective community memories and 
shared histories that are used to reinforce identity, ethnic consciousness and ethnic 
solidarity. As a result, these collective memories and shared histories act as the 
impetus for awareness and solidarity campaigns by Hazaras outside Afghanistan, an 
example of which is the annual Mazari commemoration, in memory of the pivotal 
Hazara political leader Abdul Ali Mazari, and the countless demonstrations which occur 
worldwide in the aftermath of targeted attacks on Hazaras in Afghanistan and 
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Pakistan. The collective memory of the past also acts as a catalyst for political 
mobilisation among the Hazara community today. While Pierre Nora also notes that, 
‘The passage from memory to history has required every social group to redefine its 
identity through the revitalization of its own history’ (1989: 15), and this redefinition 
can be seen in now historic marginalisation is not solely articulated by members of the 
Hazara community when discussing their community, but now additionally the post-
2001 gains of Hazaras in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This quote from Nora is also 
important to highlight because in making this assertion Nora is going further than 
some historians in highlighting the role that communities themselves play in 
preserving and documenting their history, and the agency they gain through such an 
exercise. Furthermore, he mentions that it is not only marginalised groups in society 
who are compelled to retrieve their pasts but also ‘ethnic groups and social minorities’ 
(ibid), which is equally applicable to the Hazara community. In instances where 
memory is not ‘experience[d]’ collectively, a need arises for individuals to undertake 
the task to revive and maintain these narratives. This notion of revival is also relevant 
to Hazaras given that the political mobilisation that gave rise to their ethnic 
consciousness in Afghanistan occurred reactively late, in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Similarly, in terms of memory and its role in relation to identity Paul Ricoeur notes 
that:      
...it is through the narrative function that memory is incorporated into the 
formation of identity. Memory can be ideologized through the resources of 
the variations offered by the work of narrative configuration. And, as the 
characters of the narrative are emplotted at the same time the story is told, 
the narrative configuration contributes to modeling the identity of the 
protagonists of the action as it molds the contours of the action itself (2004: 
84-85).       
 
This section has engaged with relevant literature on history and memory, both 
personal and collective, to show its relevance to the Hazara community and the 
narratives of marginality and overcoming. In understanding the importance of history 
and memory in relation to the narratives central to this research it becomes clear as to 
why the Hazara community has positioned itself in the way in which it has and why it 
propagates these specific narratives. In turn, the subsequent sections of this chapter 
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will engage with the narratives of marginality and overcoming to see how they are 
engaged with and discussed by members of the Hazara community, with reference to 
the research interviews conducted for this study. 
 
4.3 Hazara historiography:  
Having looked at the themes history and memory in the previous section of this 
chapter and the extent to which they are interconnected, it is also important to assess 
written work which details the Hazara community’s shift over time from a historic, 
marginal community, to active citizens who mobilise for their community. This will be 
done in order to contextualise the research interviews in the next section of this 
chapter, which show how the narratives of marginality and overcoming are 
personalised and demonstrate a shift within individual Hazara self-identification.  
 
In terms of the insurrection of Hazarajat being a fundamental theme within Hazara 
collective consciousness Syed Askar Mousavi notes that:         
 
The fear, hatred and repression inspired by Abdur Rahman persists to this 
day in the souls and minds of the people of Afghanistan, in particular the 
Hazaras. More than all the other peoples of Afghanistan, the Hazaras were 
the subject of the wrath and hatred of Abdur Rahman. There were two main 
reasons for this. First, it was only the Hazaras who instigated and were able 
to carry out the largest uprising against Abdur Rahman, inflicting heavy losses 
and damages on the government in Kabul. According to Temirkhanov, the 
war against the Hazaras cost Abdur Rahman roughly one half of the country’s 
budget and military force...Thus, the Hazaras constituted a real major threat 
to his rule. Second, the Hazaras were Shi’a, and so considered as godless 
infidels by Abdur Rahman, a Sunni, war against them was a religious crusade 
and obligatory, and so was carried out with vigour and the help of Sunni 
Mullas (1998: 117).   
 
Mousavi’s quote highlights how a shift has occurred in how narrations of a Hazara past 
now orient themselves to move the focus of the community from being presented as 
‘deviant’ in historical narratives to being an active collective who have their own 
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history in their own right. In this passage from his book Mousavi chooses to present 
Hazaras as formidable fighters during the insurrection of Hazarajat. This inverts the 
dominant narratives present about this period in history which emphasise that the 
Emir engaged in jihad as a means to consolidate his power. In turn, it can be seen that 
certain aspects of a historical Hazara consciousness develop through positive 
inversions of prevailing historical discourses, because in the aforementioned quote it 
can be seen that Hazara selfhood is being established through assertion, instead of a 
selfhood that manifests through being the ‘other’.     
 
Mousavi was writing at a time when Hazaras were still being persecuted, a century 
after the insurrection of Hazarajat, where marginality was not only part of the 
community’s history but a daily reality at the time. Therefore, having discussed a piece 
of seminal literature on the Hazara community written in the 1990s it is important to 
also note the work of anthropologist Bernt Glatzer who has documented his 
interactions with Hazaras in Afghanistan, before the civil war of the 1990s, as he states 
that, ‘The Hazara are identified by other Afghans as one ethnic group recognizable by 
their prevailing Central Asian phenotype. Before the war I found the Hazara reluctant 
to name themselves ‘Hazara’, maybe because in Kabul Hazara has the connotation of 
‘very poor’ or ‘coolie’. The war has changed this attitude; decades of independence 
from Kabul have led to a remarkable ethnic self-confidence’ (2001: 171). Glatzer’s 
observation here is critical to note as it encapsulates a prevailing notion relating to a 
lack of self-worth among the community which preceded the period of Hazara 
consciousness that started to take hold in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s, which multiple research participants have discussed at length. 
Research participants with protracted lived experiences in Afghanistan have noted that 
on occasion the word ‘Hazara’ was used as a pejorative term by non-Hazara Afghans 
towards them when out with Hazara friends or walking down the street in certain 
neighbourhoods, and that these experiences meant that those who had a command of 
Hazaragi would switch to standard Persian if non-Hazaras were passing, as a means to 
prevent further ridicule. Relaying these experiences of racist abuse suffered in public, 
as well as recounting the community’s collective memory of past subjugation during 
and after the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan, coupled with the awareness of the 
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prevalence of Hazara slave ownership67 meant that ethnic consciousness took hold 
among Hazaras at a much later stage than that for Pashtuns and Tajiks, for instance. 
Furthermore, sociologist Grant Farr states that, ‘[Hazaras] are publicly humiliated with 
taunts of Hazara-e mushkhur (Mice-eating Hazara), bini puchuq (flat-nose), and khar-e 
barkash (load-carrying donkeys), relating to their racial features or to their role as 
menial laborers’ (2007: 161).    
 
While in a journal paper on Shiite movements in Afghanistan, Hazara scholar Dr 
Hafizullah Emadi notes that in 1979, ‘The Shiite movement of Afghanistan was divided 
into three ideological groups: Islamist, Hazara nationalist and Socialist’ (1995: 5), while 
also stating that some of the most prominent advocates of the Hazara nationalist 
movement, namely Abdul Raouf Turkmani, Muhammad Ismail Mubaligh and Haji Nadir 
Ali Allahdad were all executed in the early 1980s (ibid: 5-6). In turn, a shift in Hazara 
ethnic consciousness started to emerge in Afghanistan at this time, when political 
mobilisation of Hazaras started to take hold in the midst of the Soviet occupation of 
the country. Here it is also important to note the time in which Emadi was writing this 
article, which was during the civil war and after the Afshar massacre making his work 
and words more salient given that the community was still enduring severe violence as 
a civilian collective almost a decade and a half after Hazara nationalist political figures 
had been killed. While Marie notes that what began as mobilisation in retaliation to 
foreign presence in Afghanistan soon turned into promoting Hazara ethnic 
consciousness (2013: 101). Dissatisfaction among Hazaras for continually being on the 
margins of society, both politically and socio-economically, led to a vociferous 
campaign demanding greater inclusion of Hazaras in the ‘public sphere’, which 
continues even today. Furthermore, Ibrahimi notes that there has been a shift in 
ethnic consciousness among Hazaras in the last two decades leaving behind localised 
identities (of clans and villages) to ‘large scale’ identity being defined as an ethnic 
 
67 Historian Dr Hasan Kakar in his book titled ‘Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 
‘Abd Al-Rahman Khan’ notes that, ‘…[t]he price paid for the [Hazara slaves] was generally the lowest’, 
showing that even with slaves there was a hierarchy (1979: 175). Kakar also cities the British explorer 
and diplomat Alexander Burnes in his book titled, ‘A political and diplomatic history of Afghanistan, 
1863-1901’, stating that, ‘…In 1838, Alexander Burnes noted that “All the drudgery and work in Kabul is 
done by some Hazaras, some of whom are slaves and some free; in winter there are not less than ten 
thousand who reside in the city, and gain a livelihood by clearing the roofs of snow and acting as 
porters”…As previously noted, most Hazaras were Shi'as, and only some were Sunnis, whereas their 
neighbors were all Sunnis. Consequently, the Hazaras were “…oppressed by all their neighboring 
nations, whom they served as hewers of wood and drawers of water.”’ (2006: 126).  
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group68 (2012: 1). Additionally, Grant Farr mentions that ethnic consciousness or 
‘ethnic nationalism’ and ethnic solidarity have grown significantly among Hazara 
populations worldwide, noting that: 
 
The Hazara have been profoundly politicized by these events of the last three 
decades, and a newfound ethnic nationalism has developed. As a result the 
Hazara have formed political organizations, and Hazara leaders are now 
demanding active participation in the events of Afghanistan and a redress of 
past wrongs (2007: 160).  
 
Having discussed literature on Hazaras written in the 1990s and reflections on the 
community’s position in 1990s Afghanistan it is also important to note the work Dr 
Niamatullah Ibrahimi here who has written extensively about Hazara collective 
consciousness. The events which inform Hazara collective consciousness, which in part 
centre on the insurrection of Hazarajat, (Ibrahimi 2012: 3-4) are commonly referred to 
in online works published by Hazara scholars and activists, but they are seldom 
thoroughly discussed in history writing on Afghanistan more generally, despite the 
scale of violence inflicted on the Hazara people during the reign of Abdur Rahman 
Khan. This is due to the fact that within Afghan history writing it can be seen that 
histories are contested, and there is not one shared historical narrative of the ‘Afghan 
nation’, even if specific narratives have gained prominence over time, as they may, 
totally or partially, be disputed by certain segments of Afghan society. In turn the 
suffering inflicted in the late 19th Century on the Hazaras, which is at the centre of the 
community’s collective consciousness became intrinsically linked to the political 
mobilisation of the community in the 1980s and 1990s in Afghanistan. Therefore, it can 
be seen that the marginalisation of Hazaras in Afghanistan both as a historic and racial 
othering has greatly impacted political awareness and mobilisation among the 
community, yet is barely addressed in Persian history writing. As a result, this brings to 
the fore the issue of the contemporary, mainstream form of a Hazara historical vision, 
in which Hazaras are not positioned as historical or racial others, but are in fact 
historical subjects in their own right, and are therefore characterised, in narratives of 
 
68 Ibrahimi also goes on to state that the term qawm mostly refers to a trans-local ethnic identity, as 
opposed to smaller ‘tribal’ identities.  
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overcoming, by a future redemption, which can be seen to be a result of this growth in 
Hazara consciousness during the 1980s and 1990s, and also due to the community’s 
civic gains in recent years. Furthermore,  it is also worth noting that some literature on 
Hazaras and non-Hazara Afghans, has highlighted how certain political events in the 
country’s history have deeply impacted issues of ethnicity and identity among Afghans, 
as Dr Fariba Adelkhah states the following in relation to ethnicity in Afghanistan:      
 
According to Olivier Roy (1985), the [Afghan-Soviet] war was a crucial vector 
of ethnic consciousness in Afghanistan. It endorsed our major groups that 
cannot be defined according to objective and unambiguous criteria: 
Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks. By definition, these categories are 
historically situated. They are contextual, relational and relative: you are a 
Hazara in relation to the Pashtuns, the Tajiks, and the Sayyids, at a given 
historical moment that refers to a more or less distant and more or less 
traumatic past as well as to completely contemporary issues interpreted 
using the yardstick of this memory (2017: 142).   
 
Therefore, not only does the Hazara community’s history act as a catalyst for 
contemporary political mobilisation, while also being central to the community’s 
collective consciousness, it has also informed and altered the way in which identity is 
constituted within the community. Furthermore, this protracted history of oppression 
underscores the master narratives within this research, and this can be seen by the 
collective action undertaken by the community, where the narrative of marginality is a 
transnational narrative, in that it not only plays a significant role within the collective 
consciousness of the Hazara community in Afghanistan, but also among the Hazara 
diaspora in Europe and Australia. This is further reaffirmed by the countless references 
made to the insurrection of Hazarajat and more contemporary forms of discrimination 
against the community, both in the information propagated online on Hazara websites 
and social media, but also through informal conversations and the formal research 
interviews that have shaped this study. Hence, understanding a narrative based on 
marginality has been essential, as it helps in comprehending Hazara ethnic 
consciousness, solidarity and political mobilisation beyond borders, while a narrative 
of overcoming highlights how a history of subjugation has been the impetus for civic 
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engagement and achievements among the community, in recent years, since the fall of 
the Taliban regime in 2001.            
 
This section has shown how marginality is a key theme within Hazara history, but how 
it also relates to more recent incidents of violence which have been inflicted on the 
community. The insurrection of Hazarajat is used as starting point to anchor a timeline 
of persecution, that still manifests, albeit in different ways. The work of Glatzer and 
Farr in this section note how the historical circumstances of the community impacted 
perceptions of the self within the community, which had mostly been negative but 
with time became more positive, given the growth of Hazara consciousness among the 
community in the 1980s and 1990s. While the work of Farr and Ibrahimi cited in this 
section highlight how this historic marginality became the impetus for change within 
the community and led to a growth of ethnic consciousness among the community. 
Furthermore, this consciousness is important to note more generally, as the gains of 
the community in the region and beyond underpin the narrative of overcoming. In turn 
the next section of this chapter explores the responses given during research 
interviews to show how both the narratives or marginality and overcoming are 
interconnected, personalised and change with time. This also relates to Foucault’s 
work on genealogy as the next section will highlight how the historic consciousness of 
the Hazara community has not solely been shaped by a linear timeline of available 
documented Hazara history, but come from various sources, including personal lived 
experiences.         
 
4.4 Marginality and overcoming over time: 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the aim here is to document the 
historic collective consciousness among the Hazara community over time. Having 
discussed history and memory and the interconnectedness of these themes it is 
important to also discuss individual articulations of the narratives of marginality and 
overcoming, in order to show the interconnected nature of these narratives, and their 
hybrid, multiple features. This will be done in order to show the community’s shift 
from an oppressed other to subjecthood, through people’s everyday commentary on 
change within the community overtime. In turn this section will show how the 
narratives of marginality and overcoming are personalised and are not just top-down 
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discourses, but are in fact internalised and personalised by community members 
themselves.     
 
Marginality is a narrative which is central to this research, and has been discussed in 
various literature on Hazaras when documenting the history of the community, and in 
certain instances when discussing the current precarity of the community. However, 
an interesting development which emerged in some interviews was the linking of past 
oppression to contemporary gains, with some interviewees stating that it is this very 
history of marginalisation that has been the impetus for the community’s changing 
fortunes in 21st Century Afghanistan. For instance, one research participant, Attahullah 
Nawrozy, an accountant based in Nottingham, who is in his late 20s, related this 
contemporary timeline of accomplishments to Hazara consciousness more generally:  
 
Being Hazara in Afghanistan, it differs, I will tell you from two perspectives. 
Back in the day, [historically] and then today. So being a Hazara back in the 
day was, people who would do menial jobs. For the very low level of the 
community. People who were not being labelled as proper human beings, 
only as labourers, that they would just do labour, like the Black community 
back in the day in American history, same as that. Back in the day worse than 
slavery [the conditions for Hazaras]. And now calling as a Hazara, right now, if 
I say I’m a Hazara, I’m a person that is more into knowledge, which is more 
into going far, and wanting to become something. I just want to improve 
myself, want to improve my community, and want to become something that 
could bring pride into Afghanistan. Now if you are Hazara, like people really 
respect you. People say we are the community that bring light in the face of 
Afghanistan to the world.   
   
While, at the same time, in multiple discussions relating to the post-2001 
circumstances of Hazaras in Afghanistan the passion for education among the 
community was referred to time and again. The pursuit of education was referenced to 
show that Hazaras are 'progressive’ and ‘open-minded', with an emphasis on the fact 
that women from the community are also pursuing education. In an article published 
in November 2018 on Taliban attacks in the Hazara populated Jaghori district of Ghazni 
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this trend among Hazaras was also noted, as the piece stated that, ‘In Jaghori, for 
example, there is near-universal girls’ education, and the number of boys attending 
school is higher than the national average. Women also work outside their homes and 
can drive cars, as is the case in most urban areas of Afghanistan but which is banned in 
areas under Taliban control’. The article also highlighted the perception the 
community has of any future Taliban rule, ‘Hazara will never accept Taliban rule 
willingly, and will do their best to resist them…Hazara do not want to have any reversal 
on their civic gains’69. Similarly, this is also referred to by Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi who 
mentions that: 
 
'...the Hazaras more generally, offer the most potent example of a shift from 
violent conflict towards peaceful and civilian politics and as a result are one 
of the success stories of...post-2001 Afghanistan. The scale of transformation 
among Hazaras is often captured by Western newspapers headlines such as 
'Afghanistan's success story: The liberated Hazara minority'...'Afghanistan's 
Hazaras: Coming up from the bottom'...and the 'Hazaras hustle to head of 
class in Afghanistan'...(2017: 223) 
 
Therefore, within this genealogy it can be seen that pursuing education is also is a 
reaction to the community's past subjugation (hence the high motivation for Hazaras 
to undertake education), while another motivation to excel is so that the community 
can work towards the betterment of Hazaras (and for some respondents for Afghans 
more generally), which was also reaffirmed Shafiq Nawrozie, an architectural designer 
based in Birmingham, in his late 20s, who stated that:  
 
I guess the Hazaras are moving in that direction, studying and education, as 
you can see in Afghanistan. The Hazara community is working really hard. I 
think the fact that they were oppressed, and a lot of people look at the past 
and see that we were oppressed and they use that as sort of sense of 
motivation to work harder than others. I think they’re generally really 
 
69 See: www.rferl.org/a/afghan-taliban-wants-what-it-hasn-t-been-able-to-hold-hazara-
regions/29598848.html.   
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talented people. They’re not as strict in the community as other ethnic 
groups in my opinion, in terms of religion or culture…    
 
Additionally, research participants who passionately embraced their Hazara identity in 
interviews would generally state how Hazaras strive for education, and support (what 
they stated as being) Western liberal ideals such as democracy and human rights, with 
one research participant, Joma Ahmadi, a taxi driver based in Nottingham who is in his 
40s stating that:  
 
Hazaras are ‘development orientated’ people. And they are progressive 
people. And they wanted to have progression from a hundred years ago, but 
they were systemically deprived of that. And that’s why so usually the Hazaras 
were looking for other channels to go forward.  
 
While other research participants would link the community’s achievements since 
2001 to wider political discourses and would state that Hazara gains in recent years 
mean that the community can no longer be side-lined by Pashtun elites, with one 
research participant who is based in Birmingham and is in his 30s mentioning that:  
 
[Hazaras] have gone through difficult times because, you know, a group of 
people like the Pashtun, they had the power, they had the larger population 
in Afghanistan so they tried to marginalise other ethnic groups in 
Afghanistan, especially Hazara because of their beliefs…but now Hazaras I 
think they are gaining confidence through education because now a large 
number of (Hazara) people are going to school, college and university so they 
are highly educated, a large number of people (are highly educated)…so this 
education has given them the confidence now slowly they are rising, now we 
can say, slowly, Pashtun cannot ignore this minority in Afghanistan because 
they have now got this power.  
 
Again, these quotes in relation to the narrative of overcoming show that the narrative 
is concurrently employed alongside the narrative of marginality to highlight that 
despite the violence and subjugation inflicted on the Hazara people, the community 
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has taken upon itself the task of working to improve their fortunes in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan. In these responses there was an emphasis on how past injustices have 
become the impetus for contemporary achievements within the community. These 
responses reaffirm how these research interviews in and of themselves can also allow 
for the development and transmission of ideas within the community. This positive 
narrative is now not only propagated by the Hazara community itself, but is actually 
acknowledged and reproduced by people from outside of the community, which 
further adds to the veracity of this internally constructed community narrative on 
overcoming.      
 
Civic gains and accomplishments among the Hazara community since 2001 are now 
ample, and are widely documented and disseminated through the internet and social 
media, and have also been referred to within the research interviews conducted for 
this study. Examples of well-known Hazara accomplishments in Afghanistan since the 
fall of the Taliban include sportsman Rohullah Nikpai winning the country’s first ever 
Olympic medal at the Beijing Olympics in 2008, Dr Sima Samar being the first 
Chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and singer 
Zahra Elham becoming the first female contestant to win the popular national music 
TV talent show ‘Afghan Star’ in the show’s 14-year history (in March 2019). This in turn 
also links to the shift in Hazara consciousness that Ibrahimi alludes to, which has 
dramatically altered the self-perception of the Hazara community and has led to a 
growth in Hazara ethnic consciousness, stemming considerably from the work of Abdul 
Ali Mazari and other Hezb-e Wahdat members in the 1980s and 1990s, with Esmat 
Amean, a freelance journalist in his 30s, based in London, who spent his youth in 
Afghanistan stating that: 
 
…when [Mazari] came to Kabul, he changed everything. He changed the way I 
see myself, as a Hazara. Before that, I was kind of, basically, was kind of, 
ashamed to speak Hazaragi, but after that, for me, it was kind of, a huge 
honour to claim that I am Hazara. Even till now I am proudly claiming that I 
am Hazara, but before that it wasn’t the case.  
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This section has undertaken the task of presenting an auto-genealogy of Hazara 
consciousness. The research interviews discussed in this section describe a shift in 
Hazara consciousness that occurred both on an individual and collective level among 
the community. An over-arching theme of the research interviews more generally was 
the historic marginalisation of Hazaras in Afghanistan. While at the same time 
attempts were made to link past subjugation to contemporary gains, and show how 
the community’s past pushed Hazaras to work hard for themselves and their 
community. Furthermore, multiple research participants would make a point to 
emphasise the positive, recent developments of the community as a means to show 
how the community is working to change its fortunes in present times, predicated on 
the community’s history of subjugation, which denied the community such 
opportunities in the past. These various snippets of both personal histories and 
collective memories have therefore impacted Hazara consciousness among these 
particular research participants. In turn, this combination of personal and collective 
histories and memories has shown how Hazara consciousness and Hazara self-
identification does not necessarily stem from access to a linear timeline of a particular 
community history, in a similar vein to Foucault, but how in fact many intertwined 
events can actually influence collective consciousness and self-identification among 
the Hazara community. 
 
4.5 On experience, memory and narrative: 
With the previous section having given an overview as to how community members 
personalise Hazara-specific narratives, it is also important to discuss the categories of 
experience, memory and narrative in relation to individuals and the collective, in order 
to understand what obligations this places on the individual as part of the collective. 
Here it is pertinent to note the work of American historian Professor Joan W. Scott, 
who has written extensively on experience. This is because personal lived experiences 
have been central to individual engagement with the narratives of marginality and 
overcoming among research participants, and it is therefore important to understand 
experience in relation to history. Here Scott notes that:   
 
It is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted 
through experience. Experience in this definition then becomes not the origin 
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of our explanation, not the authoritative (because seen or felt) evidence that 
grounds what is known, but rather that which we seek to explain, that about 
which knowledge is produced. To think about experience in this way is to 
historicize it as well as to historicize the identities it produces. (1991: 779 - 
780).  
 
The historicising of the narratives of marginality and overcoming was seen to occur on 
multiple occasions during research interviews, as throughout the interviewing process 
and also during casual interactions with members of the Hazara community these 
narratives were regularly alluded to, both explicitly and implicitly. This was evident in 
how members of the community sought to understand Hazara consciousness, and in 
relation to their own individual conceptualisations of identity. Furthermore, the 
responses from interviews presented in the marginality and overcoming sections of 
this chapter emphasise how Foucault’s work on genealogy reveals itself in a personal 
capacity within research interviews, as ‘entangled events’ that do not necessary occur 
or manifest in a linear manner, as individual lived experiences and collective memories 
of the past impact understandings of Hazara history and Hazara identity more 
generally. Following on from this, the research interviews and informal conversations 
with and among Hazara community members themselves can also become channels 
for the dissemination of particular internally constructed community narratives, and is 
also the case with Hazara social media (which is analysed in chapter six of this thesis).   
 
Here it is also important to consider the role of narrative construction and history 
writing for marginal communities given how Hazaras have been positioned within 
Afghan history writing. Historian David Lowenthal writes that certain ‘histories’ are 
accepted as fact much in the way that society understands maths to be definitive, 
given how history is taught. Thus, widely circulated historical narratives are not merely 
considered as one of many ways in which to understand the past. Instead, when there 
is then the case of people being presented with ‘alternative histories’ it becomes hard 
to persuade people that the narratives they have been presented with as ‘historical 
fact’ for so long may not necessarily be a wholly accurate representation of the past.  
In turn, ‘…historians find it hard to persuade people that there may be more than one 
‘accurate’ version of the same event’ (1998: 117), and this is relevant to note in 
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relation to the Hazara community as the historical timeline that has been created 
internally by the community is not one that is widely circulated outside of the 
community, where the insurrection of Hazarajat is seen as a major event within a 
continued timeline of oppression, as opposed to dominant accounts of Afghan history 
which document the violence inflicted on the community during the insurrection as an 
isolated event prompted by the desire of Abdur Rahman Khan to consolidate his 
power. In turn this framing of the Hazara past from within the community is then 
utilised to underscore the importance of a narrative of marginality when discussing the 
community, their past and their present circumstances, both within the community 
and to outsiders as well.    
 
In relation to the narrative of marginality and its relationship with memory, Paul 
Ricoeur notes that, ‘…the duty of memory consists essentially in a duty not to forget’ 
(2000: 30). This is very evident in the responses given during the research interviews 
where the suffering of the past was noted as a means to preserve Hazara history. 
Similarly, the extent to which a history of oppression is preserved and ingrained within 
the Hazara community as a collective memory was highlighted by Kazem Sharan, who 
is a graduate of the School of Oriental and African Studies and is currently a technology 
consultant in his early 20s based in London: 
 
I think the history of oppression, I mean, every Hazara that is born knows 
about the history and the way that we’ve been oppressed. You can ask a 
seven-year-old or a ten-year-old if they know about the oppression that 
happened during the 1890s under Abdur Rahman Khan, or the Taliban 
oppression of the 1990s, or the massacre in Mazar, so these are things that 
you are told when you are growing up. The question is, is that right? That’s a 
bigger debate, but personally I feel like it is good to know you know history, 
good to know your roots, the good things and the bad things.  And yeah, I do 
agree that we shouldn’t may be 100% focus on the oppression that we faced, 
so maybe we do need to focus on the positives, what we’re good at instead 
of what we’re not good at. What we have, not what we didn’t have. But at 
the same time, I think there is a taboo, it’s a very sensitive subject, for others 
in Afghanistan to talk about it (the history of the Hazaras)…because may be 
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people don’t want to acknowledge that these things happened. There’s 
documentation and books and resources that suggest this discrimination did 
happen. But are people going to acknowledge that, are people going to 
accept that? Instead of ignoring it and not talking about it, I think for the 
future of Afghanistan it is important for others in Afghanistan to talk about it. 
 
The response highlighted above has been taken as a snippet to show how a narrative 
of marginality has been articulated and reproduced by research participants for this 
study. During research interviews a history of oppression was referred to by the vast 
majority of research participants, to varying degrees, either with explicit reference to 
the insurrection of Hazarajat, subsequent instances of injustice or through discussing 
personal memories of discrimination and racism. Similar quotes which have been 
taken as a selection, in the previous marginality and overcoming section of this 
chapter, underscore how research participants engaged with and articulated a 
narrative of marginality more generally, and show how the research interviews 
themselves were also an outlet for the proliferation of ideas that are not necessarily 
wide-spread or easily accessible in academic literature. In turn the research interviews 
undertaken for this study demonstrate how these conversations are also channels 
which allow for views on Hazara consciousness to develop and be shared among the 
community, based on both personal lived experiences and collective memories of the 
community. By engaging with literature on experience, memory and narrative it can be 
seen how personal experiences and collective memories work to underscore the 
narratives the Hazara community choose to articulate about themselves. By relying on 
personal lived experiences as well collective memories, in relation to the construction 
of narratives within the community it can be seen that key events, both historical and 
current, are merged with the lives of individuals within the community in order to 
further relate to the narratives of marginality and overcoming. Therefore, through 
discussing personal lived experiences and collective memories in relation to narratives, 






4.6 Abdul Ali Mazari and Hazara consciousness: 
Having engaged with the narratives of marginality and overcoming in relation to 
history and identity among research participants, and literature on experience, 
memory and narratives, it is fitting to also seek to understand perspectives on figures 
who are seen as central to these narratives, where collective memories shape present-
day understandings of notable figures within the community. In turn this section of the 
chapter will focus on Abdul Ali Mazari. By focusing on Mazari this section highlights an 
earlier point presented in the introduction to this chapter in relation to memory and 
narrative formation, which is that memory rejects attempts to be entirely 
territorialised and fully assembled into a narrative. And while a historical community 
consciousness and selfhood grew through the figure of Mazari and his actions, 
personal and collective memories of Mazari also show diversity. This can be seen 
through the conversational engagements with research participants on Mazari through 
the fieldwork for this research, which emphasises this in ways that written histories 
have not.   
 
Early on, during the course of this research, it became apparent that a particular 
religious cleric who went on to become a pivotal political leader during the civil war in 
Afghanistan of the 1990s was a key figure who required further study, with that man 
being Abdul Ali Mazari. Hazara consciousness has, in recent years, started to be 
explored in journal articles and research papers, and in many of these works specific 
reference is made to Abdul Ali Mazari70. Mazari is noted as a central figure who was 
part of the movement that led to a shift in ethnic consciousness among Hazaras in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s. Mazari is drawn upon and celebrated world over 
in a way that other well-known Hazara figures are not, such as Faiz Mohammad Kateb 
Hazara, the court historian for King Habibullah Khan in the early 20th Century, 
General Muhammad Musa Khan, who was the first Hazara Commander in Chief of the 
Pakistani Army from 1958 to 1966 and Sultan Ali Keshtmand, who was the longest 
serving leader of the PDPA regime in Afghanistan. For instance, there are annual 
events commemorating Mazari’s passing (usually referred to as the anniversary of his 
Martyrdom) in March of each year, in various cities in Europe and Australia, as well as 
 
70 Mazari is commonly referred to as ‘Baba Mazari’ as a sign of respect, affection and endearment by 
some Hazara community members, as the word Baba translates from Persian as ‘father’.    
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in Afghanistan71. Hence why Mazari is a worthwhile figure to examine within this 
research. As a result, in all the research interviews conducted, attitudes and 
perceptions of Mazari as a notable figure within the Hazara community were delved 
into, alongside his role in establishing a Hazara consciousness, if any, as well as general 
understandings and thoughts on Hazara consciousness among research participants.  
 
This section will first focus on the heterogeneity in responses provided about Mazari, 
given that of the limited literature available on Mazari in English, dissenting views 
about his life and legacy are not present. Although these views only constitute a small 
number of research participants within my work, it is interesting to see how a figure 
who is valorised by the community is still critiqued by some. The following quote from 
Professor Joan W. Scott is pertinent in this regard, as she notes that:   
 
Seeing is the origin of knowing. Writing is reproduction, transmission-the 
communication of knowledge gained through (visual, visceral) experience. 
This kind of communication…has produced a wealth of new evidence 
previously ignored about these others and has drawn attention to 
dimensions of human life and activity usually deemed unworthy of mention 
in conventional histories. It has also occasioned a crisis for orthodox history 
by multiplying not only stories but subjects, and by insisting that histories are 
written from fundamentally different-indeed irreconcilable-perspectives or 
standpoints, none of which is complete or completely "true" (1991: 776).  
 
Scott’s assertion in relation to conflicting viewpoints that might emerge from 
experience is important to note also, given that not all research participants held 
particularly positive views of Mazari. The minority of discussants who were ambivalent 
about Mazari were predominantly female and the major criticism conveyed was that 
although Mazari did do and achieve a lot for Hazaras in Afghanistan, he was still 
ultimately a warlord, like many of the well-known Afghan figures of that era, and that 
in his time, both during and after, working as a religious cleric he did not do enough to 
 
71 Having extensively followed Hazara social media before and during this doctoral research, I have not 
come across events celebrating the life and work of other renowned Hazara figures such as Kateb or 
General Khan. Furthermore, multiple Hazara social media pages make regular reference to Mazari in 
their posts, but seldom do about Kateb or Khan.  
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promote women’s rights. These criticisms are also important to note given how Mazari 
is generally portrayed in relation to the narratives of marginality and overcoming, but 
how even then he is critiqued by some members of the community as he was the 
leader of an armed faction during the civil war of the 1990s in Afghanistan.   
 
In these specific interviews where criticism of Mazari was aired, the research 
participants stated that they wanted their responses to be kept anonymous, given that 
criticism of Mazari is taboo within the community. In relation to this point one 
respondent stated that although Hazaras are generally an open-minded community 
they are yet to reconcile with the idea that Mazari was not infallible, given that his 
armed faction was accused of being responsible for some of the country’s civil war 
civilian casualties72. Hence, a minority of respondents have said that they believe that 
this period of his life and his actions as the head of Wahdat at the time need to be 
critiqued. For instance, three female Hazara research participants from London, all 
under thirty at the time of their interviews noted an unease that Mazari presented 
them for them in relation to his time as a cleric and his time as a fighter during the civil 
war. One research participant stated that, ‘For me Baba Mazari is a bit different from 
other warlords because he came to represent a very marginalised community’, and 
this research participant explained that her use of the word warlord was intentional 
given that, as noted earlier, Mazari and his faction were armed, and fought, during the 
country’s civil war. 
 
For some younger Hazaras there is a tension with regards to Mazari and how they 
perceive him, given that he took up arms during the civil war, but as he was also 
central to the establishment of Hazara consciousness in Afghanistan, with these 
respondents asking for their responses to be kept anonymous, as noted earlier. These 
respondents stated that even though the community actively engages in debates on a 
wide range of issues, Mazari and his legacy is something that is not questioned and 
brought into disrepute, especially given that after his death his status among the 
community heightened as he was, and still is, viewed as a martyr who ultimately lost 
his life in the pursuit of equal rights for his community. In relation to this saint-like 
 
72 The following Human Rights Watch report from 2005 has more information on Wahdat’s ideological 
positioning and armament during the civil war: www.hrw.org/report/2005/07/07/blood-stained-
hands/past-atrocities-kabul-and-afghanistans-legacy-impunity 
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status Mazari gained after his death, one research participant based in London stated 
that:  
 
…what makes me uncomfortable is how [Mazari] is being treated as a saint, 
and also people are making anniversary for him, a second Muharram for 
Hazaras…And also it is not very much tolerated among Hazaras if you want to 
criticise him. I have not seen anything, I haven’t looked into that part, but I 
have noticed that people who are honestly want to criticise some of his 
actions are very badly treated. I remember some people writing something 
(critical about Mazari) on Facebook and then they had to remove it because it 
was becoming too much. 
 
Another research participant based in London had the following to say about Mazari 
and the general perception the Hazara community has of him: 
 
Well the thing is that unfortunately about Mazari, he's been described in the 
community as a kind of sacred, holy thing that he shouldn't be criticised and 
nothing negative should be said against him. Well Mazari in the last 3 years 
was really different from the Mazari who was before. I mean before he was 
like many other, let's say, warlords or religious leaders. He was conservative, 
he was mainly, how can I describe, he wanted a system very similar to the 
religious government of Iran but in the last 3 years of the internal war in 
Afghanistan he changed. But people like to generalise the whole facts within 
these two or three years…Even me, at Hazara gatherings, I try to be cautious 
not to say anything critical about Mazari.   
 
While a research participant based in Birmingham stated that they had 
reservations about Mazari’s political philosophy:  
 
…[I]f you think about his poltical philosophy I think he was strongly believing 
in Shia and he was thinking, because he was receiving some support from 
Iran of course, and different Hazara groups were receiving support from Iran. 
I think there were eight different groups and they were getting support from 
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Iran…But I disagree with his [religious] philosophy, as we need a secular 
country a more open society, a country, a society where everyone can live 
there with different views, but probably he has got similar views to the 
regime in Iran, so that was not a good thing. It is not necessary to put that 
much emphasis on religion in a diverse society. 
 
These were enlightening observations as criticism of Mazari is something that is 
considered as being off-limits within the community. It should also be noted that these 
research interviews were conducted separately and not in a group setting, and these 
respondents were not aware of each other’s answers with regards to Mazari, which 
makes their comments even more intriguing. The requests for anonymity highlight a 
tension that exists among the community when propagating the claim that the 
community overwhelmingly shares and promotes the ideals of tolerance, when in 
some research interviews there had been a nervousness to freely discuss Mazari. 
While some other research participants who did not explicitly criticise Mazari did note 
that as much as the community perceives itself, and prides itself, as being open-
minded and allows for debate and discussions on a multitude of issues, Mazari has 
become sacrosanct, where criticism of him as a leader as is rarely, if at all, accepted. 
These dissenting views of Mazari, although in a minority, are important to note as they 
show a division with regards to how the narratives of marginality and overcoming are 
framed, in that when discussing Mazari as a figure and his place within these 
narratives, there were alternative views as to how he is perceived and situated within 
the community more generally, and in turn this points to a schism emerging among 
the community, albeit a small one.      
 
However, the vast majority of research participants discussed Mazari’s life and legacy 
very positively, and mentioned that his shift from a religious to a political figure 
stemmed from witnessing the marginalisation Hazaras endured during his time in 
Afghanistan, and how neighbouring Shia-theocratic Iran, had at this time done little to 
alleviate the suffering of their fellow Shia brethren in Afghanistan. Multiple 
respondents with protracted lived experiences in Afghanistan stated that witnessing 
the suffering of Hazaras in the country led Mazari to vocally proclaim the importance 
of asserting one’s ethnic Hazara identity, as opposed to his previous stance of framing 
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his identity through a religious lens, as a Shia Muslim. In an espousing an ethnic Hazara 
identity, Mazari was not negating the importance or role of religion for Hazaras, 
research participants claim, but rather was explaining that to emphasise one’s identity 
as Hazara is no less important than proclaiming one’s religious identity as Shia, as they 
were not mutually exclusive. Promoting a Hazara identity occurred alongside demands 
for equal rights for Hazaras, as Afghans and citizens of the state. Here it is worth noting 
that research participants who describe Mazari’s shift from a cleric to a politician have 
constantly highlighted how in embracing a Hazara identity the demand was always for 
equality, not to claim superiority, and to work for and towards the betterment of all 
Afghans, which can be demonstrated by the following quote from a school teacher 
who is in his 30s and based in London: 
 
I mean we Hazara, 90% of us see Baba Mazari as a legend. We see him as a 
great leader. But his perception was that every small ethnic minority, not just 
Hazaras, every ethnic minority should have recognition. One of his ideology 
was that when it comes to government ruling, every ethnic minority should 
have a role in decision making. Not just Hazara, every other group. Because 
on quite a few occasions he spoke about other ethnic groups, for example 
one time he spoke on behalf of Uzbeks. He also spoke on behalf of another 
community we call Qizilbash. He spoke on their behalf as well, so his ideology 
was that all minority should have recognition when it comes to decision 
making, not just the tribe that is in power. And so that was his ideology. 
 
This perception of Mazari can again inadvertently be linked to the two narratives 
which are central to this research, that of marginality and an embryonic stage of 
overcoming, constructed specifically as liberalism, in that by explicitly demanding 
equality for all, Mazari and his Hazara supporters were moving away from the ‘tribal 
politics’ which had been dominating the political landscape of the country for decades, 
and was something Hazaras generally were and are still keen to disassociate their 
community from, given the view that it is exactly this same system that has oppressed 
and marginalised the community since the insurrection of Hazarajat. Secondly, in 
highlighting Mazari’s demand of equality for all, the notion of Hazaras as ‘distinct’ from 
other Afghan communities was further reinforced by some research participants, as 
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they spoke in terms of rights and equality, and thus demonstrated their credentials as 
an ‘open-minded’ community, moving away from embracing practices which are 
deemed as having prevented the country from progressing and developing. Esmat 
Amean also noted the following when sharing his thoughts on Mazari which implicitly 
relate to Hazara consciousness:  
 
Baba Mazari for me, was if I say, he was someone who changed the history of 
the Hazara people. I’ve seen him, I’ve met him, basically I’ve been with him 
for a period of time back in the 1990s. He was such a unique character. For 
me he is someone, if I say, he changed the whole life of Hazaras. If I say 
personally on my life basically, I was born in Kabul, and I grew up there. 
Before him, even I was in the capital of Afghanistan, I suffered basically 
racism myself as being Hazara, even when we were speaking Hazaragi 
between our friends. The minute someone non-Hazara was passing by 
automatically our accent changing and we were trying to use different 
accent, because it was kind of, automatically it was kind of a shame to speak 
Hazaragi. I’ve been called many, many times Hazara, ‘Hazara moosh-khor, 
which means that Hazaras eat mouse 73. And a lot of bad terms to be honest, 
back home. And it was personal experience, I was basically living in Kabul and 
I knew that I couldn’t claim as even being from Afghanistan [in areas] just 
outside of Kabul which were Pashtun.          
 
In certain narrations of Mazari, his character was alluded to in order highlight his 
appeal and stature among the community, as he was someone who was at the 
forefront of the fight for equal rights for Hazaras. For instance, one research 
participant, Aziz Sorabi, who is in his 30s and is a test development engineer based in 
London, left Afghanistan as a child during the Taliban rule of the country, and had the 
following to say when discussing Mazari:    
 
Well I think Baba Mazari was amazing, and that’s why he is given the title of 
‘Baba’, the father of the Hazaras. And I think it correct for him to have this 
title. And he was literally a father figure for the Hazaras, looking after the 
 
73 This term also translates as ‘rat-eater’.   
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entire Hazara people. And he was discriminated against himself, his brother, 
his family, so he knew the pain, he felt the pain himself. So, for him this was a 
battle to get this sorted once and for all. A part from being Hazara and being 
the father of the people, he was an upright man, he never wanted anything 
for himself, he only wanted it for the community. And you can see if from the 
history, the way he and his family lived…To be honest when I was in 
Afghanistan I used to be called the Hazara rat-eater, the rat-eater, moosh-
khor. I heard that from my own ears, like 25 years ago. And I must admit, I 
used to say ‘why am I Hazara, I wish I was not Hazara’. Imagine, a Hazara 
himself, thinking being a Hazara is a bad thing. So, he literally came in and 
changed that. And this is just immense work. Winning a war is one thing, but 
changing people’s perception is another thing, it’s enormous! 
 
Here it should be noted that it was not only male research participants that echoed 
positive sentiments about Mazari, but similarly most female research participants also 
started that he worked to change the trajectory of Hazaras in Afghanistan, with Elaha 
Soroor, a popular Hazara singer and song-writer who is in her 20s and based in London 
stating that: 
 
Basically, I heard that [Mazari] helped to make Hazaras confident, to 
introduce themselves as Hazaras and be part of the society as a Hazara 
person, and basically contribute in the society and develop themselves, and 
have the same rights as the other citizens in Afghanistan. And he helped a lot. 
And he fought a lot. And he led Hazara people towards this goal towards 
being equal…Now Hazaras are the most educated, and more writers and 
poets.    
 
Within descriptions of Mazari’s vision, activism and character several research 
participants referred to Mazari as the Hazara community’s ‘Nelson Mandela’, or 
described him in ways which elevated his status as a means to separate him from 
other men of his time and generation, because of his role in working to improve the 
situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan. In line with these sentiments one younger Hazara 
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research participant, Hafi Kadamzadeh, who is in his 20s and is an entrepreneur based 
in London stated that:   
 
The Hazara community see him as our idol, as our Martin Luther King, our 
Nelson Mandela, so he is like the most important figure. He is a very 
important figure, the most important figure in Hazara culture. So, you know, 
we have a celebration of him once a year, in our household we have pictures 
of him, he’s almost like a Prophet. Not a Prophet, but you know what I mean, 
like a Saint.  
 
Here it is pertinent to note the following quote from Professor Michael Rothberg (who 
takes as inspiration the work of Professor James E. Young) who states that, ‘…sites of 
memory do not remember by themselves - they require the active agency of 
individuals and publics’ (2010: 8). The responses given during this research about 
Mazari affirm Rothberg’s hypothesis, as Mazari’s words and actions are positioned and 
given meaning through research participants themselves. These individuals further 
preserve these memories of Mazari and his life through recalling his message and 
activism. It is also worth considering the work of Foucault on genealogy again, as in a 
paper on his work Dr Una Crowley of Maynooth University, Ireland states that, 
‘Genealogy displaces the primacy of the subject found in conventional history and 
targets discourse, reason, rationality and certainty. Foucault’s analyses are against the 
idea of universal necessities, the search for underlying laws and universal explanatory 
systems…(2009: 2). This function of genealogy can be seen to be reproduced in the 
responses given about Mazari in relation to Hazara community members’ lived 
experiences. This is because it was not necessarily the task of learning Hazara history in 
an ordered manner that impacted personal conceptualisations of the self and what it 
means to be Hazara, but that it was personal experiences, the opportunity to meet 
Mazari, listen to his speeches or learn about Mazari’s own past and struggles, which 
influenced research participants. In turn these methods of gaining knowledge about 
Hazara history and Hazara consciousness do not fit neatly with constructed linear 
histories of the past. While simultaneously, this section shows how the regulating of 
discourse allows for the formation of narratives, and in this instance this regulating 
refers to the dominance of a public Hazara community view of Mazari.    
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4.7 Conclusion: 
To conclude, this chapter has sought to trace the historic collective consciousness of 
the Hazara community, underpinned by the work French philosopher Michel Foucault 
on genealogy. At the core of this chapter are quotes taken from research participants 
to show how they relate to the narratives of marginality and overcoming, and how 
these narratives are personalised and change with time. The introduction section of 
this chapter was followed by a section on history and memory which highlighted the 
role and importance of both history and memory in relation to the propagation of the 
narratives of marginality and overcoming, given that history helps to establish the 
contents of these narratives, while memory allows community members to personally 
relate to these narratives. The next section looked at Hazara historiography and how 
the community’s consciousness and sense of self developed over the decades.        
 
The section on marginality and overcoming over time took as its focus quotes from 
research participants. It showed how both the narratives of marginality and 
overcoming are personalised, how marginality informs the community’s current forms 
of overcoming and how the contents of these narratives adapt and change with time. 
The research interviews discussed in this chapter have shown how members of the 
Hazara community revisit their communal past and more recent collective memories in 
order to contextualise the community’s historic and contemporary circumstances and 
situation in Afghanistan. While references to Hazara history in the research interviews 
more broadly show how a timeline of subjugation is remembered, memorialised and 
further proliferated by members of the community in present times, and is used as an 
impetus for political action in present times. Alongside recalling past subjugation 
multiple research participants did highlight that in post-2001 Afghanistan the 
community has made significant strides in many fields. At the same time by drawing on 
these historic events of oppression and recent collective gains, the extent to which 
Hazara consciousness has taken hold among transnational Hazaras is better 
understood. While in constructing and propagating a progressive narrative about the 
community it can be seen that there is not solely an emphasis on circulating a history 
of oppression within the community. In turn to ‘be Hazara’ in 21st Century Afghanistan 
and in the diaspora is to now exhibit the talents and accomplishments of the 
community and move away from discourses which have historically chosen to present 
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the community as a deviant ‘other’. Additionally, the section on experience, memory 
and narrative gave an opportunity to engage with literature on these themes in order 
to underscore how individual lived experiences alongside collective memories 
influence the Hazara community and the narratives the community chooses to 
articulate about itself.   
           
Within this chapter there was also an emphasis on the life and legacy of the pivotal 
Hazara political figure, Abdul Ali Mazari, as Mazari was a figure who was discussed at 
length in many of the research interviews conducted. This section started by 
highlighting criticisms that a few research participants had of Mazari, given that the 
existing literature on Hazara consciousness does not highlight dissenting views of 
Mazari. Although these views were in the minority they were important to highlight as 
they show how even though there are wide-spread, positive narratives about Mazari 
within the community, some community members still have reservations about him. In 
turn these disparities in the responses given in how Mazari is perceived by research 
participants shows that although on the whole collective memories of the past inform 
individual community members’ views in the present, these deviating views of Mazari 
illustrate the limits of this homogeneity within the community, as even though 
individual thoughts about Mazari do sometimes reinforce one another, they do not 
always do so.  
 
However, the vast majority of research participants noted the immense work Mazari 
did for the community and for an ethnic consciousness to flourish among Hazaras. In 
these personalised narrations of Mazari his proclamations regarding equality for all 
citizens of Afghanistan led to a new-found confidence among the Hazara community 
whereby to self-identify as Hazara was seen more positively within the community 
with time, and simultaneously the historic stigma attached to asserting oneself as 
Hazara started to diminish. In a handful of these narrations, interviewees referred to 
their own individual histories and instances of discrimination that they had endured in 
Afghanistan and how Mazari’s words and actions altered their own perceptions of 
being Hazara, which were initially framed by varying degrees of self-loathing. With 
time there a was growth in self-pride among these Hazara interviewees once they 
became aware of and familiarised themselves with the sayings of Mazari. Individual 
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reflections on Mazari and personal histories show how the narratives of marginality 
and overcoming are not just overarching community narratives but how they impact 
personal conceptualisations of identity and the self, in that Mazari’s activism for his 
community stem from past injustices suffered in Afghanistan, and how through his 
vision Hazara consciousness increased among the community. Therefore, this section 
of the chapter has shown that in the process of reflection Mazari is reconfigured in 
different ways based on the views of the individual. This in turn demonstrates how 
heterogeneity shapes the evolution and adaptation of community discourses 


























Chapter 5: A genealogy of religion and secularism among transnational Hazaras: 
 
5.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapter of this thesis has shown how ideas related to the narratives of 
marginality and overcoming circulate within the Hazara community and how they are 
personalised by members of the community, as well as how they relate to research 
participants’ own lived experiences. In turn this next chapter of the thesis will examine 
the topic of religion. Religion will be explored in this chapter to show how Hazara 
research participants perceive and relate to religion, and to what extent religion 
underpins the narratives of marginality and overcoming.   
 
As this chapter looks at religion, the particular focus here will be on Shia Islam, as the 
majority of research participants within this research either self-identified as Shia 
Muslims or came from Shia families, and given the accessibility of literature on Shia 
Hazaras. However, as noted in previous chapters, the Hazara community is not a 
monolith, and this also applies to religion. Although Twelver Shi’ism is believed to be 
the most prevalent sect of Islam followed by the community, Ismaili and Sunni Islam 
are also followed by some Hazaras (Ibrahimi 2012: 2), and secular Hazaras are also a 
contingent group within the community. Accordingly, this chapter will be divided 
several sections, which includes a background section on the Shia orientation of 
Hazaras. The following section will explore explicit discourse on religion among 
research participants. While the section on religion and secularism among Hazara 
organisations and political movements of the Soviet war period will show how the 
narratives of marginality and overcoming can be both Shi’i religious narratives while 
also being liberal narratives, and here the work of political theorist Carl Schmitt on 
political theology will be discussed to underscore how secular politics often contains 
the traces of religious governmentality. This chapter will end with a section on 
secularism in contemporary Hazara life to show how the community is working to 
frame itself as bastions of liberal values, given that the previous chapter showed how 
Mazari during his life also went from operating within the confines Shi’i politics to later 




5.2 On the Shia orientation of Hazaras and its implications: 
In relation to the Shia persuasion of the Hazaras, one research participant, based in 
Birmingham who is in his mid-20s, noted how a lack of information on the conversion 
made it hard to know how, when and why Shi’ism is followed by the community in a 
predominately Sunni Muslim state: 
 
So when you say Hazara and Shia it is because the majority of Hazaras are 
Shia. So automatically in your head you think of it as Hazara-Shia. The part of 
religion is Shi’ism in Hazaras specifically, I don’t know about the history and 
how it happened, because if you think about it, Afghanistan majority was 
Sunni at that time in history. I don’t know how that changed, that a minority 
became Shia (in Afghanistan). I don’t know how it happened, I’m trying to 
think, like no one knows the history, how that happened. They forget about 
that part, maybe it’s because we say that we are Hazara. If you’ve heard the 
story that there were a thousand Mongolians who were left behind, all that 
and then they were Mongols, they were Buddhists, so why are we Shia? We 
could have been Buddhist. So in the history (of Hazaras) there’s a gap. We 
don’t know. But you know this is very interesting, even Hazaras themselves 
they don’t know. There’s a gap in history, how did it happen (that Hazaras are 
Shia)? The Hazaras there should have been Buddhists or Sunnis. I don’t know 
how Shi’ism came to Hazaras. There is a gap (in history) there. So when did 
being Hazara become associated with Shi’ism?   
 
This quote is important to note as it is something that has been brought up both within 
interviews and casual conversations with Hazara acquaintances, which is that there 
appears to be a lack of information available as to when the community embraced 
Shi’ism. Therefore, it is important to briefly engage with literature that explores 
Shi’ism among the community before moving on to the next sections of this chapter. In 
relation to the Shia beliefs of the Hazara community Dr Alessandro Monsutti notes 
that:   
 
The relationship between Hazaras and Shiism must also be seen as a dynamic 
process. Their religious affiliation is probably the result of two distinct 
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factors: the part played in their complex ethnogenesis by the Ilkhans, the 
Mongol dynasty of Iran, whose sovereign Ghazan Khan is said to have 
converted to Shiism at the end of the thirteenth century; and the later impact 
of the Safavides, who declared Shiism the official religion of lran and 
extended their zone of influence to contemporary Afghanistan under the 
reign of Shah 'Abbas (1587-1629). Beyond any direct legacy or influence, 
however, the conversion of Hazaras to Shiism may have been due to a long 
process of opposition to neighbouring Sunni populations, which has 
continued down to this day (2007: 175).  
 
Additionally, Humayun Sarabi, in a master’s dissertation on politics and the modern 
history of Hazaras, also discusses the Shia conversion of Hazaras (and cites the work of 
American sociologist and historian Herbert Franz Schurmann) noting that:  
 
Schurmann also believes that Hazaras possibly converted to Shiíism through 
Iran by their alliance with Iranian Safavids; perhaps Shah Abbas that the 
majority parts of Hazarajat was allied to Iran for a short time. According to 
Schurmann the conversion of Hazaras, Tori Pashtuns and some other groups 
of Shiíis to Shiíism possibly happened during or after 16th century while the 
Safavids were ruling Iran and some parts of Qandahar merged under the 
Iranian Emperor. Schurmann further says that Shah Safavid gifted the 
command of the Hazarajat to one of the ìMirsî of Day Kundi ìDoulat Begî for 
eight generations (2005: 40). 
 
While Dr Naysan Adlparvar in his doctoral research on inter-ethnic relations in the 
Bamiyan valley mentions that prior to the proliferation of Hazara consciousness and 
ethnic identity among the community, a cross-ethnic Shia religious identity began to 
manifest and grow among Afghanistan’s Shia populations, in the early to mid-20th 
Century, and he states that: 
 
The consolidation of the Afghan State following the ascension of King Zahir 
Shah (r. 1933H 1973) to the throne, however, expedited the widespread 
emergence of Shi’i and ethnic identity in Afghanistan (Shahrani, 1986). The 
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expansion of the Afghan government under Zahir Shah’s regime led to rapid 
growth in the population of Kabul, which was directly correlated with the 
influx of Hazarahs from the Central Highlands into the capital (Edwards, 
1986)…In these urban settings individuals identifying with different Shi’i 
ethnic categories began to intermingle and, unified by their perception of 
mutual oppression at the hands of the Sunni state, began to develop a 
common sense of identity expressed in terms of Shi’i ideology. This sense of 
oppression was furthered with Zahir Shah’s strong orientation toward 
Pashtun nationalism, which included the appointment of Pashto as the official 
state language (Shahrani, 1986). Following the reopening of a number of 
membars74 in Kabul, sanctioned by Zahir Shah, the mourning rites of 
Muharram—including Ashura— became increasingly commonplace in Kabul 
and were central to promoting collective Shi’i identity (Edwards, 1986). As 
these ceremonies were carried out under the watchful eye of the king they 
were generally apolitical in nature, but that did not stop the emotive and 
symbolic nature of Ashura contributing to the development of a common 
sectarian identity (ibid). (2014: 94-95).    
 
These three excerpts from texts on the Shia heritage and orientation of the Hazaras 
helps to chronologise their conversion and the strong pronouncement of a Shia 
identity, at some point during the reign of Zahir Shah, which would be earlier than 
when ethnic consciousness emerged among the community in the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi notes that in his own interactions with Shia Hazaras 
prior to 1978, which was the year of the Saur Revolution which led to the deposition of 
President Daoud Khan, Hazaras, ‘…[hid] their identities at the schools or bitterly 
complained of the social humiliation and rejection they were exposed to in their 
classrooms’ (2012: 6).  
 
Ibrahimi’s observation is not surprising if existing literature on the Hazara community 
in Afghanistan in considered, given that it shows how the community’s Shia identity 
was historically a burden, as it was used to severely subjugate the community, from 
 
74 Dr Adlparvar states that a membar is, ‘A place of worship dedicated to the Imams. Used by members 
of the Jafari school of Shi’i Islam’ (2014:ix).     
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being victims of massacres, rape and slavery. Although slavery was outlawed by King 
Amanullah Khan, Hazara slave ownership was still practiced after the decree was 
passed (Ibrahimi 2017: 90). These historical circumstances of the community led to a 
sense of self-loathing to develop among the community, with Dr Bernt Glatzer noting 
that before the civil war the community was reluctant to label themselves as Hazara 
(1998: 171), as noted in the previous chapter. However this changed with the 
formation of community organisations and political movements, which worked to 
further the Hazara cause and demand greater rights for the community, as citizens of 
the state, initially in Afghanistan, and in recent years in Pakistan given the growing 
targeted attacks against the Hazara community in Quetta. In turn marginality stemming 
from religion, and also ethnicity, can be seen to have plagued the community both in 
the late 19th century and even in the 20th century, which underscores the double 
marginality of the community and the status of the community within the country for 
decades.     
 
At present, to be perceived as ‘being Shia’ is making the daily lives of Hazaras in certain 
areas very precarious, especially in the last several years in Kabul, and for over a 
decade in Quetta. Whether Hazaras choose to assert and relate to a Shia identity is of 
very little importance in these circumstances as it is people from outside of the 
community who label the whole community in such a way as to see all Hazaras as Shia, 
and  as legitimate targets of direct violence. This had led to countless attacks on the 
community in Kabul since 2015, at religious institutions, education centres and sports 
facilities. While in Quetta the community has become ghettoised and confined to the 
Mariabad and Hazara Town areas of the city. Consequently, although religion was a 
tool used to subjugate and oppress the community well over a hundred years ago, it is 
now making a revival with religion again being used as a reason to justify harm against 
the community, with ISIS having also referred to Shias as ‘infidels’ (2017: 6) according 
to a United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan report, which is reminiscent of 
the times of Abdur Rahman Khan’s reign. Therefore, marginality in relation to one’s 
Shia beliefs, or perceived Shia belief, is also a contemporary issue affecting the region’s 
Hazaras.       
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Shi’ism also impacts individual identity and the Hazara-specific narratives within this 
research more broadly, in that Shia theology relates to the notion of martyrdom, 
which is commonly referenced term in relation to Abdul Ali Mazari. It also brings to the 
fore how marginality as a narrative refers to the community’s specific history in 
Afghanistan, and currently more widely in the region, while also having religious 
undertones in its links to Imam Hussain and the battle of Karbala, and universal ideas 
of justice and oppression. Similarly, the narrative of overcoming as well as being a 
contemporary Hazara narrative further relates to Shia theology in terms of 
redemption, and marginality ultimately being overcome. Throughout the research 
interviews conducted for this study, and the available, existing literature on 
transnational Hazaras, it can be seen that community members either choose to relate 
these narratives to Shia theology explicitly or emphasise the unique, Hazara-nature of 
these narratives, thus presenting these community narratives as secular in their 
essence, which will be explored further in this chapter. It should be noted that in 
discussing religion in relation to these master narratives the claim is not that a 
narrative of overcoming literally stems from Shi’i theology, but to say that both 
religious and secular perceptions of the narrative resonate and have the ability to give 
each other meaning, within contexts of marginality. This in turn shows that both 
understandings of this narrative are now parallel in Hazara contexts, as a result of their 
extensive interaction.   
   
Having noted the centrality of the 1890s insurrection of Hazarajat within Hazara 
collective consciousness in previous chapters, this monumental incident within Hazara 
history is an appropriate starting point when looking to discuss the community’s 
relationship with religion, in particular Shi’ism75. As has been highlighted before, the 
insurrection of Hazarajat resulted in massacres, rape and enslavement of Hazaras, as 
well as the mass displacement of the Hazara community from central Afghanistan and 
was justified by the Emir through the new top-down articulation of a Sunni 
 
75 It should be noted that some research participants and Hazara acquaintances have stated that they 
dispute the common claim that Shi’ism is the most prevalent religious ideology followed by the 
community, and this partly based on the assertion that once Sunni Hazaras, who have in the past been 
labelled as Tajiks, are accounted for then both the numbers of Shia and Sunni Hazaras even out, or may 
even show that Sunni Hazaras outnumber Shia Hazaras. However, given the reasons outlined in the first 
page of this chapter Shi’ism will be the main focus of this chapter, but it is important to note this 
diverging opinion within the community as to the proportion of Shias and Sunnis within the Hazara 
community.   
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majoritarianism, as part of his definition of sovereignty. This historical incident 
formally set the precedent for Hazaras to be marked as the marginal others, the 
sovereign exception, as Shia Muslims in a predominately Sunni Muslim state, as well as 
an being perceived as an unruly, rebellious ethnic minority who needed to be subdued. 
Although the Shia orientation of certain segments of the community was used to 
justify the worst atrocity that was carried out against the community, religion has also 
been central to some of the community’s 20th Century political movements. At time 
same time there were other Hazara political movements which took as their 
inspiration secular political ideologies, since the 1960s, as a result of liberal policies by 
the state towards Hazaras, as mentioned in the work of Hazara scholar Hafizullah 
Emadi (1997: 373). While across the border in Quetta it can be seen that the Hazara 
Democratic Party (HDP) which was formed in the early 2000s which has sought to fight 
for the rights of the community is commonly referred to as a secular political party in 
online articles about the party76. Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi further notes different 
religious and secular Hazara organisations which operated in Afghanistan and Quetta 
from the late 1970s to the 1990s, including the Shia ordinated ‘Shuray-e Ittefaq-e 
Enqelab-e Islami Afghanistan (Unity Council of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan)’ 
which was formed in Bamiyan in 1979 and the secular ‘Ittehadiah Islami-e Mujahedin 
Afghanistan (Islamic Association of the Mujahedin of Afghanistan)’ which was formed 
in Quetta in 1980 (2012: 13).  
 
Similarly, literature on Hazaras shows how religion is engaged with in different ways by 
transnational Hazara communities. The seminal study by anthropologist Alessandro 
Monsutti on Ashura among Hazaras in Quetta, which was mentioned in the 
introduction chapter, highlights how this commemoration is personalised to reflect 
how the current circumstances of the Hazaras relate to the life of Imam Hussain. 
Monsutti states the following in relation to the Muharram sermons in Quetta and the 
paralleling of Imam Hussain’s life to that of the Hazaras: 
 
 
76 See for example: 
1) www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/567645-complexity-hazara-killing.  
2) www.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-blast/bomber-targets-pakistans-hazara-minority-in-run-up-to-




The thirst which tortured the Imam’s companions, prevented as they were 
from drawing water from the Euphrates, was compared to the Taliban 
blockade of the Hazarajat between summer 1997 and autumn 1998. The 
profanation of Husayn’s body was twinned with the tragic end of ‘Abdul ‘Ali 
Mazari, the Hazara leader captured and killed by the Taliban in March 1995; 
and, more generally, the fate of the victims of Karbala was compared to the 
massacres inflicted on the Hazaras (for example, the butchery of several 
hundred civilians in Afshar Mina, a district of Kabul, by troops allied to 
Massoud in January 1993, or the killings perpetrated by the Taliban in Mazar-
e Sharif in August 1998) (2007: 187).   
 
While research conducted by Farzana Marie on ‘nonviolent social struggles’ among 
Hazaras in Afghanistan notes that while many sectors of Hazara society hold profound 
religious beliefs, utilising these beliefs for the purpose of identity was considered to be 
exclusionary and divisive. A major misconception about the community has been that 
they are ‘monolithically Shi’a’, when in fact not all Hazaras are Shia, and not all Shias in 
Afghanistan are Hazara. One reason as to why religion is not drawn upon in order 
mould a ‘Hazara identity’ by Hazara activists is because of ‘internal tensions’ within the 
Shia community. An example stated in Marie’s journal paper was the Shia personal 
status law of 2009, which was approved by former Afghan President Hamid Karzai. To 
briefly outline, the law allows husbands to deny feeding their wives if they refuse to 
have sexual intercourse with them, and this law only applied to the Shia population of 
Afghanistan. However, many Hazaras were outraged by the passing of this law, due to 
their more ‘open-minded’ view of women. Thus, Marie states that while ‘…religiously-
based strategies for inspiration or identification may still be relevant in some contexts’ 
her research ‘…did not show it to be significant for Hazaras in today’s Afghanistan’ 
(2013: 89-90). In relation to Marie’s statements it is also worth noting a recent statistic 
which relates to these points. The Afghanistan Survey conducted by the Asia 
Foundation in 2018 found that in regards to religious leaders’ participation in politics, 
‘Pashtuns are the most likely to support the idea (65.0%), followed by Uzbeks (64.3%), 
Tajiks (58.1%), and Hazaras (49.8%)’ (2018: 143)’. Therefore, not only are some Hazaras 
reluctant to conflate their religious beliefs with how they conceptualise their identity, 
they are also less likely to support religion and politics intertwining more so than the 
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any other major ethnic group in Afghanistan, which is unsurprising given the 
community’s history in the country. These two examples taken from Monsutti’s and 
Marie’s work further reinforce both the narratives of marginality and overcoming. This 
can be seen by how Hazaras in Quetta remember their community’s oppression 
through specific religious commemorations, while at the same time the Hazaras 
interviewed in Afghanistan by Marie did not necessarily strongly identify with religion 
as part of their political identity, which falls in line with an internally constructed image 
of the community to portray themselves as progressive and liberal to the outside world 
and to cultivate that ethos within their own community.           
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
To end this section, it is important to consider what Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi has 
written on Hazara ethnic consciousness, as the issue of religion is touched upon in this 
working paper. Ibrahimi notes that the features which distinguish Hazaras from other 
ethnic groups are internally contested and is,, ‘…shaped by particular social and 
political environments’. An example he shares is the religious identity linked to Hazaras. 
He states that internally within the Hazara community an emphasis on religion splits 
the Hazara community into three different sects (Shia, Ismaili and Sunni), and in turn 
the ‘…boundary of a shared Hazara identity can both expand and shrink when Shia 
Islam is activated as an overarching element of identity. It expands because it connects 
them to the broader Shia world extending to Iran, Iraq and Syria. It shrinks because the 
Sunni Hazaras will be excluded or recognised to a lesser degree as part of this broader 
identity’ (2012: 2-3).  This quote is pertinent to note given that the next sections of this 
chapter will explore religion in relation to identity, as well as religious and secular 
Hazara political movements.  
 
This section has sought to explore the Shia orientation of Hazaras. Alongside, how 
Shi’ism relates to both the historic and current marginalisation of the community in 
Afghanistan and the neighbouring region, and its relationship with the narrative of 
overcoming. The following sections of this chapter will look at religion in relation to 
Hazara identity, religious and secular Hazara organisations and political movements 




5.3 Explicit discourses on religion: 
Having discussed the historical place of Shi’ism among the Hazara community and the 
implications of this minority status in Afghanistan, this section aims to delineate 
perspectives on Shi’ism among research participants. In turn this section will explore to 
what extent religion is seen as incidental, integral or neutral to Hazara identity. In this 
section neutral is used in reference to the fact that some research participants view 
religion as part of a larger identity, which is neither positively affirmed or negatively 
perceived.      
 
For most research participants religious and ethnic identities were viewed as distinct, 
and Hazara identity was not hybridised as an ethno-religious identity as Hazara Shia or 
Shia Hazara. This is explicitly highlighted by the following quote from Joma Ahmadi, 
who noted that, ‘I believe when we compare, religious identity is very important to me 
but still it doesn’t mean that I neglect or pay little importance to my ethnic identity, 
because usually you can change your religious identity but you can’t change your 
ethnic identity. You will remain Hazara for thousands of years, and you have been 
Hazara for thousands of years’. Some Hazara research participants mentioned how an 
ethno-religious identity was problematic for them as it was exclusionary to equate 
‘being Shia’ with ‘being Hazara’ given that there are also Ismaili and Sunni Hazaras, 
with some research participants stating that some Hazaras have converted to other 
faiths or are atheists, and are excluded from such an understanding of Hazara identity. 
In relation to this point Esmat Amean stated that, ‘We are Shia but that doesn’t mean 
that [Sunnis] are not a part of us. We have got lots of Sunni Hazara, [who are] more 
‘Hazara’ than us, even though they changed their religion. But they have got a strong 
Hazaragi feeling, but they [were] still [persecuted] for being Hazara, even though they 
were Sunni’. Similarly, research participant Asadullah Shafai noted a difference in 
perspectives on religion which diverges based on education and age:  
 
Well the thing is that it seems that the majority of Hazaras are Twelver Imami 
Hazaras, so for most of the people there is a kind of a mixed identity of being 
Hazara and Shia. So most of those people especially the Sunni Hazaras were 
not very known to the Imami Shias, although they knew that there are some 
Ismaili Hazaras. Well in a way they regard them as Shia although different 
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sect of Shia, but because of that fact most of the Shia Hazara, I mean Twelver 
Imami Jafari Shias, they describe themselves as a kind of mix of being a 
specific kind of ethnic group belonging to a specific sect of Islam. But 
recently, for the educated people they would like to describe themselves as 
Hazara’s rather than belonging to a specific sect of Islam. So first of all, I 
mean, the matter of religion is not as important for the new generation as 
the old generation. And secondly they want to describe, to say, that they 
belong to a bigger community of Hazaras in which there are some Sunnis as 
well.   
  
Attahullah Nawrozy spoke of a more personal experience upon learning that not all 
Hazaras are Shias:  
 
So if I say that I’m Hazara people say that you are Shia. But that is not true. 
We’ve got Sunni Hazaras. The worst thing was like I myself, I was labelling all 
the Hazaras as Shias…until I came across three gentlemen here in 
Nottingham, and they were Hazara and I was king of relating to them, I am 
Hazara and we are from the same religious background, and we are from the 
same community. And then they told me that no we’re Sunnis. And then I 
asked them that Hazaras do we have Sunnis? And they said yes Hazaras have 
lots of Sunnis. One is from Baghlan province, Pule-e Khumri, and there are 
like thousands, tens-of-thousands of Sunnis there who are Hazara. And then I 
spoke to an elder person, back in Afghanistan, and said you guys didn’t tell 
me that Hazaras are not only Shia people, Hazaras have got Sunnis as well. 
And he told me, well this is not good, but he is a Hazara elder, he told me, if 
you are Hazara you have to be Shia, because if you are Sunni then you are not 
Hazara. So this is how Hazara people see themselves. They kind of connect 
‘Hazaraism’ (‘Hazaraness’) to Shi’ism. So that’s how we were brought up and 
we didn’t know that they are Sunnis who are Hazaras.   
 
While Elaha Soroor noted how religious distinctions have separated some members of 
the community from one another: 
 143 
I realised Ismaili Hazaras, and like other Twelver Hazaras they are not very 
connected to each other, but they still consider themselves Hazaras, and only 
connect in this way, but they do not get married together and they would not 
have family connections, if they are very religious. If they are liberal then they 
would (interact) but mainly they would look at each other negatively.    
 
Other research participants noted how religion is something people actively chose 
while one’s heritage and ethnicity is something that people do not have control 
over. For instance, Abuzar Attifi, a business studies teacher and professional 
photographer based in London, noted that: 
 
I mean Hazaras can be Sunnis, Hazaras could be Christian, and Hazaras could 
be Hindus if they want to. Religion is a personal choice, I can change right 
now to be Buddhist, and it is my choice. I’m not harming anyone. But Hazara 
is what I am, I cannot change Hazara. 
 
While Hojjat Yaqubi, a recent University of Manchester graduate in history, 
mentioned that:    
 
Religion is a personal thing. No one can tell you to do this or that. Religion is a 
relationship between you and God and no one can tell you what to do. 
Obviously, Shi’ism, you can choose whatever belief you want to follow, but 
being Hazara you can never change that.   
 
Some research participants were also critical of the espousal of an ethno-religious 
identity as it was seen as negating the community’s pre-Islamic heritage. In this regard, 
Ezzatullah Zamani, an LPC and master’s student based in London, stated that, 
‘Ultimately, I think to conflate religion with being Hazara deprives us of our very long 
and rich [pre-Islamic] history’. While, Hasan Raza, a business data analyst in his 30s and 
based in Birmingham, noted that: 
 
Hazaras were not Muslims to start with. They became Muslims. Some of 
them later converted to Christianity. Religion is purely your personal affair 
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between you and your creator…Hazaragi identity is something that your 
genes determine. 
 
Additionally, one research participant who grew up in Quetta and is now based in 
London, mentioned that: 
 
Hazaras existed in the pre-Islamic era…and the giant statues of the Buddhas 
were built in the Bamiyan region which meant they were Buddhist before. 
And then they converted to Islam, to Shia Islam, and then there were Hazaras 
who were converted to Sunni Islam during Abdur Rahman’s rule.   
        
In relation to this group of research participants it is also worth noting the issue of 
religious practice and related problems, which were mentioned in multiple research 
interviews. Numerous interviewees who perceive their religious and ethnic identities 
as distinct noted how in their view a hyphenated ethno-religious identity among 
Hazaras has caused a rift among some Hazara communities, in terms of religious 
practices and rituals, with a specific focus on Muharram. One Hazara community 
leader noted the outcry that followed when in the previous year a Hazara community 
association in the Midlands looked to alter the way Muharram proceedings were 
conducted at the local Hazara Hussainiya, in which a Hazara religious studies graduate 
delivered sermons about Imam Hussain and the battle of Karbala, as well as taking 
time to address the youth of the congregation about the need for them to work to 
contribute to their local communities in Britain positively, all in the Hazaragi dialect of 
Persian. Whilst younger Hazaras lauded this new approach to the annual sermons, 
some older community members were outraged that the traditional format of the 
sermons was not preserved and that the yearly invitation of an Iranian scholar to the 
vicinity had been scrapped, even though for the aged members of the congregation 
the formal, standard Persian spoken by the Iranian scholar was difficult to understand. 
These internal community issues in terms of religious practice have become issues of 
fragmentation among the community, with many research participants stating that 
after many years their local communities still do not have community spaces, due to 
arguments as to whether such spaces should solely be used for religious purposes, or if 
they should be used for cultural gatherings as well. Therefore, not only is religion in 
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relation to identity contentious, methods of performance of religious rituals are also 
divisive among the community.   
 
For respondents who hold strong religious beliefs which intertwine with their ethnic 
identity, two main reasons were given as to why this ethno-religious identity has 
emerged. Firstly, the history of the community in relation to the insurrection of 
Hazarajat which was orchestrated on religious grounds plays a major factor in the 
espousal of an ethno-religious identity. For some of these research participants they 
could not openly assert their religious identity for fear of reprisals in Afghanistan, but 
living in Britain gave them an opportunity to proclaim an ethno-religious identity 
without fear of persecution. It is seen as a means of reclaiming something that was 
denied for over a century, and has become the impetus for many of these research 
participants to consciously assert themselves as Shia Hazaras, hence why multiple 
research participants stated that they actively affirm their religious identity as Shia 
Muslims, and as Hazaras. This was something highlighted by Asef Ali Mohammed, a 
photographer and film-maker in his early 30s based between Quetta and London, who 
stated that: 
 
Being a double minority, Shia and Hazara, it’s something that the Hazaras 
have suffered for decades. Some people call themselves Hazara-Shia, for 
them it’s so important and some call themselves Shia-Hazara, and it’s like 
which one comes first? But when you see things, sensitivities like that, you 
think it is really important. 
 
Similarly, Mohsen Abbasi, a financial analyst in his 20s, based in London, noted that, 
‘Being Shia is a big part of Hazaras’ identity, and one of the main reasons is because 
they have been differentiated for others. So it does play a big role for us’. This 
response highlighted how the community’s history also relates to articulations of a 
religious identity, given that the community’s marginality was predicated on their  
religious beliefs as Shia Muslims. While other research participants mentioned how to 
‘be Shia’ is intrinsic to what it means to be Hazara, as multiple research participants 
noted that being Hazara and Shia are inter-linked, and formed part of a hybridised 
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ethno-religious identity. For instance, Haji Asad a shopkeeper in his 50s, based in 
London, stated that:     
 
Hazara means Shia, Shia means Hazara. So being Shia in Afghanistan means 
that you’re Hazara, or being Hazara people automatically know that you’re 
Shia. So according to him they’re not separated, so if you’re Hazara, you’re 
Shia, and if you’re Shia, you’re Hazara. That is how in Afghanistan they would 
see it (other Afghans). I think that if people know you by being Hazara then 
they know you by being Shia. 
 
While, a soon to be retired school teacher, based in London, who grew up in 
Pakistan, noted that: 
 
Well the thing is, to be honest with you, religion is very personal. Everyone 
has their own views, their own ways of looking at religion. But when 
somebody says that I am Hazara I automatically think they’re Shia. 
 
This Shia essence of Hazara identity was not just limited to more mature research 
participants, as some diaspora Hazaras also articulated similar sentiments, with one 
research participant, based in Birmingham and in his mid-20s mentioning that: 
 
I think if you know of a person that’s Hazara, straightaway you know that 
they’re Shia, ok. Like I told you I have not come across anybody, unless 
they’ve changed their faith…during the course of their own time, that’s totally 
up to them, but I’ve never met a Hazara that was born and told from the start 
that hold on you’ve got to be a Christian or whatever religion. If you know 
someone Hazara you know straightaway that they’re Shia. You know they’ve 
been brought up in a house where Islam and Shi’ism was the pillar of that 
house.  
 
While for other research participants who discussed a hybridised identity it was more 
so as a matter of fact that the community is ethnically Hazara and religiously Shia. In 
turn to be a Hazara Shia or Shia Hazara is just a lived reality of the community, where 
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religion is a neutral fact of a bigger identity. This was a trend that was seen to manifest 
among research participants of both genders and of various age groups. Furthermore, 
some research participants noted that it is not only within the Hazara community that 
a hybridised ethno-religious identity is asserted, but how an assumption still persists 
among non-Hazara Afghans that all Hazaras are Shia, with Shokryah Mohammadi 
stating that, ‘I think the fact that everybody thinks Hazaras are Shias could be wrong, 
because may be we have Hazaras who are Sunni’. While Zahra Zahidi, an optometry 
student at Aston University in Birmingham, mentioned that, ‘If I say to someone I’m 
Hazara I think that they would know that I’m a Shia, because from the big Hazara band 
about 90% of Hazaras are Shia and even when you go to Afghanistan they 
automatically think that you’re a Shia’.  
 
Within some of the research interviews the overtly Shia commemorations of 
Muharram and Ashura were discussed and the importance of these commemorations 
in connecting to one’s Shia beliefs. In engaging with the ritual practices associated with 
Muharram and Ashura, it is claimed that what was denied for over a century, the 
ability to openly engage in Shia rituals, is reclaimed and has become the impetus for 
many of these research participants to consciously assert themselves as Shia Hazaras 
through ritual practices. In relation to the importance of ritual practice among the 
community Mohammed Azizi, a pharmaceutical research chemist from London in his 
early 40s, noted that: 
 
Muharram yes. It’s very significant for the community. And it’s not only for 
the Hazaras, all Shias. And one other thing that is quite significant, we see lots 
of resemblance between what Mazari did and what we’re seeing in Kabul, 
and although we don’t see it as equal (to Imam Hussain’s death), because 
that was more on a bigger stage, but this was big in its own terms. 
 
While research participant Rayhana Neyazi, who is a university student in her early 
20s, based in London, stated that: 
 
[During] Muharram there are these gatherings and we have to attend every 
night for the prayers and it’s called Majalis. So they go there and on the 10th 
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of Muharram there’s a big march and Hazaras are a big contributor to that.   
And what they do is, again they remember Imam Hussain. 
 
Additionally, literature on transnational Hazara communities highlights how Ashura is 
particularly significant for the Hazara community as the trials and tribulations of Imam 
Hussain, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad, were seen as paralleling the current 
situation of the Hazaras in Afghanistan and the neighbouring region, with Denise 
Phillips, a PhD candidate at the University of New England writing, in a journal paper 
on Hazara Refugees from Afghanistan, that:   
 
Alessandro Monsutti notes that the exiled Hazara community in Quetta meld 
grief for their own ethnic suffering with Ashura commemorations. I have 
observed a similar phenomenon among local Hazaras during Ashura 
ceremonies conducted in community halls in Brisbane (2011: 183). 
 
Here the link to Imam Hussain in paralleling the situation of Hazaras at present to the 
situation of early Shia leaders is mentioned in work by Monsutti and Adlparvar, but 
appears to manifest among younger Hazaras too, as exemplified by the following 
quote from Shakiba Alizada, an accounting and finance student at Birmingham City 
University: 
 
…I think Shi’ism with the Hazaras, well the majority of Hazaras are Shia so I 
think that’s why we place them together. So I think with what Shias say about 
Imam Hussain and what he went through, I think that’s quite similar to what 
the Hazaras have also been through as well.   
 
This link to a religiously significant incident in the past to the contemporary 
circumstances of the Hazara community was mentioned by multiple research 
participants. These interviewees noted that as a Shia minority they connect to the 
narratives circulated around Imam Hussain’s death in a personal capacity, as it directly 
relates to the current circumstances of Hazaras in Afghanistan and the neighbouring 
region. This is turn further emphasises the observations noted in both the works of 
Monsutti and Phillips.     
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This section has shown how for some members of the Hazara community the espousal 
of an ethno-religious identity was seen not accounting for the fact that religion is a 
choice and one’s ethnic background is not, while also being an exclusionary identity 
category for not representing non-Shia Hazaras, which also omits the community’s 
pre-Islamic. For some research participants religion is of significant importance in their 
daily lives. Among some of these research participants this extends to how they 
conceptualise their identity, as an ethno-religious identity, as Hazara Shia or Shia 
Hazara. The strong attachment to Shi’ism for some of these research participants 
stems from their history and heritage as Shias. While for others it specifically relates to 
the subjugation of the community on religion grounds. However, for other research 
participants to be Shia Hazara or Hazara Shia is just a factual reality of the community, 
which is neither perceived positively or negative, but solely as a neutral fact.  
 
Having discussed perspectives of religion among Hazara research participants and its 
relationship with identity the next section shifts from explicit discourses on religion to 
resonances with, and legacies of, religious narratives in secularised forms and vice 
versa. Therefore, a genealogy of Hazara political theology before and during the Soviet 
war will be the next section of this chapter. The following section will in turn bring to 
the fore the work of political theorist Carl Schmitt, which at its core states that modern 
secular states’ liberal ideas develop from religious theological sources.  
 
5.4 A genealogy of Hazara political theology before and during Soviet war:  
This next section of the chapter is a genealogy of Hazara theological politics from the 
Soviet war, given that Hazara political movements at the time were both secular and 
religious in their ideologies. Some of these movements were influenced by Maoist 
political ideology such as the Hazara-led Sazman-e Javanan-e Mutarraqi (Progressive 
Youth Organization) co-founded by Hazara political activist Akram Yari in 1965, while 
others drew inspiration from the Iranian resistance and revolution of the late 1970s 
and Shia theology, such as the Harakat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Movement of 
Afghanistan). To begin this section an overview of Hazara organisations and political 
movements during the war will be presented. This will be followed by an exploration 
of the political theology of these numerous groups. The section will then end with an 
outline of the political theology of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Iranian sociologist 
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Dr Ali Shariati, as the work of the latter theorist underscores the importance of social 
justice in relation to Shia theology, while the Khomeinist ideology itself was linked to 
several Hazara political movements in the late 1970s and 1980s, during the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan.  
 
Here it is important to detail the Hazara war-era organisations present in Afghanistan 
prior to and during the Soviet occupation. Political scientist, Professor Olivier Roy in his 
book titled ‘Islam and resistance in Afghanistan’ details the different social movements 
among the Hazaras in the mid to late 20th Century. He mentions the emergence of the 
educated youth in the mid-1960s who were, ‘Strongly politicised, progressive and 
Hazara nationalists, they turned to Maoism (Keshtmand, the present prime minister, is 
one of the few to be pro-Soviet) or became followers of Khumayni’ (1990: 140). During 
the Soviet occupation Hazara groups came together to become part of the resistance 
during the war, but internal divisions began to appear among Hazara groups in the 
early 1980s which separated into three groups, which comprised of:  
 
…the secularists, which included the mir and the left (the alliance of 
Maoists…)…Another extreme group comprised the radical Islamists and 
included shaykhs who supported the Iranian revolution…and who accused… 
the sayyads of corruption and nepotism (a charge which was not far from the 
truth). There was also a traditionalist and clerical centre dominated by the 
Sayyad (ibid: 141).  
 
Within these movement, as noted above, there were secular political movements 
among the Hazara community during the Soviet invasion, mainly supported by the 
educated youth. The early 1960s saw the formation of the ideological Maoist Shula-i 
Jawid (Eternal Flame), which according to Harpviken had ‘…had a larger membership 
than Khalq and Parcham combined around 1970’ (1996: 35) and mainly comprised of 
Hazaras (ibid). Another Maoist Hazara group that formed in the 1960s in Afghanistan 
was the Sazman-e Javanan-e Mutarraqi (Progressive Youth Organization, henceforth 
the PYO), which as noted earlier, was co-founded by Hazara political activist Akram 
Yari in 1965. However, in discussing the PYO it should be noted that Niamatullah 
Ibrahimi mentions that, ‘The Maoists, that is SaJaM/PYO, became better known in 
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Afghanistan as the Shola’i, after Shola-ye Jawed (Eternal Flame), its first newspaper 
publication in 1968’, stating that the PYO evolved into the Shola with time77 (2012: 1-
2). Prior to the establishment of the PYO Yari was involved with another organisation 
known as the Sazmani Demokratiki Navin-e-Afghanistan (Neo-Democratic 
Organization), with Hafizullah Emadi noting that:  
 
Leading Hazara intellectuals who advocated revolutionary armed struggle and 
supported the people's revolution included Akram Yari and Sadiq Yari. Akram 
was one of the founding members of the pro-Beijing organization of Sazmani 
Demokratiki Navin-e- Afghanistan…After the establishment of the pro-Soviet 
regime in Kabul in April 1978, Yari and his associates were arrested and 
executed (1997: 374).  
 
While more generally in relation to Hazaras who aligned with secular movements at 
the time Harpviken states that: 
 
The radical seculars were dominant among the educated youth, emerging as 
an influential grouping within the Hazara community from the [mid-1960s]. 
Those who had obtained education came mainly from relatively wealthy 
families, often the sons of the mir (1996: 30).  
 
Ibrahimi also makes reference to the fact that PYO supporters were mostly educated 
Hazaras, who did not support the PDPA (2017: 129). Ibrahimi also refers to secular 
orientated political mobilisation happening across the border at the time in Quetta 
within his work, stating that an organisation which was known as the Tanzim-e Nasle 
Naw-e Hazara Moghul (Organisation of the New Generation of the Moghul Hazaras), 
espoused a ‘secular ethnic identity’ as Hazaras (ibid: 130), and in turn was more ethno-
nationalistic in its ideology than some other Hazara organisations active in the region 
at the time.   
 





Of the many secular and religious political organisations and movements that have 
already been discussed, and remain to be discussed in this section, many dissolved 
over time or had notable members defect to other organisations when ideological 
differences began to manifest within the higher echelons of these groups. However, 
towards the end of the 1980s when fragmentation had long been common place 
among these organisations, a new political movement emerged on Afghanistan’s 
political scene in 1989, the same year the Soviet occupation of the country came to an 
end. The Hezb-e Wahdat was a coalition of several Hazara political movements in 
Afghanistan, with Canfield noting that:  
 
In July 1989, the disparate Hazara organizations that had been fighting each 
other endorsed a new alliance in Bamian, calling it Hizb-i Wahdat ("Party of 
Unity"). Many Hazara fronts joined…Mazari's policy was on the one hand to 
avoid the coercive influence of Iran and on the other hand to persuade 
Hazaras of all stripes, including most of the Islamists, that in the long run they 
had a common interest as an ethno-national entity (2004: 255-256).  
 
Although the party did not restrict itself to Hazara members only, most of the 
movement’s supporters were ethnic Hazaras. The group was led by Abdul Ali Mazari, a 
cleric turned political leader. Additionally, in a book titled ‘Modern Afghanistan: the 
impact of 40 years of war’ edited by Professor Nazif Shahrani, Dr Melissa Kerr 
Chiovenda notes that Mazari ‘…decided to open the party to Islamist and secular 
Hazaras, with a focus on ethnic affiliation rather than religious sectarian affiliation’78 
(2018: 257). While in a book on ‘Militancy and political violence in Shiism' edited by 
Assaf Moghadam, Brian Glyn Williams states that:  
 
...Mazari was famous for stating. "Our only wish for our people is that being a 
Hazara should no longer be a crime" and "No society can survive without 
equality, tolerance, social justice, and brotherhood." This lack of religious or 
millenarian messages on the Mazari posters, billboards, and calendars is 
 
78 It should be noted that multiple research participants have stated that Wahdat did not restrict itself 
to Hazara members only, has always been open to all Afghans, and seeks to promote equality and 
justice for all people of Afghanistan.   
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testimony to the strong secular-nationalist character of the Hazaras. In this 
respect, Mazari is more of an ethno-nationalist icon...(2012: 190). 
 
In turn Wahdat accommodated members of various political and religious ideologies 
but framed its aims within a liberal discourse relating to equality, rights and justice for 
all. These demands, multiple research participants have noted, are not just demands 
for Hazaras but for all citizens of Afghanistan.         
 
Having discussed secular Hazara movements that emerged before and during the 
Soviet war, it is also important to explore religious Hazara movements present at the 
time as they also had strong support among certain segments of Hazara society. Olivier 
Roy notes that from 1950 to the mid-1980s the Shia clergy ‘enjoyed a revival’ among 
the Hazara community ‘because of the influence of Iran’ (1990: 140), and in his work 
he also refers to the pro-Iranian Nasr Hazara political movement which was ‘…set up in 
Iran after the communist coup’ (ibid: 143) and was also funded by Iran. The early 
1980s also saw the formation of the Afghan Pasdaran movement whose leadership 
were ‘educated in Iran’ (ibid: 144). At the same time another major religious Shia 
movement with a Hazara following was the Harakat-e Islami Afghanistan, which, as 
mentioned earlier, was formed in Qom in the late 1970s and led by Ayotollah 
Muhammad Asif Mohseni. Harakat took as its inspiration the Iranian resistance against 
the rule of the Shah in the late 1970s. In relation to Harakat Roy states that it:   
 
…ha[d] been inspired by Islamist ideas; they are few in numbers, but militarily 
very effective, and they play a pivotal role in the resistance movement. 
Founded by Shaykh Assef Muhseni Kandahari, who himself speaks Pashtu as 
his first language, the movement did not originate with the Hazara and has 
recruited its members from amongst the educated and politicised Shi'a, 
whatever their ethnic group may be. The movement is strongest in the 
border areas of Hazarajat… (ibid: 146). 
 
While Hazara scholar Hafizullah Emadi notes that several well-known Hazara-led or 
Hazara-supported organisations and movements operating at the time in Afghanistan, 
namely the Harakat-e Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) as 
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noted earlier, Sepah-e-Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard Corps), and Sazman-e-Nasr 
(Victory Organization) were all formed in the holy city of Qom in Iran, in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s (1997: 378). However, Dr Kristian Berg Harpviken states that, ‘With 
the exception of Pasdaran, the Hazara groups were not fully dependent on Iran’ (1996: 
83). While Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi notes that support for Khomeini among some 
Hazara political activists stemmed from the fact that educated Hazaras returning from 
Iran to Afghanistan has been exposed to Khomeinist ideas while in the country: 
 
A growing number of Shiite religious students had been returning to 
Afghanistan since the 1960s after attending religious training centres in Iraq 
and Iran. Many of them were returning with a higher level of religious 
education and new ideas regarding matters of religious interpretation. They 
built new mosques and madrasas in cities as well as in rural areas, which 
further expanded their network and amplified their ideological propaganda 
(2009: 2-3).  
 
While, at the same time, the traditional ruling class in Hazarajat consisting of khans did 
not appear to have a long-term political agenda to work towards, which further 
weakened their impact on the society in the region (ibid: 3). Similarly, schisms between 
the Maoists and nationalists in Hazarajat also limited their influence (ibid). An 
appealing aspect of Khomeini’s worldview, one that moreover resonated with 
revolutionary communist sensibilities and perhaps helped fold that trend into a 
religious politics  was the ‘…division of the world's peoples and governments into two 
distinct camps: the oppressor and arrogant powers; and the oppressed and 
downtrodden nations…the Mostakberin and the Mostazafin’ (Hunter 1988: 734). This 
not only relates to how Hazaras, and Afghans more generally, would have perceived 
themselves in relation to the Soviet occupiers during the 1980s, but is still salient in 
present times in Hazara discourses in how the community perceives itself in relation to 
the Afghan government and regional insurgent groups. Here Hazaras both past and 
present are the mostazafin who have been oppressed for decades by the mostakberin, 
representing the government and extremists. This in turn again underscores the 
contemporary nature of the narrative of marginality.  
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Having noted the importance of the Iranian revolutionary movement for the Harakat, 
Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi notes that pro-Khomeinist political leaders were also to be 
found among the Hazara activists of the 1980s. Ibrahimi mentions that an ideological 
schism emerged at the time between Hazara ‘traditionalists’ and ‘Khomeinists’, while 
also noting how the ‘revolutionary enthusiasm’ of some of these groups was, 
‘…inspired by the fresh memory of the revolution in Iran [which] compounded [the] 
problem’ (2009: 2) as to the what these groups could achieve regarding their influence 
and power in central Afghanistan. Another Shia group which was also active and 
present in Hazarajat at this time, the Shura-yi Inqilab-i Ittefaq-i Islami-yi Afghanistan 
(Council of the Islamic Revolutionary Alliance) was made up of both Hazara and non-
Hazara Shias. Furthermore, Professor Robert Canfield notes that, ‘Well-to-do non-
religious elements initially dominated the council, but within a short time, the 
leadership of Shora-ye EInqelab was taken over by the sayyid contingent’ (2004: 247). 
Canfield also lists several other local organisations active at the time with Hazara 
membership:  
 
▪ Nahzat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) was 
founded in 1358 (1979-80). The leaders were from Jaghori; the most 
notable one was Iftikhari, also (their representative in Peshawar) Rahimi.  
▪ Niyru-i Islam-i Afghanistan (Islamic Force of Afghanistan). Prominent 
leaders were Sayyed Zaher-i Muhaqqiq and his son Sayyed Husayn 
Muhaqiq (from Bihsud), and Hashimi (from Sang Charak in Jawzjan). 
▪ Da'wat-i Ittihad-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Invitation to the Islamic Unity of 
Afghanistan). Its only strength was in Angora, Ghazni province (in 1989).  
▪ Hizb-i Islam-yi Ra'd-i Afghanistan (Party of Islamic Thunder of Afghanistan). 
The leader was Qari Ahmad, also known as Qari Yakdista.  
▪ Jabha-ha-yi Muttahid-i Inqilab-i Islami Afghanistan (United Islamic 
Revolutionary Front of Afghanistan). This organization was formed in 1988 
from four very small organizations, all of which were organized in 1978 or 
1979: Ruhaniyat va Jawanan-i Afghanistan (The Religious Divines and the 
Youth of Afghanistan); Islam Maktab-i Tawhid (Islam, School of Unity); 
Ittihad-i Ulama (Union of Islamic scholars); Junbish-i Mustaz'afin-i Islami-yi 
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Afgha- nistan (Association of the Islamic Oppressed of Afghanistan); 
Fidaiyan-i Islam (Zealots for Islam).  
▪ Ittihadi-yi Mujahidin-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Union of Islamic Warriors of 
Afghanistan) led by Abdul Husayn Maqsudi (ibid: 252).  
 
Having discussed pro-Khomeini and religious Shia orientated Hazara organisations it is 
also important to delve into the political theology of Khomeini and Shariati. This is 
because several Hazara groups present during the Soviet war took inspiration from the 
Iranian resistance of the late 1970s, or aligned themselves with Khomeinist ideology. In 
relation to the political ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ibrahimi states that:  
 
By establishing the Islamic Republic of Iran under his leadership as supreme 
leader, Ayatollah Khomeini provided a role model for the religiously-
motivated Shiite clerics around the world. He transformed Shiite Islam into a 
mass political ideology and spoke in the name of the downtrodden against 
the corrupt upper classes and traditionalist religious elites that, by their 
silence and inaction, were endorsing the ills in Islamic society originally 
spread by the colonial powers. He articulated a wide range of socio-political 
agendas that entailed reforms in all spheres of society with the ultimate aim 
of establishing a puritan Islamic society based on the example set by the 
Prophet Muhammad in the sixth century (2009: 4). 
 
This quote shows why a religiously-motivated political ideology may have been 
relevant to some Hazara activists during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In 
emphasising the dispossessed, members of the Hazara community could directly relate 
to the words of the Ayatollah given that the upper classes at the time had aligned 
themselves with a communist regime, which was antithetical to Islam and the views, 
beliefs and way of life of certain segments of Hazara society. In turn the appeal of an 
ideology which sought to speak to and uplift the oppressed finding support across the 
border in Afghanistan is unsurprising, given the turbulent political reality the country 
was experiencing in the midst of a war, which was framed as both the occupied 
resisting occupation, while additionally, the righteous believers defying the non-
believing oppressors, as Professor Shahrough Akhavi notes that, ‘…Khomeini's rhetoric 
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is replete with allusions to the 'oppressed' (mustaz'af) (1988: 425). Here it is also 
important to note the work of the 20th Century political theorist Carl Schmitt, with a 
journal article on his work stating that to ‘…maintain political unity within a space it is 
necessary to have an idea of good. The more it is shared, the greater the unity of form 
and politics…’ (Cerella 2012: 980), this can be seen to resonate with the Iranian 
revolution itself and its influence on Hazara activists in Afghanistan, while also relating 
more broadly to Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation.  
 
Consequently, although the views espoused by Khomeini during the Iranian resistance, 
and when he became Ayatollah, reverberated and transcended national boundaries 
and struggles, in how they influenced a segment of the Hazara and non-Hazara Shia 
Afghan resistance, they also link to the narrative of marginality that the community 
propagates in present times. This is because even if explicit references to the Ayatollah 
or religion are not made when referring to this narrative, this narrative still centres 
around the subjugation of a marginal group by an oppressive state, and successive 
governments, which is reminiscent of Khomeini’s views on social justice. In turn the 
narrative of marginality although espoused as a wholly secular narrative by some 
members of the Hazara community can also be seen to have Shi’i religious undertones. 
Here it is also worth noting Schmitt again as he stated that, ‘All significant concepts of 
the modern theory of state are secularized theological concepts not only because of 
their historical development—in which they were transferred from theology to the 
theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the 
omnipotent lawgiver’ (1985: 36). Therefore, from the perspective of religiously 
inclined Hazaras it can be claimed that the modernising project itself and the master 
narratives have secular liberal undertones now, but are still paralleled with a prior 
religiously-orientated redemption discourse and Maoist liberation discourse, even if 
one or both of these heritages are commonly renounced now. 
 
Following on from discussing Khomeini’s views in relation to the mostakberin and the 
mostazafin it is also pertinent to note the work of Iranian sociologist Dr Ali Shariati 
who has written extensively on Shia Islam. Professor Abbas Amanat in his book titled 
‘Iran: A Modern History’ discusses Shariati’s view on the role and function of Shi’ism, 
stating that: 
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Shari‘ati sought a [message] of liberation in the Qur’anic narrative and in the 
Shi‘i past. He was not interested in the empirical, factual history of Islam, 
which he dismissed as irrelevant and misleading, produced by oppressive 
powers and Westerners. Rather, he sought in the early Shi‘i sacred past 
archetypes for his vision of revolt against political and religious 
oppressions….In this sacred past, the age of the early believers, Shari‘ati 
imagined a dynamic course when the pure, egalitarian, and self-sacrificing 
Imams and their companions actively resisted their corrupt oppressors. This 
he called the age of ’Alid Red Shi‘ism (2017: 853-854). 
 
While Professor Ervand Abrahamian discusses the importance of social justice within 
Shariati’s conceptualisation of Shi’ism, noting that:  
 
For Shi'ism, in Shari'ati's own words, was not an opiate like many other 
religions, but was a revolutionary ideology that permeated all spheres of life, 
including politics, and inspired true believers to fight all forms of exploitation, 
oppression, and social injustice (1982: 26). 
 
Shariati himself discusses two distinct strands of Shi’ism in his essay, ‘On red Shi’ism 
and black Shi’ism’. In his work ‘red Shi’ism’ is akin to liberation theology and ‘black 
Shi’ism’ is a non-revolutionary form of Shi’ism propagated by the ruling classes, which 
does not take as its focus social justice and the emancipation of the oppressed. Shariati 
states that:   
 
[Shi’ism] keeps alive the hope of ‘redemption after martyrdom’. It promotes 
the idea of revenge and revolt, faith in the ultimate downfall of tyrants and 
the decrees of destiny against the ruling powers who dispense justice by the 
sword. It prepares all the oppressed and justice-seeking masses who are 
waiting to participate in the rebellion79. 
 
 




Shariati’s work also relates to the prior discussion of Khomeini’s position regarding the 
oppressed and the oppressor. As Shariati is seen as the ‘…the main ideologue of the 
Iranian Revolution’ (Abrahamian 1982: 24) his work relating to the true ‘essence’ of 
Shia Islam in terms of social justice would also have impacted notions of Shi’ism and 
social justice across the border in Afghanistan, both explicitly and implicitly. This is 
because the Iranian revolution made a mark on many political activists in the country, 
even if the desired outcome of various Hazara political actors in Afghanistan differed 
from the outcome of the revolution in Iran. Moreover, what Shariati notes here as an 
essence of Shi’ism is important to note in the context of this research and in relation to 
the narratives central to this research, that of marginality and overcoming, more 
generally, as it can be seen that these narratives encompass these elements of Shi’ism 
relating to oppression and redemption that Shariati discusses in his work. Furthermore, 
throughout the course of this research reference has regularly be made to historic 
injustices which have taken place against the Hazara community, but how in spite of 
the subjugation and marginalisation of the community, Hazaras have made great 
strides in recent years and strive for peace and prosperity, for themselves, their 
community, Afghans and the country. Therefore, although the Shia undercurrents of 
these narratives may not be a parallel that all Hazaras of a Shia background may 
actively choose to make, it is nonetheless interesting to see the similarities between 
these contemporary Hazara narratives and historic religious narratives.  
 
With these newer Hazara narratives it is important to note the language being used. 
Throughout the course of the research interviews and informal conversations 
undertaken for this research with Hazara community members, in discussing the 
community’s ‘redemption’, to reference to Shia theology, overcoming was always 
discussed in terms of community achievements, fundamental rights and peace, again 
relating back to the community’s liberal ideals. This narrative was never framed around 
discourses on rebellion, uprising or insurgence. The language used by research 
participants always underscored the need for the community to refrain from engaging 
in acts of violence which could again harm the community and further destabilise 
Afghanistan. Instead through engaging in peaceful means of community activism and 
community development, tangible progress has been made for and among the 
community, with one example of a well-publicised community achievement being the 
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success of Hazaras in the kankor, the annual university entrance exams. Therefore, 
although the contemporary Hazaras narratives can be seen to overlap with traditional 
Shia narratives, they do have a unique and distinct nature which does, at times, set 
them apart from religiously-orientated narratives, but also relate back to Schmitt’s 
early stated work on political theology in relation to modernity, secularism and religion 
(Ifergan 2010: 157-158).     
 
This section of the chapter has explored the secular and religious dimensions of Hazara 
organisations and political movements from the 1960s to the 1980s and 1990s in 
Afghanistan. This section started with an analysis of the secular Hazara movements 
present in Afghanistan both prior to, and during the Soviet occupation of the country, 
with reference to the pivotal Wahdat party, whose core aims and message still 
resonate with the Hazara community, two and a half decades since the passing of 
Abdul Ali Mazari. This section then detailed the religious Hazara movements active in 
Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation of the country, and their pro-Khomeinist or 
traditionalist leanings. This section ended with a political theology of both Ayatollah 
Khomeini and Dr Ali Shariati in order to contextualise the ideology underpinning the 
pro-Khomeini and Shia orientated Hazara organisations and political movements in the 
country at the time. While at the same time highlighting how Khomeini’s and Shariati’s 
perspectives on social justice and oppression also relate to the contemporary secular 
narratives of marginality and overcoming within this research.     
 
5.5 Genealogies of secularism in contemporary Hazara life:  
Having discussed how religion is perceived among Hazara research participants as 
either integral, incidental or negligible in relation to their identity, as well as secular 
and religious Hazara organisations and political movements during the late 1970s to 
the 1990s in Afghanistan, this section will discuss several recent examples of 
community activism relating to contemporary secular, liberal ideals that members of 
the community are choosing to advocate both in online spaces and public spaces.     
 
To begin with it is important to discuss a petition that was circulated online in 
November 2018. The petition was created through the website www.change.org. The 
petition was directed to the Washington Post, and print and online media more 
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generally, and asked that Hazaras be referred to by their ethnicity as Hazaras, and not 
as Shias, as, ‘Not all Hazaras in Afghanistan are Shiite and not all Shiites [in 
Afghanistan] are Hazaras’80. This is something that has become more salient in recent 
years when articles about attacks on Hazaras refer to the victims as Shias or Shia 
Hazaras. In some casual interactions with Hazara community members, and through 
comments shared on social media it is clear that for some Hazaras for international 
media to constantly mention that the targeted attacks in Afghanistan are against Shias 
and not specifically Hazaras is seen as problematic. The reason being that for these 
respondents they believe that attacks on the community are more to do with ethnicity 
than religion, as the perpetrators wish to attack Hazaras because they are Hazara, so in 
stating that victims are Shia due regard is not given to who the victims actually are and 
why they have been targeted. Although these are just an amalgam of anecdotes, they 
are still important to note because in relation to this specific example of the online 
petition it can be seen that some members of the Hazara community are taking active 
steps to move away from being identified within an ethno-religious lens, with one 
comment on the petition stating, ‘Basic education for the reporters to know me, as a 
secular Hazara…’81.  
 
It should also be noted that this perspective is not new, given that both Ibrahimi and 
Canfield have noted how the Hazara intelligentsia of the 1980s supported secular 
ideals, and as Wahdat itself also promoted an ethnic Hazara identity within its 
discourse on equality, rights and justice. Even though the content of this petition is 
nothing knew among the community, given that a separation of religion from an ethnic 
identity has been supported by certain segments of Hazara society for some time, this 
particular petition is still noteworthy in that the constant framing of Hazaras through 
an ethno-religious lens was being challenged online, and the issue at hand was being 
directed at a well-known Western news outlet. Furthermore, in recent years liberalism 
has become a strong undercurrent of Hazara identity, which can be seen through the 
content posted on Hazara social media, as well as through conversations with 
members of the community. The following quote from research participant Attahullah 
Nawrozy illustrates this point acutely: 
 
80 The petition can be accessed via the following link: www.change.org/p/washington-post-i-want-to-be-
called-hazara-not-shia.  
81 ibid.  
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So now if you go back to Afghanistan you see all the sportsmen who bring the 
gold medals are Hazaras, we have got a system called kankor system which 
means that there are like 15 – 20 public universities, and you can’t go there 
unless you have the top marks, it’s an examination that takes place every 
year. And you know the top person, the person who takes the top score 
every year is Hazara. And we have got people, like last year like 67 Hazaras 
were member of the Parliament. And we especially the women’s rights in 
Afghanistan, human rights commission is run by a Hazara, Dr Sima Samar. 
And apart from that, everywhere you see the Hazara people in every sector 
of government, in the private sector you see Hazaras thriving at the minute. If 
you are a Hazara right now [Afghan] people say that these people are 
modern, educated, have a worldly perspective, and they respect you for that. 
And this is how we overcame (our past).       
 
Having discussed personal perceptions and experience of religion among research 
participants it is also important to note the Shia personal status law of 2009, given the 
Hazara community’s reaction to the law. In the context of discussing religion among 
Hazaras this law is significant to note as the protests held by the community at the 
time show how they vehemently they opposed the passing of the law, which was seen 
as an affront to the community’s liberal ideals, and was very acute in the diaspora. This 
moment was therefore a catalytic one, in which Hazaras consciously chose a particular 
ethos over religion as an identity marker, and consolidated the mapping of overcoming 
onto political liberalism, the seeds of which were sown in Mazari’s late 1980’s 
separation of his particular religious theology from his coalition-oriented politics. In 
relation to the diaspora activism undertaken with regards to the personal status law, 
an Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) paper from 2009 notes the 
following, in one of its footnotes, that:  
 
Of note is that Hazara communities in exile actively mobilised to oppose the 
law’s contents, holding demonstrations in front of Afghan embassies, 
parliaments or UN offices in the United Kingdom, Norway, Italy, Australia, 
Germany, Denmark and Austria, with protestors in Australia passing a 
resolution of solidarity with Shia women in Afghanistan and condemning 
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discriminatory laws against women. A Hazara diaspora organisation in New 
York lobbied the Afghan embassy in the US over the law. A much linked-to 
opinion piece came from an Afghan Hazara woman living in the US, entitled 
“Why Afghanistan’s Family Shia Status Law Must Be Changed.” (19). 
 
The reactions to this event, in part affirm, Marie’s statement about how the Hazara 
community in Afghanistan prefer to not solely present the community through the 
prism of religion, given the sizable negative response to the law, as well as the fact that 
countless community members took to the streets to protest the law. The paper also 
noted how women had also organised protests against the law which was seen as an 
affront to women’s rights, which the community has been championing, both at the 
time and now. This further relates the how overcoming as a narrative is secularised as 
it can be seen that it is not centred around redemption through rebellion, as a religious 
understanding of the narrative relates to, but instead advocates liberal ideals, 
underpinned by equality for the sexes. Although this secular narrative of overcoming 
does relate back to the notion of redemption, what this redemption entails is greater 
access, prospects and gains for the community, as opposed to the traditional Shi’i 
understanding of redemption predicated on ‘rebellion’, as stated in Dr Ali Shariati’s 
work on red and black Shi’ism. Interestingly, some critics of the protesters made 
reference to Western infiltration when trying to delegitimise the protests, as the AREU 
paper mentions that, ‘A common rebuttal from clerical politicians when confronted by 
civil society on rights issues is to accuse them of being western agents and of receiving 
funding from western sources’ (ibid: 24), which also shows how the Hazara protesters 
themselves were seen as supports of Western liberal ideals, and in turn shows how the 
notion of redemption is integrated within this liberal order. This specific incident of 
political mobilisation among the community further relates to both the narratives of 
marginality and overcoming, in that a formerly marginal community whose religion 
affiliation was historically side-lined took to the streets to protest against what the 
community perceived as a misrepresentation of their beliefs and values.             
 
The following quote, also from the AREU paper on the Shi’ite personal status law, is 
pertinent to note in relation to the importance and leverage of clerics, at present 
times, among Afghanistan’s Hazaras. The paper states that, ‘[Muhammad Asif] 
 164 
Mohseni’s de-emphasis of ethnicity, as well as the perception that he is closely tied to 
Iran, has minimised widespread support for him among Hazara [S]hias while also 
attracting vocal opposition from some Hazara leaders’ (ibid: 18-19). This is a very 
striking point to consider given that up until his death in 2019 Mohseni was the most 
senior Shia religious cleric in Afghanistan, as he had been granted the title of ’Grand 
Ayatollah’, meaning that he had the authority to make legal decisions pertaining to 
Islamic law. For such a schism to emerge within the community as to the support given 
to a senior cleric like Mohseni further highlights the heterogeneity within the Hazara 
community with regards to the perception of religious authority, religious rulings and 
religion more generally, as well as the diminishing influence of such figures within 
certain segments of Hazara society. In relation to this point the article also noted that, 
‘The divide between [Mohseni and Royesh]82 represents in many ways a larger divide 
between Hazaras who are disenchanted with Iran and turning westwards, and other 
Shias who seek to carve out a political identity rooted in a sectarian emphasis, and 
who have accessed Iranian resources to do so’ (19). In turn the protests against the 
personal status law are an example of the Hazara community consciously affirming the 
distinction between religion and their secular, liberal ideals, even though the Hazara-
specific narratives within this research do mirror religious narratives.  
 
Having analysed two examples of activism relating to the challenging of the Shia label 
ascribed by online publications to Hazaras and the imposition of religiously-orientated 
law on the community, it is also important to discuss an institution whose work relates 
to the liberal ideals espoused by the community, even though the organisation’s name 
itself has an explicit reference to religion. The General Council of Sunni Hazaras was 
established in 2014 in Afghanistan, and in an interview with Dr Daniel Karell of New 
York University in 2017, Abdul Rahman Rahmani who is the chair of the Public 
Relations Committee for the organisation stated that: 
 
The General Council of Sunni Hazaras and I believe that there is no difference 
between Sunni and Shia Hazaras. We can bring our people together once 
again after the last century. We believe that in a democratic country everyone 
 
82 Aziz Royesh is a Hazara teacher and social activist who established Marefat High School in Dasht-e 
Barchi, Kabul, which is known for its high-performing pupils in the kankor exam.  
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should live equally and in peace…We believe that the country will not be 
moving in the right direction until political power is equally shared between 
all the tribes of Afghanistan (2016: 515).  
 
Although the organisation does make explicit reference to religion in its name, the 
interview with Rahmani is interesting to analyse given that it made multiple references 
to rights, equality and justice, in turn constantly utilising liberal terms, despite the 
assumption that could be made about the group’s supposed religiously-orientated 
aims, given the organisations name. However, the content of the interview suggests 
that the name has been chosen purely to represent an underrepresented demographic 
within Afghanistan, as opposed to espousing and promoting Sunni religious ideology. In 
the interview Rahmani repeated the importance of respecting the rights of all citizens 
of Afghanistan and recognising all the ethnic groups of the country. Rahmani further 
asserts what many research participants have said, and Hazara social media 
propagates, about the community’s liberal ideals with the following quote:   
 
Even though [both Sunni and Shia] Hazaras are the most educated group in 
Afghanistan, and they are against extremism and Islamic radicalism, and they 
are the strongest supporters of the homeland and democracy, the ‘social 
curse’ is still alive...The goal is to show that we are all human beings and we 
are all equal in Afghanistan (ibid). 
 
Rahmami’s statements further affirms that the group’s aims are to promote Hazaras in 
Afghanistan, in particular Sunni Hazaras. The organisation is demanding equality and 
justice for a community which has been invisible for over a century in the country, 
given that many Sunni Hazaras took on a Tajik identity for decades. Hence the active 
affirmation of being Sunni Hazara among the community is not being done for religious 
reasons but to promote and raise awareness of an underrepresented community, that 
some Shia Hazaras are not even aware of. Rahmani ends the interview by stating that, 
‘We are Hazaras. We are Afghans. We have the right to ask for our identity. We are 
equal with other citizens of Afghanistan and finally we are human beings!’ This again 
links back to the liberal ideals of the organisation and its members, which shows the 
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cotemporary secular orientation of some Hazara activists in present-day Afghanistan 
(ibid: 516).     
 
This section has shown how secularism manifests in present times among 
transnational Hazaras. The three case studies discussed in this section relate to an 
online petition, a public demonstration and a community organisation. The online 
petition showed how some Hazaras are actively choosing to separate religion from 
Hazara identity, in a more concerted manner, given that this petition was direction at 
an English-language online news outlet with a wide readership. While the example of 
the Shia personal status law of 2009 and the protests related to the law show how the 
community, overwhelming, reacted negatively to the law which was seen as 
undermining the community’s progressive, liberal ideas. This specific incident 
highlights how religion can no longer be used as a tool to suppress or undermine the 
community, especially when such decrees violate the community’s liberal beliefs. The 
last example discussed in this section relates to the General Council of Sunni Hazaras 
which was established in 2014. The interview discussed in this section, with a leading 
member of the organisation, also affirms the extent to which in recent years 
transnational Hazaras are embracing and promoting secular, liberal discourses. In turn 
this section has shown how the Hazara online domain, collective protests and 
community organisations are also utilising secular discourses, to further their aims in 
present-day Afghanistan.        
 
5.6 Conclusion: 
To conclude, this chapter examined religion among the Hazara community. The 
chapter began with an overview of the Shia orientation of the community and the 
impact this has had for the community both past and present. The following section 
explored perspectives of religion among Hazara research participants who were 
interviewed for my PhD research, given that the role of religion in relation to the 
narratives of marginality and overcoming have taken on various tangents during 
research interviews. For some research participants the espousal of an ethno-religious 
identity was problematic. This is because an ethno-religious identity is perceived as 
being exclusionary, particularly towards Sunni and Ismaili Hazaras and omits neglects 
the community’s pre-Islamic history. While for other research participants to affirm a 
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Shia religious identity was empowering as it allowed members of the community to 
preserve an identity that had historically been marginalised in Afghanistan. For some 
interviewees a hybridised ethno-religious identity as Shia Hazara or Hazara Shia was 
presented as a neutral, lived reality of the community, given their heritage as ethnic 
Hazaras and given their religious orientation as Shia Muslims. Here it was also 
mentioned that it was not just internally within the community where an ethno-
religious identity had been constructed, as many non-Hazara Afghans also associated 
Shi’ism with Hazara identity.   
 
This chapter then looked at Hazara political theology before and during the Soviet war. 
This section started with an overview of Hazara organisations and political movements 
active during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan to show the diverse political 
ideologies of these groups, ranging from pro-Maoist, Khomeinist and traditionalist. 
This section then detailed the ideological foundations of the pro-Khomeinist Hazara 
groups in Afghanistan, and how certain Shia discourses relating to oppression and 
social justice directly link to the contemporary Hazara narratives of marginality and 
overcoming. Within this section the work of political theorist Carl Schmitt was also 
referred to given that his political theology states that modernity is still underpinned 
by religious theology, which again relates to the Hazara narratives within this research.    
 
This chapter ended with a discussion on secularism in contemporary Hazara life. Three 
case studies were looked at in this section, which comprised of an online petition, a 
large-scale public protest in relation to the application of a narrow-form of Shia 
jurisprudence in Afghanistan, as well as a community organisation which was 
established in the country in the 2010s. The petition stated that an English-language 
news outlet should refrain from referring to Hazaras as Shias and should in fact refer to 
the community solely with reference to their ethnic Hazara identity. While the Shia 
personal status law of 2009 shows how religion was manipulated to undermine rights 
of members of the Hazara community, and in turn the community’s reaction to the 
legislation exemplified its incompatibility with secular, liberal Hazara discourses. Lastly, 
the example of the Sunni Hazara council shows how a formally underrepresented 
segment of the community seeks to utilise liberal discourse to further its aims in 
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contemporary Afghanistan, as opposed to using religious discourse for greater 

































Chapter 6: Social media use among transnational Hazaras:  
 
6.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapter demonstrated how religion is a tool which provides spaces for 
collective community affirmation, both at present and in the past, through religious 
ceremonies as well as political activity during the Soviet war. It also highlighted how 
these sites contain accounts which reaffirm the wider master narratives within this 
thesis, and their framing within post-war secular settings. The chapter dealt with 
narratives in relation to a particular mode of transmission: religion. Similarly, this 
chapter will also discuss another site of narrative production: social media. Here it will 
be seen that the narrative of overcoming is now embracing liberal ideas and values, 
which is circulated online, globally. However, social media in contrast to religious 
discourse which is personal, private and is mostly internal within the community, is 
publicly orientated and is aimed at both the Hazara community and the wider world. 
 
The Hazara community has an active presence on social media, and has also amassed a 
plethora of websites and social media pages dedicated to documenting, preserving 
and propagating Hazara history, human rights issues and political mobilisation among 
the community and beyond. Furthermore, given that this research seeks to understand 
the extent to which the narratives of marginality and overcoming are engaged with by 
the British Hazara migrant and diaspora community, social media thus lends itself as a 
key tool which can be utilised to gauge community sentiments on a wide range of 
issues, while also allowing for an analysis of the narratives within this research and to 
what extent they are reproduced. In turn social media becomes a mode of 
communication which helps in assessing these internally constructed community 
narratives and how they impact community attitudes and direct action. As a result this 
chapter seeks to highlight how social media is a response to the growing social capital 
of the Hazara community and how internal community dynamics lend themselves to 
produce organised networks, which then become a driving force for political 
mobilisation beyond borders. Thus, these resultant networks formed through 
engagement with social media lead to both individual personalisations of the Hazara 
master narratives within this research and the emergence of transnational Hazara 
politics.  
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To begin with it is essential to highlight why social media as a research tool can be 
useful within academic studies, as, for example, it is has the ‘…potential as a 
recruitment platform, [with a] reach into a particular demographic, and the behav-
iours, attitudes, and perceptions that are readily observable and extractable…’ 
(McCay-Peet and Quan-Haase 2017: 20). While at the same time it is worth noting 
that: 
 
Examining social media often gives the impression that it is a universe unto 
itself that exists in isolation from other spheres of life. This kind of 
perspective is myopic, however, and disregards how social media and the 
phenomena that emerge within it are closely interlinked to other spheres of 
life. Perhaps most importantly, social media usage is closely interwoven with 
everyday life’s rhythms and patterns’ (ibid).  
 
This quote is particularly pertinent in relation to this research given the public social 
media pages and webpages engaged with throughout this study seek to understand 
how issues affecting transnational Hazara communities are propagated, analysed and 
discussed online, and as they show how online spaces directly connect with people’s 
daily lived realities, and in turn Hazara political mobilisation worldwide. This then goes 
beyond the work of Pierre Nora who structures memory within a national framework 
(1989: 22-23), and subsequently shows how memory is being organised in a 
transnational space. While at the same time in relation to social media, the work of 
Maurice Halbwachs is also relevant. This is because the online domain has become a 
place where past events in people’s lives are reproduced and altered, in order to given 
them a heightened standing (1992: 52).  
 
As it will be seen through the course of this chapter on social media and the internet, 
there is an emphasis on Hazara history given how Hazara conceptualisations about the 
community’s past underscore the narratives the community seeks to promulgate to 
non-Hazaras about their community. This is partly done in order to raise awareness 
about their situation in Afghanistan and the neighbouring region, predicated on a 
history of marginalisation. For example, the internet and social media are significant 
tools with regards to constructing Hazara historiography. This is because it allows 
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Hazaras to be part of discourses on Afghanistan and means that their collective voice is 
given an outlet in a way that has not previously occurred in the community’s history. 
Social media places Hazaras within the framework of Afghan history production, as it 
gives a voice to a subaltern group who have been on the periphery in relation to 
various discussions about Afghanistan and its people, and in turn the Hazara 
community can now shape the narratives that they as a collective wish to disseminate 
about themselves and their community. In propagating a ‘Hazara account’ of the 
events of the late 19th Century online, such information is in the public domain and is 
accessible to anyone who wishes to engage with it. However, in Afghanistan the 
opportunity to vocally challenge dominant historical narratives and discuss Hazara 
grievances would be extremely difficult, hence the importance and value of the 
internet for the Hazara community in this regard. While in the section on Hazara 
history within this chapter, widely followed Hazara social media pages and Hazara 
websites will be referred to show the content that is proliferated through these online 
domains and how this content works to reinforce the narratives of marginality and 
overcoming.  This chapter then turns to the issue of political mobilisation among the 
Hazara community and how the information provided online about the community 
and its past become a catalyst for contemporary forms of action and how this 
collective action ties into the broader narrative of overcoming.    
 
6.2 Propagating Hazara history online:     
As noted earlier, Hazara social media has become a site where among others things, 
Hazara history is documented and shared. The use of the internet and social media 
allows the community to construct and propagate a history of Afghanistan through a 
Hazara lens, making the insurrection of Hazarajat, 20th Century massacres against the 
Hazaras and the subsequent migrations of the community out of the country, the focal 
point of this historiography. From the momentum built through remembrance of the 
past, through the content shared online, it can be seen that the Hazara community in 
Europe can effectively mobilise for the community in Afghanistan and the 
neighbouring region, which lessens the opportunity for the community to be solely 
viewed as victims. It also allows the community to challenge dominant accounts of 
Afghan history, and this is empowering for the community given that there is limited 
literature available on the Hazara community, and of the literature that does exist, the 
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insurrection of Hazarajat and the turmoil that followed is seldom discussed from a 
Hazara perspective. This is because the way in which the insurrection of the region is 
recounted is at times devoid of acknowledging the power structures that were at play 
during the war, and consequently some accounts about the insurrection portray the 
subjugated as conspirators, and the aggressors as merely people suppressing a violent 
revolt, as Dr Robert D McChesney, a scholar of the social and cultural history of 
Afghanistan, notes that, ‘[The insurrection of Hazarajat] has been characterized by pro-
Muhammadzai historians as suppression of a “rebellion”’ (1999: 8). While other 
accounts of the insurrection emphasise the collusion of certain local Hazara leaders 
with the Emir and his army as indicative of Hazara entanglements being testament to 
the community’s own role in their subjugation, although such a claim 
disproportionately lays blame at the hands of Hazara mirs in the conflict. Furthermore, 
in relation to historiography, in a journal paper on ‘teaching history’ Dr Robert J Parkes 
a lecturer at the University of Newcastle in New South Wales states that:   
 
…we must understand the act of teaching and learning history, as one of 
engaging in interpretive acts, as we read the histories that are made available 
to us. Acknowledging and pedagogically emphasizing the interpretive act, or 
the practice of ‘reading’, that is required if we are to engage with multiple 
histories, opens up the possibility for a transformative history pedagogy that 
does not automatically or inevitably result in a turn to relativism. That is, 
acceptance of the existence of multiple, and indeed rival narratives, does not 
in and of itself, doom us to indecision about which narratives are more likely 
to present an adequate representation of the past (2009: 126).   
 
Parkes’ intervention in relation to becoming familiar with ‘multiple histories’ is 
important to consider, as accepting numerous parallel historical accounts at any given 
time in history allows for the opportunity for holistic historical discourses to develop, 
across regions and borders, both locally and transnationally, in any given socio-political 
context. Subsequently, in engaging with multiple narratives of past events an 
opportunity arises for historians to work towards establishing a more inclusive 
approach to representation and understanding the past, as various accounts of history 
are then incorporated into discussions about the past, because as in the case of the 
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Hazaras it can be seen that the experiences of the community have been marginalised 
within dominant historical narratives. At the same time, with regards to online 
content, indigenous sources of information on peripheral histories shared online 
cannot simply be dismissed due to the method taken to disseminate the information 
being seen as less credible to written sources, because it is dominant power structures 
that have prevented such histories from being documented through official means in 
the past, which is why there is a growing use and reliance on alternative media 
sources, in order to preserve and propagate these neglected histories. Therefore, 
within this research the internet and social media have been utilised as key spaces of 
knowledge production which are of as much weight and value as traditional sources of 
information within academia.   
 
In discussing contemporary attempts to document Hazara history online an 
opportunity arises for a marginal history to be engaged with, while also allowing those 
from outside the Hazara community to learn about key moments in Hazara history, 
and this is pertinent to note if it is considered that, ‘…there have always remained 
many gaps of coverage [with Afghan history writing], not least in terms of women, 
lower classes and minority religious and ethnic groups’ (Green 2015: 47). 
Consequently, in engaging with contemporary modes of documenting Hazara history it 
can be seen that this ‘gap’ in Afghan history is being filled with emerging knowledge 
produced from within the Hazara community, as can be seen by Hazara websites such 
as, ‘Hazara.net’ and ‘Hazara International’, as well as through some of the information 
being circulated on Hazara social media, alongside contemporary literature being 
produced by Hazara scholars such as political scientist Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi and 
anthropologist Dr Khadija Abbasi. Subsequently, although there may be some 
knowledge about this history among Afghans more generally, the Hazara community 
has taken upon itself the task of linking multiple instances of oppression and framing it 
into a timeline of continued marginalisation, which fits into a new narrative structure 
that is working to reinforce and preserve newer instances of injustice, within this 
internally constructed historical timeline.        
 
Within the Hazara community it can be seen that a recurrent theme is the attempt to 
emphasise historical and current grievances, as a mechanism to preserve past 
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memories, as Nora noes that, ‘Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond 
tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past’ (1989: 8). This in 
turn allows the community to remember the marginalisation, suffering and loss they 
have endured, which becomes the impetus for one of many Hazara narratives, such as 
that of marginality. Subsequently, this narrative acts as a catalyst for change from 
within the community. In Britain an attempt has been made to broadcast multiple 
Hazara narratives, including that of marginality. In this regard social media is an 
important tool in disseminating information about the history of Hazaras, drawing 
parallels with current issues affecting the community mainly in Afghanistan but also in 
Pakistan. Given the scope of social media to reach many people at any given time, and 
in any given place, it has a heightened significance with regards to preserving and 
propagating certain historical narratives of the past. Here it is apt to briefly note the 
work of Michel-Rolph Trouillot, as he states that people’s understanding of what 
constitutes history is shaped not necessarily but what evidence can be produced to 
establish historical fact, but rather due to who communicates a given narrative and the 
accessibility of this narrative (1995: 2-4). Thus, it can be seen that marginal histories 
are at times preserved through alternate means to established history and governing 
narratives. Furthermore, as noted earlier, Trouillot notes in his work the power 
dynamics at play within dominant historical narratives that are widely propagated 
(ibid: 5), while also stating that, ‘Each historical narrative renews a claim to truth’ (ibid: 
6). And with regards to the Hazara community this can be seen through the 
information propagated on social media, Hazara websites and through community 
organisations, as well as at events, and in everyday conversations.        
 
In terms of the effective dissemination and preservation of Hazara history online, a 
significant source to consider is the website ‘Hazara.net’, which publishes content in 
English and Persian, and also has a Facebook page and Twitter account of the same 
name, which have just over 23,000 ‘likes’ and 5,000 ‘followers’, respectively83. The 
mission statement on their Facebook page states that they are the, ‘First Hazara 
website on Internet (Sept 28, 1998) in response to Hazara Genocide in Mazar-e-Sharif, 
Afghanistan. [With the] [s]ingular purpose: NEVER AGAIN!’, while their website states 
that, ‘Hazara.net is a non-profit website mostly focused on the human rights of the 
 
83At the time of writing, April 2020.   
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most-persecuted Hazara community’. The website has many sections divided into 
several tabs, including: ‘news’, ‘history’, ‘culture’, ‘human rights’ and [Hazara] 
‘women’, among other sections. The history section of the website covers a timeline 
from 247 BC when it is stated that Buddhist monks from India came to Afghanistan, 
and this historical timeline of events in the country brings readers up to the recent, 
late 20th Century Hazara history in the region, through the various articles provided. 
The Buddhist connection is important to mention as multiple Hazara research 
participants have stated that before embracing Islam, (be it the Shia, Sunni or Ismaili 
sects of Islam) the community was predominantly Buddhist. Furthermore, irrespective 
of whether this assertion is based on facts is irrelevant, in so much as it has persisted 
in the collective consciousness of some segments of Hazara society who genuinely 
believe this claim and in turn link it back to the Buddha statues of Bamiyan as being a 
part of Hazara cultural heritage, with research participant Hakima Arefi, who was born 
in Iran and is now based in London, stating that, ‘A Hazara can be a Shia or not, 
because in history we know about the first Hazara religion in Afghanistan, [it] was 
Buddhism...’. Therefore, it becomes apparent why some Hazara websites and social 
media pages choose to make reference to pre-Islamic Buddhist Afghanistan, as it is 
seen as directly relating to the community’s pre-Islamic history in the country, by 
members of the community that ascribe to this heritage claim, with Dr Melissa Kerr 
Chiovenda noting that:    
 
…many [Hazaras] expressed a deep connection to the Buddha statues and the 
Buddhist past of the Bamiyan valley. They made the claim that their own 
faces looked the like the faces of the statues, which were destroyed long ago, 
and yet were supposed to look the same as the faces of figures painted inside 
the caves and cells surrounding the statues. Hazaras often state that their 
resemblance to the statues proves they have inhabited the land for “4,500” 
years. They also express deep sorrow because of the destruction of the 
statues, seeing it as a destruction of part of their heritage (2019: 26).     
 
Among the articles presented on Hazara.net the insurrection of Hazarajat is widely 
written about, and information is also provided about Hazara slavery, the Hazara 
pioneers regiment of the British Indian Army, and the Afshar and Mazar massacres of 
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1993 and 1998. Although some online Hazara publications do make reference to an 
assumed pre-Islamic Hazara heritage and history, it should be noted that the general 
focal point of this contemporary Hazara historiography project situates itself around 
the late 1800s, during the time of the insurrection of Hazarajat, given the substantial 
socio-political shift these events triggered for the Hazara community. This is also 
because the wide-scale abuse inflicted on the community at the time has become a 
central theme of Hazara collective memory and collective consciousness. While in 
relation to the content of this specific website it is also worth briefly considering the 
importance of the ‘women’ section of Hazara.net. This section of the website has 
information about inspirational Hazara women from both Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
such as Dr Habiba Sarabi, the first female governor in Afghanistan, Kalsoom Hazara, a 
martial arts champion from Pakistan and Laila Haidari, who runs Afghanistan’s only 
private drug rehabilitation centre. In turn the description given of the subjugation 
mentioned on the website and the information provided about high-achieving Hazara 
women directly link to the narratives of marginality and overcoming, with the former 
being more explicitly referred to on the website, while the latter is implied, and 
highlights their reach among transnational Hazara communities. Thus, it can be seen 
that not only does Hazara.net work to preserve and disseminate Hazara history, the 
website also propagates the narratives within this research, and as a result can be seen 
as influencing how members of the Hazara community and non-Hazaras perceive the 
community in general, as both victims of continued discrimination, and as a 
progressive collective. In relation to this online content proliferated on Hazara 
websites and social media, Mohammad Yonus Entezar in a 2016 master’s thesis on 
online Hazara activism notes that:  
 
Hazara activists claim they are promoting democratic values and fighting for 
social justice in the websites. They have constructed Hazaras as victims and 
out-grouped other ethnicities as oppressors. Some Hazara writers went 
further and constructed a polarization between Hazara people and Hazara 
politicians. Regardless of whether such polarization strategies in Hazara 
discourse is discriminatory or not, it highlights and problematizes ethnic 
media discourse that does not promote civic and democratic values in 
Afghanistan (57). 
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Although Hazara.net claims to be the oldest Hazara website, its social media presence 
is a fraction of the popular Facebook page and website known as the ‘Hazara 
International’, which also publishes content in English, as well as in ‘Hazaragi|Dari’, 
Urdu and Italian, and has just under 276,000 likes on Facebook and almost 7,300 
followers on Twitter84. Hazara International also has the same informational tabs on 
their website as Hazara.net, but has additional sections on ‘art’, ‘sport’ and 
‘Hazaristan’. Their website also mirrors the themes proliferated on Hazara.net and 
again the narratives of marginality and overcoming are drawn upon and propagated 
through the information shared about the website about the ‘genocide’ of the 
Hazaras, which refers to historic and contemporary instances of oppression in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as through information shared about Hazara 
accomplishments. However, in terms of the information provided on Hazara history 
there is a greater emphasis on contemporary Hazara history on this website as 
opposed to Hazara.net, as the massacre in Mazar is written about on numerous 
occasions, as well as the website providing resources about attacks on Hazaras in 
Quetta and materials on the widely publicised ‘Enlightenment Movement’, which 
gained widespread support both from Hazaras in Afghanistan and the diaspora, from 
around 2016 onwards. As with Hazara.net the Buddhas of Bamiyan are also written 
about on the Hazara International website, with the subtext of one article on the topic 
stating that the statues were, ‘A Symbol of Hazara Culture, Art and History in 
Hazaristan’, which shows that the content creators of this website are sympathetic to 
the Hazara heritage claim that some members of the community espouse in relation to 
the origins of the statues. There is also a brief but informative piece on the Hazara 
court historian Fayz Muhammad Kateb Hazara on the website titled, ‘The Father of 
Modern History of Afghanistan’.   
 
Unlike Hazara.net, Hazara International is very open about its support and 
proliferation of the ‘Hazaristan’ movement85. Although the website does not explicitly 
explain what Hazaristan is or embodies, it is evident from the information presented 
on the website that it relates to Hazara nationalist politics, as the website has an 
 
84 As above.  
85 Hazara.net does make two implicit references to the Hazaristan movement, as the website has two 
articles on Hazaras in Afghanistan and Hazarajat which use the image of the flag of Hazaristan within the 
articles, but no information is actually provided about the Hazaristan movement in these articles.  
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article dedicated to the flag of Hazaristan which details how part of the flag represents 
‘Hazara transparency, loyalty, and honesty’. The website has also published an article 
on Hazara nationalism in Hazara music and literature, with an emphasis on the songs 
of Sarwar Sarkhosh, the late brother of acclaimed Hazara musician Dawood Sarkhosh, 
who the article states was, ‘The first person who started (singing) revolutionary 
songs…’. Additionally, on the Hazara International website, overcoming is again 
referred to through the dissemination of information about prominent Hazaras, both 
in the fields of arts and sport, in Afghanistan and the diaspora. Having noted the 
content and information detailed on both the Hazara.net and the Hazara International 
websites, it is worth considering the following remark on the impact of social media for 
Hazaras and Afghans more generally, from a research participant based in London: 
 
I think it has created, not only for Hazaras but for Afghans in general who are 
in different countries, first it has created a place, a platform to exchange 
ideas. For instance, I notice that Hazaras who live in the West they have this 
notion of democracy and human rights, and then they exchange this with 
Hazaras inside (Afghanistan), so they use these themes to ask them to fight 
for their rights. So this flow of information and ideas is easier… 
 
In turn Hazara social media is becoming more methodical with time, and is being 
utilised for various purposes by the community, both in Afghanistan and abroad. 
Furthermore, given the content proliferated within these online spaces it appears that 
the central objectives of these community-orientated Hazara social media pages is to 
raise awareness about the human rights situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and the 
neighbouring region, co-ordinate political mobilisation worldwide, as well as being a 
significant tool in documenting, preserving and proliferating Hazara history. As a result, 
some of the most influential and important Hazara websites and social media pages 
have overlapping themes, such as presenting an indigenous Hazara history to diverse 
audiences online, as well as providing information above the contemporary 
accomplishments of the community.         
 
This section has discussed the specific content available on Hazara websites and social 
media pages relating to Hazara history. At the same time it can be seen that there is an 
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overlap among these online sources and the content they proliferate in relation to 
Hazara history. While the timeline constructed on the websites encompasses a longer 
history than what the everyday conversations and research interviews have produced 
within this study, which generally start at the insurrection of Hazarajat, these online 
timelines seek to emphasis and promote a pre-Islamic history of the Hazara 
community, stemming from a Buddhist past. While simultaneously engaging with the 
narratives of marginality and overcoming in highlighting the brutality of Emir Abdur 
Rahman Khan in Hazarajat, and the recent community achievements of Hazara in 
sports, politics and music. The next section will thus examine more contemporary 
issues and how social media acts as a catalyst for Hazara political mobilisation 
worldwide.   
 
6.3 Hazara solidarity and mobilisation beyond borders:  
As previously noted, the growing prevalence of social media has seen Hazaras relying 
heavily on its use. Online portals available to the Hazara community have made them a 
powerful force when it comes to indigenous constructions of Afghan history online, as 
well as with regards to political mobilisation. The preceding section highlighted how 
information about Hazara persecution and marginalisation is preserved and 
disseminated effectively through social media, especially outside Afghanistan, in 
Europe and Australia, as the migrant and diaspora community outside the region have 
a very active social media presence. However, social media is also a powerful tool for 
the Hazara community in working to co-ordinate demonstrations worldwide against 
human rights violations, and also for online awareness campaigns.  
 
In an article by Afghan journalist Fariba Nawa she notes that, ‘The advent of satellite 
TV and social media in the last decade has brought the diaspora closer to those inside 
the country. Afghans are communicating transnationally, and those who live on the 
outside are in daily contact with their compatriots at home’ (2014)86, which can be 
seen by how Hazaras outside Afghanistan engage with social media. Furthermore, it 
can be seen that documenting the community’s history online and undertaking 
political mobilisation through engaging with the online domain becomes a form of 
empowerment for the Hazara community and works to weaken their previous 
 
86 See: www.himalmag.com/many-faces-diaspora/.  
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marginal status. Here it is also worth mentioning how online awareness campaigns 
undertaken by the community result in concrete action, as there are now lobby groups 
advocating alongside the community, such as the All-Party Parliamentary Group for 
Hazaras, with the group having organised multiple events at the UK Parliament with 
MPs about the plight of the Hazaras. This is in addition to the slow but steady increase 
in literature on the Hazaras being written by Hazara scholars, helping to shed light on 
this under-represented community in literature on Afghanistan and the country’s 
history, which is widely proliferated online.     
 
The proliferation of social media in recent years has been extremely beneficial for 
Hazaras, with regards to activism. The increasing use of social media as an information-
sharing platform by Hazara activists has allowed for members of the Hazara 
community to openly engage with Hazara-specific issues and the global Hazara qawm. 
Social media can also play a formative role in addressing issues of misrepresentation 
and misinformation, no more so than in relation to historiographies of marginal 
communities. The Hazara community has utilised social media not only to raise 
awareness about the current attacks and discrimination against the community in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, but also to redress issues of the past. This is evident 
with the issue of Hazara historiography, as Maurice Halbwachs notes that, ‘While the 
collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of 
people, it is individuals as group members who remember’ (1992: 142). For instance, 
the aforementioned ‘Hazara.net’ website documents Hazara affairs, states that the site 
is ‘a non-profit site focused on the human rights of Hazaras and the promotion of 
Hazara culture’. The website has a section dedicated to Hazara history which lists some 
of the massacres against the community since the late 19th Century. Thus, in turn the 
work of Hazara.net in documenting the history of the community is a means of 
preserving a past that dominant narratives of Afghan history may only do partially. 
Hence, within this research it is a worthwhile endeavour to include a sections 
dedicated to assessing social media’s impact on Hazara consciousness and Hazara 
historiography, as it is the past the acts as the impetus for collective action in the 
present, while also fuelling contemporary political movements. Here an intriguing 
phenomenon to consider is the online ‘Hazaristan’ movement. The Hazaristan 
movement promotes the idea of an independent ‘Hazara nation’, within the current 
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territory of Afghanistan in the central Hazarajat region, with anthropologist Robert 
Canfield noting that: 
 
In the last two decades there has been a striking rise in the political 
consciousness of the Hazaras of Afghanistan…[which is] evident in the 
appearance of several nationalistic Hazara websites. What is striking about 
the websites is the pointed assertions of a Hazara ideology. In these sites the 
homeland of the Hazaras is now referred to as "Hazaristan" and in the latter 
weeks of 2001 they warned in "Declaration of a People," subsequently 
posted on the Wahdat web site, that the Hazaras could no longer be 
disregarded: "Hazaras will no longer sit idly by while our Afghan brothers 
decide what is best for them" (2004: 241).  
 
The Hazaristan movement in explicitly working towards establishing a Hazara nation 
within the current boundaries of Afghanistan, in turn directly challenging the Afghan 
state. In advocating such a movement, members of the Hazara community are actively 
choosing to disrupt the notion that all those with a link to Afghanistan are Afghans, 
which acts as a form of dissent, as there are multiple photos, which have been shared 
on Hazara social media, showing people holding the flag of Hazaristan in various 
locations across the country, even outside Mazari’s modest mausoleum in Mazar-e 
Sharif. These Hazaras are choosing to reject identifying as Afghan, as for these people 
the term Afghan is synonymous with Pashtun, given that some Pashtun nationalists 
chose to equate the term Afghan solely with the Pashtun community, as well as the 
fact that historically the term Afghan was the Persian word for the Pashtun people, 
which has been stated by multiple research participants. Instead, these people chose 
to promote an ethnic Hazara identity to further their aims for separate state, relying 
on invoking a Hazara consciousness by emphasising the community’s historic 
persecution, and current marginalisation in Afghanistan. However, it should be noted 
that this movement is quite a divisive topic among the Hazara community. The reason 
being that some Hazaras believe that given their community’s precarious situation in 
Afghanistan at present, all effort should be made to elevate their status and improve 
the daily lives of Hazaras in Afghanistan, rather than causing relations between the 
various communities in the country from becoming more fragmented, by advocating 
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such a movement. Nonetheless, the movement is interesting to consider in so much as 
it works to reinforce the belief that the community in recent years has very overtly 
chosen to express themselves in relation to their historic past and recent 
achievements, as the history of Hazaras in Afghanistan has driven some community 
members to espouse secessionist sentiments, while the recent gains of the community 
have paved the way for a new found confidence among the community, predicated on 
the influence of Mazari and his contemporaries, which in turn allows for segments of 
the Hazara community to then hold and share such bold views.              
 
Another significant movement to consider is the Hazara ‘Enlightenment Movement’, 
which is an on-going global movement aimed at challenging the rerouting of part of a 
Central Asian electricity project from the Hazara majority province of Bamiyan to the 
Pashtun-Tajik populated area known as Salang. This is in addition to highlighting the 
general lack of infrastructure and development in the broader Hazarajat region. The 
partial change of the electricity route caused wide-spread outrage among members of 
the Hazara community both in Afghanistan and outside of the country. As a result the 
movement was widely publicised through social media, first when the planned route 
change had been announced, and then again when a mass protest against the route 
change in Kabul was bombed by ISIS in July 2016, which at the time was the deadliest 
attack in Kabul since 2001. In the aftermath of the attack the hashtag ‘enlightenment’ 
started ‘trending’ on twitter in Afghanistan. This gave more exposure to the Hazara 
community and their demand that the proposed route change should not go ahead. In 
coming together in such a bold way, members of the Hazara community were publicly 
voicing their dissatisfaction with the government’s decision to deprive their region of 
development. Such collective action in such a public arena can be seen as being a bold 
act given the heightened number of attacks against the Hazara community in 
Afghanistan in recent years, by both the Taliban and ISIS, which did not deter 
thousands of protesters from assembling for the demonstration. Furthermore, a report 
by the United States Institute of Peace, published in February 2019, on ‘Youth Protest 
Movements in Afghanistan’ notes how the bombing in July 2016 did not alter the 
movement’s activism and demands:  
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The movement, angered by the government’s failure to meet its demands, 
announced a new round of “indefinite protest” that was to commence on 
September 27, 2016. On September 26 the coordinating body of the 
Enlightenment movement announced it would enter into negotiations with 
the government under UN supervision, reiterating that it would continue 
with its civil resistance if the negotiations failed to yield results (2019: 13). 
 
Although the Enlightenment Movement demonstration ended in tragedy, prior to the 
attack on the protesters, the demonstration and the community’s general frustration 
regarding the electricity route change did gain media attention, both domestically and 
internationally. Furthermore, after the attack the demonstration and the community’s 
objectives in protesting were given wider coverage by international media. This again 
feeds into both a historic timeline of oppression and contemporary modes of 
resistance, as the demonstration was held to highlight what the community perceived 
as discrimination by the government for rerouting the power line, by engaging in 
collective action in the country’s capital city.   
 
Demonstrations and condemnations of the rerouting of the TUTAP project resulted in 
the government postponing the move. Abdul Basir Azimi who is a spokesperson for the 
Ministry of Energy and Water said in an interview with Al Jazeera about the TUTAP 
project in May 2016 that, ‘[The route change] is totally [a] financial and technical issue, 
and it’s not subject to any kinds of discrimination. Financial resources are so limited in 
Afghanistan and we have to utilise our financial resources effectively and 
efficiently…’87, and he further stated that rerouting the project back from Salang to 
Bamiyan at that time would instead delay 28 months’ worth of power supply to 12 
provinces, as well as the fact that the Bamiyan TUTAP route is 80km longer than the 
Salang route, and would cost 40 million more than the Salang route, and would take 10 
months extra to construct. However, it should be noted that Azimi did not discuss the 
cost benefits gained from initially moving the route from Bamiyan to Salang, but rather 
the obstacles that would result in undoing the decision, financially. While in the same 
interview, Thomas Ruttig stated that if there had been transparency on the part of the 
 
87 For the full interview see: www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2016/05/afghanistan-
hazaras-marginalised-160517165454303.html.  
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current and previous governments when the project started, then a lot of the resultant 
problems could have been avoided. With regards to the demands for greater 
development in Bamiyan, Dr Melissa Kerr Chiovenda notes the following in relation to 
the availability of electricity in the region which helps to contextualise the frustration 
of the Hazara community in relation to underdevelopment in Hazarajat, and why the 
community undertook collective action: 
 
The electricity situation in Markaz Bamyan was nearly untenable while I 
conducted my research. Almost everyone had at least a weak solar panel or 
battery, but few had any power source more effective than this, which 
provides only several hours of weak electricity a day, perhaps enough to run 
one television and charge a couple of cell phones. Many of the most 
impoverished still relied on oil lanterns, although this was seen as a last 
resort as it is considered dangerous and old fashioned. Some paid into a local 
generator project, in which one neighbourhood member buys a generator 
and maintains it, and others pay a fee (2014: 455).         
      
Here it is also important to note an incident that took place in 2017, which again went 
viral on Hazara social media pages. A Kabul-based newspaper called Etilaatroz which 
translates from Persian to ‘Daily Information’ leaked a memo which had been drafted 
by the deputy chief of monitoring and observation at the Administrative Office of the 
Afghan President. In short, the memo stated that non-Pashtun officials in the 
government should be replaced by Pashtuns, and it also stated the following about a 
Hazara government employee, ‘Ali Khan is working well, but he brings Hazaras and 
appoints them to good positions. In his place we should find a capable Pashtun who 
would speak all languages and is a writer’88. The leak of this memo was shared on 
Hazara social media to give credence to the assertion that Hazaras are still 
discriminated against and marginalised, over a century after many were forced to flee 
Hazarajat. This is an important incident to note given the small number of Hazaras 
within the government, but how, even as a minority, they are seen as a threat by some 





Pashtun hegemony in Afghanistan, as through working within government and other 
established institutions, the Hazara community is given greater public exposure and is 
able to protect and promote the interests of its community on a national level, which 
prior to the Bonn Agreement of 2001 would have been a grand and unattainable goal.             
 
In contrast, an incident which took place in 2018 shows how the Hazara community 
not only wants to raise awareness about their past and current marginality, but how 
they seek to utilise online spaces to inform and promote instances of Hazara 
achievement. This incident relates to an image which went viral on Hazara social media 
in 2018. The image was of a Hazara lady, Jahantab Ahmadi, which was also broadcast 
by the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera, as well as other international news outlets. An image 
of Jahantab was widely circulated which showed her nursing her two month old baby 
while sitting on the floor at an outdoor examination, which was a university entrance 
exam, and she had travelled on foot for several hours to take the exam. Hazara social 
media shared her image with captions denoting how Hazaras value education, 
women’s rights, and how Jahantab demonstrates the community’s resolve to succeed. 
Therefore, it can be seen that the image was utilised to further the narrative of 
Hazaras as distinct from other Afghan communities, as a ‘forward-looking’ community. 
This can be demonstrated by an article in the Telegraph about Jahantab Ahmadi’s viral 
photo which noted that, ‘Mrs Ahmadi's story has resonated with social media users 
across the country, who have praised her determination to be educated’89 and cited 
the following as an example, ‘"You are a true world champion, you have shown that a 
Hazara girl can do anything in any conditions or circumstances," Nazar Hussain Akbari 
wrote on Facebook, referring to the fact Mrs Ahmadi is part of the persecuted Hazara 
ethnic group’.   
 
With the photo of Mrs Ahmadi having gone viral on Hazara social media and Afghan 
social media more generally, there was even a ‘Jahantab’ hashtag on twitter in March 
2018, which people were using to tweet about Jahantab, with some tweets 
congratulating her for her fortitude and wishing her greater success90. While in relation 




90 See: www.twitter.com/hashtag/jahantab.  
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was set up by the Afghan Youth Association, which is run by UK-based Hazara youth, in 
the days that followed the circulation of the image, and £10,000 was raised for 
Jahantab in three days, as she had passed her entrance exam but could not afford to 
pay the university fees, with CNN mentioning that the online donation site had been 
set up to assist Jahantab91. Subsequently, Jahantab’s story which on a personal level 
was one of overcoming personal struggles and determination, became part of a wider 
narrative among the Hazara community, to show that despite the adversity that 
individual Hazaras and the community more generally endure, the resolve to access 
and seek education is widespread among the community, which again shows the 
community’s support of liberal ideals and in this particular example that of gender 
equality. This example is also is central to the narrative of overcoming, in that 
community members are looking to alter their individual and the collective fortunes of 
the Hazara community, principally through utilising education, both in Afghanistan and 
among the diaspora.       
 
Here it can be seen that there are multiple examples which show how the Hazara 
community in asserting themselves as Hazaras online, are empowering their 
community through political mobilisation and through community events, as well as 
lobby groups, demonstrations, and through rewriting and propagating Afghan history 
from the community’s perspective. Asserting Hazara identity also disrupts Pashtun 
hegemony in Afghanistan, as it allows a marginal group to demand greater visibility in 
domestic politics, sees Hazaras as senior MPs and governors for various districts and 
provinces in Afghanistan. Hence, this shows an understanding that the ‘Hazara vote’ 
and Hazara alliances are now necessary for even a Pashtun leader to gain legitimacy, 
as the prominent Hazara political leader Muhammad Mohaqiq was chosen as the 
second vice chief executive officer after the 2014 presidential elections in the unity 
government led by ethnic Pashtun, Ashraf Ghani. Lastly, through the Hazara 
community’s work in government and civil society, we can see that some Hazaras are 
asserting their national identity as Afghans, directly challenging ethno-nationalist 
narratives which equate the term Afghan solely with the Pashtun community. 
Therefore, the next section will seek to assess Hazara social media use more broadly 
and examine the documentation of history.        
 
91 See: www.edition.cnn.com/2018/03/20/asia/afghan-mother-university-exam-nursing-intl/index.html.  
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6.4 An analysis of Hazara social media use:  
The previous sections in this chapter have highlighted how social media is being 
utilised by the Hazara community to document and propagate Hazara history online. 
While at same time the internet and social media are sites where political mobilisation 
can flourish, as a result of the internal community cohesion generated through the use 
of these online spaces. This is in relation to activism regarding the human rights 
situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and the neighbouring region. In turn, this section 
seeks to analyse Hazara social media use more generally. In a journal paper on 
‘activism and knowledge’ Dr Mahvish Ahmad and Dr James Caron discuss ‘non-
academic intellectual production’ in marginal spaces and regions, stating how certain 
local forms of knowledge production are preserved and propagated among the masses 
and are seen to have more agency and value among these communities, yet are 
viewed as having limited significance within some academic circles (2016: 3-4). This 
hierarchal nature of knowledge production is important to note with regards to this 
research, given how academia in the global north generally favours what are perceived 
as traditional sources of academic knowledge, such as books and scholarly journals 
articles, which do not account for alternate forms of knowledge production, such as 
current information propagated online on neglected, peripheral histories (such as that 
of the Hazaras). Here Ahmad and Caron further note that, ‘Hybrid print and digital 
modes of publication mean that we can present articles that are enhanced by 
participative oral media online or critical oral media that are enhanced through their 
articulation to scholarly networks and translators…’ (ibid: 35). This allows for a wider 
scope and engagement with non-traditional information sources, as, ‘Innovative 
scholarship can even stem from user-contributed analysis, citizen journalism and 
testimony’ (ibid: 6).  
 
This wider engagement with non-traditional information sources can be seen to be 
occurring in online Hazara circles, where information about Hazara history is being 
written and preserved, as well as being a space where non-traditional information 
sources such as social media and websites become platforms for disseminating 
information about contemporary Hazara resistance to perceived governmental 
suppression and discrimination. This is ultimately done through global political 
mobilisation, which has been instigated by the use of various social media platforms, 
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allowing for new histories to be written. Although this information is well-known with 
the Hazara community itself, the contemporary forms of resistance stemming from a 
protracted timeline of oppression is not widely discussed within sources of modern 
Afghan history. Hence, given that social media has been a key tool for Hazaras in 
publishing and distributing information about their community, it is useful to study the 
role of social media and the internet in relation to contemporary forms of knowledge 
production relating to Hazara historiography. Therefore this online domain is worth 
examining given its public usage and accessibility globally. With this in mind it is worth 
considering the following quote, from a report mentioned earlier, on ‘Youth Protest 
Movements in Afghanistan’, in order to contextualise Afghan social media use. The 
report states that:   
 
The use of social media platforms (such as Facebook) to promulgate 
information did emerge as a persistent trend, with many Afghan youths 
regarding themselves as “brokers” in the contentious politics of the post-
2014 era. Young Afghans today understand that they have the ability, and are 
incentivized, to write history as they see it, posting their opinions online in 
the hope of influencing national and international audiences. Thus, an 
increasingly skilful use of social media to organize, influence, engage, and 
oppose may be a durable outcome of the youth movements essaying change 
(2019: 16).  
 
This quote also shows how social media not only acts as a medium for information 
sharing, but how it is also a platform which allows users to engage in the process of 
history writing, with an emphasis on the fact that this task is being undertaken by 
Afghan youth who now have more opportunities to access knowledge and education, 
since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. The use of the internet and social media is 
also pertinent to note given their accessibility in modern times. In turn these online 
spaces play a significant role with regards to political mobilisation in areas blighted by 
instability, which is relevant in the Afghan context given growing instability in the 
country. Similarly, in relation to this issue, Dr Wazhmah Osman, an assistant Professor 
in Media Studies & Production and Globalization at Klein College of Media and 
Communication in Philadelphia, notes that:   
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Although vibrant and productive, public space is also fraught and 
exclusionary. At protests in Afghanistan against the problematic Iranian Shiite 
Marriage Law (otherwise known as the Rape Law), for example, I witnessed 
women protesters being attacked by radicalized youth from the massive 
mosques that Iran has built and funded. As news of these attacks spread, 
fewer women and girls attended subsequent protests. Under such dire 
circumstances, social media became a more democratic and inclusionary 
sphere. Similarly, when Afghan government officials refused to investigate 
the deaths of female journalists and television personalities, local college 
students and voices from the Afghan diaspora demanded justice via 
Facebook fan pages as well as blogs, which afforded the safety of anonymity 
and distance but do not constitute a public sphere in Afghanistan (2014: 880).  
 
During the course of this research Hazara social media’s impact on Hazara 
historiography has been assessed, because as noted in the aforementioned quotes 
social media is now being thoroughly utilised by the Hazara community to circulate 
information about the community’s history, without a considerably heavy reliance on 
external sources. Having stated that social media has been a key tool within the 
research it is therefore relevant to briefly explain why social media is central to this 
particular research project. Social media has been a key tool in linking Hazara 
‘movements’ around the globe, and as a result has heightened Hazara ethnic solidarity. 
During a conference at the University of Oxford in July 2016, anthropologist Dr Khadija 
Abbasi discussed Hazara utilisation of social media in a presentation titled, ‘The 
Republic of Silence: An imagined community of Hazaras in diaspora’92. Dr Abbasi stated 
that the Hazara-run ‘Republic of Silence’ website and social media more generally, 
were spaces which allowed the Hazara diaspora to connect and interact with one 
another, and that this space also gave a marginalised community a ‘voice’. 
Furthermore, Abbasi noted that the Republic of Silence website served as a tool for 
political mobilisation. It was also mentioned in the presentation that social media 
allows Hazara community members to recall and preserve specific narratives of the 
community’s past. While in recent years there has been a growth in the proliferation 
 
92 The conference was a two-day event on Afghan migration. I attended the second day which focused 
on Hazara migration, and attended Dr Khadija Abbasi’s presentation. The abstract of Dr Abbasi’s 
presentation can be found at the bottom of the following link: www.afghanmigration.org/abstracts/.  
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of Hazara websites and social media pages dedicated to telling the history of the 
Hazara people and documenting attacks against the Hazara communities in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. In turn this has had a significant impact on the mobilisation 
of Hazaras in Europe and elsewhere (Olszewska 2013). Other prominent Hazara 
websites and social media pages working to create larger, less localised Hazara 
networks include the ‘World Hazara Council’, and the aforementioned ‘Hazara 
International’ and ‘Hazara.net’, to name a few.     
 
Alongside the points mentioned by Abbasi, social media is also utilised by the Hazara 
community to highlight personal experiences of migration, persecution and 
marginalisation. It further allows for the construction and proliferation of a Hazara 
historiography created from within the community, which impacts individual and 
community conceptualisations of identity, as Geoffrey Roberts notes that ‘…the 
discipline of history is essentially a narrative mode of knowing, understanding, 
explaining and reconstructing the past’ (2001: 1). This is significant to bear in mind in 
relation to the Hazara community and the contemporary historiography project that 
the community is engaged in, as it allows for parallel understandings of historical 
events, which go beyond widely proliferated accounts of history, which undermine or 
misrepresent marginal or minority communities. Subsequently, social media has a 
dual role, as it also becomes a vessel through which dominant narratives of Afghan 
history, which neglect the Hazara community are challenged, and where alternative 
histories are presented. Here community organisations also have a role, as events such 
as the annual Baba Mazari commemoration allow speakers and attendees to 
remember and revisit the community’s past. Thus, social media allows for personal 
experiences, narratives, historiography and identity to interact. However, the following 
quote by Professor Anne Marie Musschoot of Ghent University is also pertinent to 
consider in relation to the history writing that is now prolific on the internet and social 
media:  
 
New historians…cut off from the assumption of ever being able to 
reconstruct the past as it really was, turn to narrative techniques in order to 
present possible reconstructions of the past as it may of could have been. 
The basic assumption here is that our knowledge of historical reality will 
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always be restricted and conditioned by the necessarily biased opinions of 
the narrating subject or that narrating instance (2016: 144).   
 
Musschoot’s quote is important to note as she highlights how all history is a series of 
historical events which are framed within given narratives, which means that all 
history of all peoples world-over cannot always be represented through such 
techniques, and as such only segments of history are characterised and proliferated. In 
turn all history is embedded within a process of selection. The question then arises as 
to why certain histories are represented in the particular ways that they are 
constructed? This is a question that this chapter, alongside the previous chapter and 
the subsequent chapters, seeks to answer through showing the various methods being 
utilised to construct and propagate Hazara history, which would not have been 
possible in the past.  
 
Branching out further, the content shared on Hazara social media pages shows how 
everyday experiences of violence is narrativised and converted into transnational 
politics by the Hazara migrant and diaspora community worldwide. The Hazara 
community outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan utilise social media to organise 
demonstrations, petition parliamentarians and spread awareness about the 
community’s history, and persecution, both past and present. Thus, tangible outcomes 
relating to political mobilisation through social media have taken place among the 
Hazara migrant and diaspora community. In Britain for example, there was for a few 
years a very active All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for the Hazara community, 
which aimed ‘…to raise awareness of the human rights of Hazara communities in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to encourage appropriate governmental and 
international action’93, with twenty Members of Parliament (MPs) acting as the group’s 
‘qualifying members’ and two MPs as its ‘officers’. The APPG held events at Parliament 
on the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with MPs from constituencies 
 
93 For information on the Hazara APPG see: 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/register/hazara.htm.  
It should be noted (as mentioned by several research participants) that the Hazara APPG is no longer 
active as the MPs that initially supported the initiative either resigned or lost their constituency seats in 
subsequent elections, but Hazara community members did articulate a desire for wanting to work to re-
establish the Hazara APPG.  
 192 
with large Hazara populations speaking at such events, which included the former MP 
for the Southampton Itchen constituency, John Denham.  
 
More recently Adrian Bailey and other British MPs raised the issue of safety and 
security of Hazaras in December 2018 during a session in Parliament, and again in a 
parliamentary session in January 2019. Adrian Bailey sought answers regarding 
humanitarian assistance for Hazaras as a result of a deadly Taliban offensive in the 
Hazara-dominated area of Jaghori in Ghazni province, which took place in late 201894. 
Both these incidents saw British parliamentarians explicitly highlighting the situation of 
Hazaras in Afghanistan at the House of Commons, which is generally as a result of 
constituents writing to, and meeting with, their local MPs in order to persuade them to 
take action on an issue of importance for them and their wider community. The 
actions taken by politicians like Adrian Bailey and others, in Parliament, in late 2018 
and early 2019 display the effective mobilisation of the Hazara community when it 
comes to raising awareness and support for community issues, namely in relation to 
human rights, as Hazara activists based in London have noted that Hazaras in the 
country have taken to lobbying their MPs in order to raise awareness about the 
situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in previous years. In turn, as a result 
of social media use and engagement the number of demonstrations instigated by the 
Hazara community in multiple cities globally, has grown.  
 
Furthermore, in relation to Hazara refugees Amy Elizabeth Neve notes the following, 
while citing the work of Diana Glazebrook: 
 
Hazara refugees in Australia have a documented history of using technology 
to enable their transnational lives. Glazebrook (2005) looks at the use of 
mobile phones among Hazara refugees in Melbourne to manage their social 
networks within Australia and overseas. She argues that the phones provide a 
mechanism for Hazara to gain and manage their social capital within the 
community and access and transmit news from their home countries and 
family (2014: 165).  
 
94 For more information on the proceedings of both sessions in Parliament see: 
1) www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2018-12-04e.646.1.  
2) www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2019-01-09a.345.5.  
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Glazebook’s intervention here is quite important to note as this use of ‘social capital’ is 
very evident in how transnational Hazara communities work to co-ordinate 
demonstrations and online ‘twitter storms’ world-over, in the aftermath of bombings 
and attacks on the community in Afghanistan and the neighbouring region. This is also 
relevant in relation to mobilisation against the Afghan government in Europe when the 
president or other high-ranking official representatives from Afghanistan visit various 
cities abroad, with this specific form of political mobilisation being undertaken in order 
to highlight and raise awareness of the perceived discrimination of Hazaras by the 
Afghan government and lack of security afforded to the community in spite of multiple 
attacks on Hazaras in Afghanistan by IS-Khorasan since 2015.         
 
Having highlighted the centrality of social media within this research it is also essential 
to analyse discussions on historiography, given that it is the dominant theme within 
this chapter, as it is relevant to the construction of a Hazara history from within the 
community. Here it is worth noting the work of historian Alun Munslow who examines 
the major role and position a historian has when it comes to how the past is discussed. 
Munslow states that, ‘…what is represented (told) as history is the historian’s choice’ 
(2007: 4), which can be seen in the Afghan context as literature on Hazaras is limited. 
This in turn makes it very difficult to produce a definite history and ‘origins story’ of 
the Hazaras. What is now occurring is a Hazara led initiative to construct and preserve 
the community’s history, and disseminate information about this history through the 
internet and social media. Munslow’s assertion links to anthropologist Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot’s more ‘moral’ point in relation to historians, namely that, ‘…the role of the 
historian is to reveal the past, to discover or, at least, approximate the truth’ (1995: 5). 
However, even if there is general agreement that such is the role of a historian, this 
does not necessarily mean that they adequately fulfil such a role in all instances. Thus, 
with regards to Afghan history, and all histories more broadly, there are conflicting 
narratives about the past, as Professor Nile Green notes that this viewpoint is 
prevalent in the work of historian Sayed Askar Mousavi:   
 
A milestone work in writing Afghan history from the Hazara minority 
[perspective] was written by Syed Askar Mousavi (1956- ), who studied at 
Oxford University during his years as a refugee. In his book, Mousavi rejected 
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the nationalist version of Afghan history (and with it, collective identity) as 
the monopolizing discourse of ruling elites. Indeed, to describe this process of 
the hegemonic Pashtun denial of alternative pasts and pluralistic identities, 
Mousavi coined the pejorative term ‘Afghanistanization’ (2015: 45).  
 
Therefore, it can be seen that Hazara history is being documented and constructed 
simultaneously online, in order to show how the national history writing project of 
Afghanistan is not holistic. This is because historic Hazara grievances resulting from the 
community’s wide-scale subjugation have not been given sufficient consideration in 
these dominant accounts of Afghan history, although they may at times have been 
noticed. This in turn has mean that accounts of Hazara history have not been 
consolidated into distinct themes within the main sources of Afghan historiography. 
Consequently, in propagating accounts of Hazara history online a new outlet is 
provided to the community where Hazara-specific narratives can be spread far and 
wide, which then becomes a mechanism for political mobilisation beyond Afghanistan. 
Thus, this online engagement shows how a marginal community has taken it upon 
itself the task to preserve and propagate its history.             
 
Another equally pertinent quote by Munslow is the following which states that, 
‘…there was much uncertainty about the creation of historical knowledge, and 
specifically the ability of being able to ‘turn’ our knowledge of the past into an 
objective written representation’ (2007: 9). This is why, in the case of the Hazara 
community, indigenous and contemporary constructions of the past are important, as 
such marginal groups have comparatively less documented history. In this regard oral 
history plays a vital role, as it allows Hazaras to narrate and preserve the history of a 
marginal community on their terms. Furthermore, accounts of Hazara history are 
significant for the purpose of this research given that central to this history is the belief 
of wide-scale oppression which underpins the narrative of marginality within this 
research. Although, it should be noted that this narrative may be contested by some 
Pashtuns who believe that the Hazara community’s aim in disseminating these 
accounts of oppression are not actually an attempt to reconfigure Hazara history, but 
are instead intended to demonise Pashtuns by linking their community to acts which 
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members of their community may perceive as fabricated narrations. With regards to 
historiography, Munslow also states that: 
 
Most [historians] accept the ‘common-sense’ or practical realist position [to 
history] that there is a reality beyond us, and, fortunately, we possess a 
capacity to satisfactorily represent (re-present) it. So as a result truthful 
historical statements can be produced because they match or correspond to 
the facts of known reality (ibid: 11).  
 
However, this quote implies that historians can represent all forms of truth holistically, 
which is not realistically possible, so instead an issue of importance that emerges here 
is the ability to represent marginalised realities, which critical deconstructionist 
historians should seek to do as an ethical responsibility within the field. Furthermore, 
as noted in the preceding pages, Trouillot emphasises that critical historians have an 
ethical duty to represent marginalised historical accounts (1995: 5). Otherwise, it 
becomes harder to know about histories which do not already fit within academically 
codified narrations of the past. What is now occurring among the Hazaras is a 
community led initiative to construct and preserve the community’s history, and 
disseminate information about this ‘Hazara history’, and this is partially constructed 
and propagated through the use of the internet and social media. Here it should be 
noted that as a result of this campaign to document and propagate Hazara history 
online a tension is now arising between Hazaras and Pashtuns in relation to the extent 
to which the Hazara community have been ‘victims’ under Pashtun rule in Afghanistan, 
and the need to engage in such a project at a time when Afghans of all ethnicities are 
suffering in the country as a result of increased instability and growing insurgent 
activity. Consequently, this documentation of Hazara history works to fuels animosity 
between the two communities, which appears to be a continuation of hostilities of the 
past, further fragmenting both communities. While in relation to Munslow’s earlier 
point about choice, and with the above emergent conflict in mind, it is worth 
remembering that some individuals may purposefully choose to not engage with 
historical narratives critically, and that they may seek to perpetuate certain dominant 
accounts of history given that they have remained largely undisputed or as they may 
appear to benefit certain communities, for instance, by reinforcing a dominant 
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community’s sense of worth or in working to serve that community’s material 
interests, and in turn such communities may seek disrupt the production and 
proliferation of various forms of information which undermine dominant historical 
narratives.    
 
Based on the aforementioned points, Hazara historiography has been vital to discuss in 
this section given the developing trend among the community to attempt to record 
and disseminate information about the community’s past online. It has given the 
Hazara community an opportunity to engage in presenting a history of the community 
from within the community, challenging or expanding on Pashtun accounts of Afghan 
history, because as noted by Professor Nile Green, ‘…there has never emerged an 
effectively hegemonic (still less, consensual) history acceptable to the different 
communities of Afghanistan’ (2015:3), while Michel-Rolph Trouillot states that, 
‘…theories of history actually privilege one side as if the other did not matter’ (1995: 
22). Therefore, the creation of an indigenous historiography in the case of the Hazaras 
allows for a marginal community to narrate their past on their terms. It also allows for 
the community’s collective memory of persecution and marginalisation to be explicitly 
highlighted, discussed and critiqued within the purview of Afghan history more 
generally, and it also allows for the incorporation of a more positive, contemporary 
history of Hazaras, since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, which documents the recent 
achievements of the community in Afghanistan. This allows for the construction of a 
history that does not solely focus on accounts of oppression and marginalisation, but 
also looks to modern-day community accomplishments, embodied in the narrative of 
overcoming. Thus, this community led initiative to produce a Hazara historiography has 
been significant to engage with as it impacts the narratives the community propagates 
about itself and what members of the Hazara community articulate about their own 
personal conceptualisations of identity.  
 
This section has shown how Hazara social media is being utilised by the community to 
propagate an internally constructed community history of the Hazaras. As a result 
numerous Hazara social media pages and websites have emerged over the last few 
years which document this history. This history seeks to document a protracted 
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timeline of oppression alongside a recent history of community triumphs in spite of 
continued adversity.  
 
6.5 Conclusion: 
To conclude, it can be seen that in recent years the Hazara community has taken upon 
itself the task of documenting, preserving and propagating their community’s history 
in Afghanistan. The most effective tool in achieving the aims of this historiography 
project has been the use of the internet and social media. This is because, globally, this 
online domain has wide-scale accessibility and reach. The accessibility of online media 
has meant that Hazaras can easily share information about their community and 
history, where acquisition of such material by Hazara communities can easily be done, 
wherever they may be based, be it in Afghanistan, the neighbouring region, or further 
afield in Europe or Australia. Given this level of accessibility, it has also meant that 
anyone within the community has the ability to circulate sources of Hazara history that 
may be available to them, while also being able to utilise social media to mobilise for 
Hazara political causes and undertake collective action. This engagement and resultant 
activism stemming from Hazara social media use thus emphasises the social capital of 
the community, which in turn creates cohesive networks. These networks then work to 
undertake collective action in support of Hazara communities world-over, and 
subsequently results in individual personalisations of the master narratives within this 
research and visible transnational politics externally.    
 
Within the historical narratives being propagated online, the late 19th Century 
insurrection of Hazarajat is widely discussed, and the violence inflicted on the Hazara 
people by Emir Abdur Rahman Khan and his army is greatly emphasised (while on 
occasion an assumed pre-Islamic history of Hazaras in Afghanistan is also highlighted). 
Therefore, an underlying feature of these narratives is that the history of the 
community since the late 1800s is heavily shaped by continued subjugation and 
marginalisation of the community, albeit to varying degrees than at the time of the 
insurrection of Hazarajat. As a result Hazara websites and social media pages 
document incidents such as the Afshar massacre and that of Mazar within a continued 
timeline of marginality. Concurrently, a more optimistic timeline of contemporary 
Hazara history is also being circulated online. What is documented here is the 
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achievements of Hazaras in Afghanistan and the neighbouring region and the gains 
made since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. Similarly, in the contemporary 
sources being propagated online reference is also made to the educational 
attainments of Hazaras, their accomplishments in the arts and sports, and their 
support for women’s rights and education. In turn it can be seen that two parallel 
timelines of Hazara history dominate the content of Hazara websites and social media 
pages: that of marginality, documenting historic and more recent examples of 
oppression, and the other of contemporary instances of overcoming where Hazaras 
are taking it upon themselves to work hard for themselves and their community, in 
order to alter the trajectory of their community’s fortunes in 21st Century Afghanistan.      
 
At the same time social media is being utilised for political mobilisation among Hazara 
communities worldwide. While the section within this chapter on Hazara social media 
and political mobilisation has shown how the online domain is a powerful tool for the 
community when working to air community grievances about the situation of Hazaras 
in Afghanistan and the neighbouring region. This has resulted in multiple 
demonstrations taking place across various continents and cities, as a collective 
response to targeted attacks against the community and perceived discrimination by 
the Afghan government. In vocally airing their grievances and working to challenge the 
status quo in Afghanistan it can be seen that the transnational Hazara community has 
gained a new found confidence which has become the impetus for greater visibility for 
the community, taking to the streets in Afghanistan and elsewhere in order to demand 
safety and security for their community. The examples of political mobilisation 
discussed in the section on Hazara social media and political mobilisation within this 
chapter all gained wider coverage through the use of social media. While at the same 
time the information propagated online with regards to Hazara campaigning and 
demands have shown how the gains of the community since the fall of the Taliban 
regime have allowed the community to assert themselves in ways that would have 
been unthinkable during Taliban rule and prior. In using social media as a conduit for 
political activism it can be seen that the community is in fact linking both the internally 
constructed community narratives of marginality and overcoming, in that the former 
narrative becomes the motivation for political mobilisation itself, while the latter 
narrative has allowed for the community to become bold in their demands for their 
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community and has heightened their visibility globally. This subsequently shows how 
the online domain is being used as a space to work to change the fortunes of Hazaras 
in Afghanistan. Furthermore, in utilising social media for political mobilisation and 
voicing Hazara grievances it can be seen that the narrative of overcoming is embodied 





























Chapter 7: Political mobilisation, collective action and community events among 
transnational Hazara communities: 
 
7.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapters have highlighted how a Hazara past predicated on subjugation 
and recent community achievements and civic gains have been central to how 
members of the community engage with their history, and how they present 
themselves to the outside world, be it through conversations, community events or 
the online sphere. However, these two narratives can also be seen to be influencing 
collective action among the community, post-2001, since the fall of the Taliban regime. 
In turn this chapter will look at Hazara political mobilisation, both in Afghanistan and 
overseas, to show how this mobilisation has led to direct action and prominent 
community events, given that, ‘Since the fall of the Taliban…[t]he traditional 'under- 
class', the Hazaras, have gained in political influence and, at the grassroots level, some 
are trying to reverse gains made by Pashtuns favoured most recently by the Taliban’ 
(Simonsen 2004: 717), which can now be seen to be giving the community greater 
visibility in Afghanistan. Alongside political gains, the community is also now excelling 
in education and numerous international articles now discuss achievements of the 
community since the fall of the Taliban regime. This is particularly evident in relation to 
women’s rights and democracy. Online, English-language publications have made 
reference to accomplished female Hazaras in Afghanistan, while also noting, for 
instance, the high turnout in elections among Hazara women, as well as writing about 
the continued Hazara success in the kankor, the national university entrance exams, 
which attests to the liberal attitudes the community claims to promote. Therefore, 
these examples of community achievements and the aforementioned quote exemplify 
how the narrative of marginality has been used as an impetus for community gains, 
while the community is also working to alter its fortunes and not to be constantly 
defined by past marginality. 
  
With the above in mind, it can be seen that community achievements underscore the 
narrative of overcoming and a new chapter in contemporary Hazara history, 
predicated on liberalism and liberal ideals, where these community gains are now 
acknowledged and discussed in relation to the place and role of Hazaras in 21st Century 
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Afghanistan. Some features of these liberal values, which will be explored in this 
chapter, include the use of material culture as symbols of identity, such as the 
dambora festival in Bamiyan, with the dambora now becoming a symbol of Hazara 
identity, the promotion of a secularised Hazara identity online, political mobilisation 
against the enforcement of rigid religious decrees like the 2009 Shia personal status 
law, in turn supporting the separation of religion and state, alongside civic 
engagement in the community as a marker of liberal values. At the same time these 
liberal ideals manifest in situations where the rights of citizens within supposed liberal 
states are not upheld, leading the community to engage in political protests. This 
chapter will therefore show how the liberal ideals of the community underscore their 
political mobilisation, civic engagement and community events, as well as how specific 
instances of political or social mobilisation catalyse the narratives of marginality and 
overcoming alongside the precise content of these acts95.    
 
The liberalisation of these master narratives was not always so prominent or evident. 
Therefore, in order to understand how these narratives have become framed in such a 
way, we need to briefly explore the situation in Afghanistan just before 2001, to help 
contextualise why 2001 is the historical starting point within this chapter. 2001 was 
the year which saw the fall of the Taliban regime, a regime which had been in power 
for five years, since September 1996. Prior to NATO presence in the country there had 
been instances of severe violence carried out by the Taliban against the Hazaras, 
namely the massacre in Mazar-e Sharif in 1997 and the Yakawalng massacre of 2001. 
While in 2002 mass graves were found in Bamiyan which locals claimed contained the 
remains of victims who were killed by the Taliban just before the collapse of the 
regime in 200196. The autumn of 2001 thus marked the end of a brutal era of 
repression and dispossession of the Hazara people, and ushered in the opportunity for 
the community to reposition itself within Afghan society. However, in taking late 2001 
as the starting point for this new timeline, documenting Hazara collective action, it is 
 
95 On how specific mobilisations catalyse narratives see the following literature: 
Akbarzadeh, Shahram et al. “The Iranian Kurds’ transnational links: impacts on mobilization and political 
ambitions.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2019, pp. 1-20, and Baser, Bahar. “The Awakening of a Latent 
Diaspora: The Political Mobilization of First and Second Generation Turkish Migrants in Sweden.” 




important to note that Hazara political mobilisation had in fact been established in 
Afghanistan a decade and a half prior to the Taliban’s capture of Kabul, in turn showing 
that the community was no longer willing to accept a marginal status within the 
country and the national political framework going forward. A pivotal study to consider 
here is the work of Dr Kristian Berg Harpviken whose doctoral thesis of 1996, titled, 
‘Political mobilisation among the Hazara of Afghanistan: 1978-1992’, details Hazara 
political mobilisation throughout the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. In relation to 
the Hezb-e Wahdat political movement Berg notes that:   
 
Hezb-e Wahdat was only one of several groups to be based in an ethnic 
minority. Historically, the rulers of Afghanistan had come exclusively from 
within the Pashtun ethnic group. This also applied to the period of 
Communist domination, from 1978 to 1992. The removal of the government 
in April 1992 was initiated by the so-called Northern Alliance, which consisted 
of four groups, all representing ethnic or sectarian minorities. Among these 
groups, Hezb-e Wahdat was the most clear-cut ethnically based organisation. 
It represented a majority of the Hazara population, and it launched political 
demands aimed at overturning discriminatory practices (1996: 1).               
 
While Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi mentions that: 
 
Wahdat’s leaders were endeavouring to strike a balance between ethnicity 
and religion. The result was an Islamic ideology used to express and further 
the rights of a historically disadvantaged community; a strong desire for unity 
of the Hazaras was its main driving force (2009: 5).  
 
Wahdat’s role in Hazara political mobilisation is necessary to consider here, given that 
the group, with Abdul Ali Mazari as its leader, was able to bring various Hazara factions 
together to strive for greater rights and political representation for the community. 
However, as monumental a figure as Mazari was for bringing various Hazara political 
leaders together for the community, he was not able to negotiate peace with the 
Taliban, because it was the Taliban who took Mazari’s life in 1995 under the guise of 
peace talks. Although, if in taking Mazari’s life there was a belief that his political 
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ideology would also dissipate, this has immensely backfired, as the opposite has 
occurred with his legacy living on among Hazaras both in Afghanistan and overseas. 
The Hazara consciousness and social media chapters of thesis have shown how Mazari 
continues to be revered among the community as a martyr. While at the same time his 
demands for equality are still eulogised by Hazaras who were only children when he 
was a political leader. In turn his life is also seen as a personification of both the 
narratives of marginality and overcoming, with marginality relating to his brutal death 
and overcoming relating to his actions and legacy.    
 
Following on, this chapter will be divided into three events sections. The first section 
will focus on city-specific incidents in Quetta, the second on national action in 
Afghanistan, and the third on transnational diasporic events. In these sections 
reference will be made to certain post-2001 political events, Hazara mobilisation or 
community events and their significance in relation to the narratives of marginality and 
overcoming, in chronological order. In relation to the subsequent Hazara events which 
will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter it is important to note the following 
quote from Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi who states that: 
 
Ethnic narratives and symbols, which are accumulated historically and 
interpreted in specific socio-political settings, are some of the resources that 
people draw on to make sense of uncertain environments and respond to 
rapid changes (2016: 640). 
 
Ibrahimi relates this statement to two post-2001 examples, these examples being 
political factions in Afghanistan, as well as the diaspora who returned to country. 
However, the events discussed in the following sections will show how Ibrahimi’s 
assertion links to community events and political mobilisation as well, both nationally 
and internationally. While also showing how it also relates to the diaspora who choose 
to remain, rather than return to the homeland. Therefore, this chapter will show how 
the Hazara community is engaging in public forms of dissent to demand protection of 
their rights and person as citizens of the state whose fundamental rights have not 
been upheld, be it in Quetta or Afghanistan, again showing how the narrative of 
marginality is still a lived reality for the community. At the same time this chapter will 
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show how precarity faced by the community will not deter them from working to 
improve the circumstances and future opportunities of the community, as the previous 
example of the kankor has shown. Similarly, the post-2001 gains of the community 
means that they will no longer tolerate being side-lined or dismissed, and events such 
as the annual dambora festival in Bamiyan, which will be discussed further in this 
chapter, show  that the community will continue to be visible and occupy spaces that 
they have not been able to in their history. While the section on diaspora in this 
chapter shows how the community’s liberal ideals are underpinning global action for 
the Hazara communities in Quetta and Afghanistan. Subsequently, this chapter will 
highlight how Hazara community consciousness post-2001 and the community’s liberal 
ideals are fuelling activism among the community both at home and overseas.     
 
7.2 Quetta events:  
The trajectory of the Hazara community in Quetta was historically markedly different 
to that of the Hazara community in Afghanistan. As noted in the introduction chapter, 
Hazaras started to arrive in Quetta during the late 1800s during the insurrection of 
Hazarajat. They soon made their mark on society, at the time in British India and then 
in newly established Pakistan, with the formation of the Hazara Pioneers regiment of 
the British Indian army and General Musa Khan who was the first Hazara Commander 
in Chief of the Pakistan Army from 1958 to 1966. This allowed for ethnic consciousness 
to flourish among the community in Quetta decades before it did so for Hazaras in 
Afghanistan. However, since the 2001 NATO intervention in Afghanistan and growing 
terrorist and sectarian violence in Pakistan, the Hazara community of Quetta have 
become victims of insurgency, with multiple targeted attacks taking place against the 
community since the early 2000s. These continued attacks on Hazaras in Quetta have 
not been curtailed by the state and has instead led to the Hazara community in the city 
taking to the streets to voice their demands for protection and justice after years of 
violence being inflicted on the community. In turn this section will focus on and detail 
instances of collective action undertaken by the Hazara community of Quetta. Here it 
is important to briefly detail some statistics about attacks on Hazaras in Quetta, in 
order to underscore the precarity of the community in the city. In a Human rights 
Watch report on Balochistan’s Hazaras from 2014 it was noted that, ‘More than 500 
Hazaras have been killed in attacks since 2008’, up until 2014 when the report was 
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published, and that, ‘In 2013, nearly half of Shia killed in Pakistan were Hazaras’97. 
While in 2018 they also reported that, ‘At least 509 members of the Hazara community 
have been killed and 627 injured in militant attacks in Quetta’98.   
 
Here it is important to also refer to the work of Michel Foucault given its relevance to 
the collective action undertaken by Hazaras in Quetta, which will be discussed in the 
remainder of this section. In Foucault’s work on biopower and biopolitics it is noted 
that the nature of sovereign power has altered from what it was before. At the centre 
of his work on biopower and biopolitics, the former being the current form of how 
power is manifested and the latter being the application of this power, the old 
formulation of power was the state’s ability and right to the preside over and 
determine death of individual state subjects (1998: 139). However, this means of 
utilising state power is no longer the norm as this has been ‘…carefully supplanted by 
the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life’ (ibid: 140). In 
discussing this change in the understanding of power Foucault refers to the French 
Revolution, stating that:  
 
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the 
ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it 
would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of 
life itself; it was the taking charge of life…(ibid: 143).  
 
Foucault’s work thus locates the change in sovereign power to a specific time in 
history. In turn if the state is now the custodian and protector of life, in the context of 
this chapter and research, it can be seen that the Pakistani state has fallen short of 
upholding its duties towards its citizens, particularly in this case the safeguarding of 
the Hazara community. This has therefore led the community to engage in collective 
action, demanding that the state act to protect the community, given that their most 




pakistan.    
98 See: www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/30/pakistans-hazara-community-under-attack.  
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In terms of collective action, in 2013 in Quetta there were widespread protests 
undertaken by thousands of Hazaras in the city against targeted killings of civilians. In 
relation to one of the bombings, at the time, the BBC stated that, ‘Reports said 
thousands of angry Hazaras moved the bodies to a local mosque but then began 
chanting and protesting instead of proceeding with the burials’99. While Al Jazeera 
reported that:  
 
Thousands of Shias in Pakistan have held a sit-in in the city of Quetta, refusing 
to bury their dead for a second day, demanding that security forces protect 
them from armed Sunni groups. More than 4,000 women blocked a road in 
the southwestern city on Monday, vowing to continue their protest until the 
authorities take action against those behind the attack that killed 84 
members of the Hazara Shia community. Protesters chanted "stop killing 
Shias"100.  
 
This specific incident is important to note as it saw such a large number of Hazara 
civilians take to the streets to protest. The lack of state intervention with regards to 
continued sectarian attacks against Hazaras in Quetta brings to the fore the peripheral 
nature of the Hazara lived experience in Quetta which eludes the mainstream Pakistani 
society’s consciousness. Here a pertinent quote to note is the following from a female 
Hazara protester, which is referenced in a book on faith-based violence in Pakistan. 
The protester stated that:   
 
I must share what it means to be a Shia Hazara. Today, I am going to share a 
bit of my story – the story of me and my people. When one of us comes in 
front of you, you mostly label us Chinese or Korean. Our complexions are 
note like yours, neither is our race or genetic composition. We are the 
“others”. And our pain is that of the others. We are Pakistanis but not even 
considered a part of you. Very few will raise their voice for us, even when 27 
of us are taken off a bus and are shot and killed just because we are Shias. 
Just because we have Mongol-like features. Just because we migrated here 
 
99 See: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21495975.   
100 See: www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/02/201321813486399438.html.  
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from Afghanistan. But what is the reality? How many of you can relate to 5 
dead bodies being taken out of a house–father, brothers, sons (Ali 2016: 
177).   
 
This quote important to note as it encapsulates the extent to which the Hazara 
community in Quetta has been pushed to the margins so much so that most Pakistanis 
are not even aware that they are interacting with their co-nationals when they meet 
Hazaras, even after a decade and a half of violence has been inflicted on the 
community. This also explains why the Hazara community in Quetta have to undertake 
such drastic collective action in order to gain media attention, to penetrate the 
national consciousness to create greater awareness of the community’s plight and the 
need for state intervention. Here it is important to note the following statement from 
a journal paper by Dr Katia Genel, an associate Professor at the University of Paris I 
Panthéon-Sorbonne, where Genel notes the following in relation to Foucault’s work on 
biopower and biopolitics, ‘The new technologies of power are situated in effect below 
the power of sovereignty: power is increasingly less the power to put to death, and 
increasingly more the right to intervene in order to make live’ (2006: 47). This quote is 
significant to consider in relation to the Hazara community in Quetta as it can be seen 
that state’s intervention to protect life has not occurred since the beginning of the 
targeted attacks on the Hazara community in Quetta.  
 
On multiple occasions members of the community have stated that in protesting they 
are seeking protection by the Pakistani state, as citizens of state, within the 
Constitution. Article 4.1 of the Constitution of Pakistan of 1973 states that, ‘To enjoy 
the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law is the inalienable right 
of every citizen. Wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time being 
within Pakistan’101. However, the normative framework of who is considered a 
‘Pakistani’ places Hazaras, as Shias, outside of this categorisation and in turn the state 
does not give due regard to the precarity of the community. Consequently, the 
inability of the state to uphold one of the most fundamental rights of certain citizens 
has led to an already marginalised and dispossessed community to have to take upon 
 
101 The full text of the Constitution can be accessed from the following link: 
www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1333523681_951.pdf.  
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themselves the task of highlighting the state’s failure of upholding their rights, through 
undertaking drastic means of collective action, as well as occupying public spaces. 
Additionally, in relation to the Hazara community in Quetta refusing to bury the 
deceased, Forbes reported that in a conversation with Hazara community leader 
Qayyum Changezi, Changezi had said that: 
 
…the provincial government had failed to protect the life and property of 
citizens. “All we are asking for is security for our lives. We will note move 
from here until the government gives us assurances that [Lashkar-e-Jhangvi] 
will be punished. We will note bury the bodies of our loved ones until 
then’…102.  
 
Changezi’s statement further emphasises how the continued attacks on Quetta’s 
Hazaras brings to the fore the issue of the inability or unwillingness of the state to 
intervene to protect its citizens, which again is in direct contravention of the country’s 
Constitution, as the law explicitly states that citizens have a right to protection, under 
the law. Here it is important to note the following quote from Foucault in relation to 
Changezi’s quote, as, ‘It is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that 
govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them’ (1998: 143). This statement can 
be seen to apply in a multitude of contexts, both past and present. It is particularly 
pertinent to the Hazara community in Quetta given that the state has not been able to 
curtail the attacks against the community which have been taking place for years. 
However, in propagating a certain model of who constitutes a citizen or who belongs 
to state, which explicitly occurred during the Presidency of Zia Ul Haq in the late 1970s 
and 1980s, and is yet to be officially dismantled as state policy, it becomes glaringly 
apparent why in the Pakistani context it is extremely difficult, and will take time, for 
the lives of Hazaras to be ‘integrated’ and protected. In turn it can be seen that the 
collective action of the community in Quetta also relates to the narrative of 
marginality as continued insurgent violence is leading the community to have to 
engage in protests in order to bring attention to the violence being inflicted on the 





In terms of a more recent example of community action, 2018 saw members of the 
Hazara community in Quetta engage in another form of protest in order to again 
highlight their grievances against the state for failing to protect the community. In this 
instance members of the community went on a hunger strike. At the time of the 
hunger strike in April 2018 the Voice of America reported that several attacks against 
the community had occurred in that month alone103. Hazara lawyer and human rights 
activist Jalila Haider who became the face of the hunger strike is quoted in the same 
article as saying that:    
 
I want to request army chief (Qamar Javed) Bajwa to come here as a common 
man, as a father, as a husband, and feel our pain. We have 3,000 widows and 
10,000 orphans. Face them. Tell them why their loved ones are being 
killed104. 
 
These hunger strikes are important to note as it was the first time that Hazara 
protesters were engaging in a form of protest which as an act had the negative 
implication of causing direct harm to these specific protesters, despite the fact that it 
was the harm that the community endures that lead to these protesters to engage in 
such a drastic political act. With this point in mind, it is important to consider the work 
of Professor Ewa Płonowska Ziarek in relation to hunger strikes as a form of protest. In 
a journal paper on ‘Biopolitics of Race and Gender’ Ziarek discusses hunger strikes in 
relation to Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s work on biopolitics. She notes that, 
‘…it was militant British suffragettes who in 1909 revived and redefined the hunger 
strike as a modern political weapon of an organized movement by linking it for the first 
time with the discourse of human rights’ (2008: 99). Ziarek later cites a letter from a 
suffragette who was on hunger strike at the time to explain the motivation behind 
engaging in this specific form of protest, noting that, ‘…subjugated groups resort to 
violence against their bodies when rational law-based arguments fail—that is, when 
instituted political speech is deprived of its performative power…’(ibid: 100), as well as 
stating that, ‘The suffragettes’ usurpation of the sovereign decision over mere life in 
the struggle for political rights negates their exclusion…’ (ibid: 102).   
 
103 See: www.voanews.com/east-asia/pakistans-shiite-hazara-hunger-strike-protest-targeted-killings.  
104 ibid. 
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The rationale of the suffragettes a century ago can be seen to be mirrored by the 
Quetta Hazara protesters, as the superficial messages of support and solidarity, as well 
as official state visits have not resulted in a change of circumstances for the Hazara 
community in the city, and in turn has led members of the community to engage in an 
extreme form of protest as a means to gain attention for their cause. The point about 
exclusion in Ziarek’s paper is also important to note in relation to Quetta, as it is the 
exclusion of the Hazara community within dominant understandings of what 
constitutes a state subject which has partly allowed this cycle of violence to continue 
against the community. However, in engaging in such a severe form of political 
protest, the excluded community has now claimed some space for manoeuvring and 
negotiating, as this form of political action is being linked to state inaction, and 
temporarily removes Hazaras from their state of exclusion while they are undertaking 
such a visible form of collective action. Here a relevant statement to consider is the 
following from Dr Zeynep Gambetti of Boğaziçi University, taken from her work on the 
Gezi park protests in Turkey in 2013, but which also relates to the collective action of 
the Hazara community in Quetta. In relation to the collective action undertaken at Gezi 
park Gambetti states that:  
 
I call it a “politics of the body”, literally speaking. Any “body” who was 
discontented or outraged by police violence or felt choked by the 
authoritarian regime was out in the streets. The emphasis here is on “out in 
the streets” rather than on any body’s specific or personal motive for being 
there… Making the resistance visible thus became a major stake. In order for 
any demand addressed to the government to be heard, the bodies in the 
streets and squares had to first to make visible the claim that they were a 
force to be reckoned with, whatever the specific reason for the frustration 
may be (2014: 95).   
 
Such collective action therefore allows the community to be seen as active agents as 
opposed to passive victims of state aggression in the case of the Gezi protesters, and 
insurgent violence in the case of the Hazara community in Quetta. In relation to Quetta 
is can be seen that when all other avenues of dialogue and diplomacy are exhausted 
the Hazara community then has had to literally rely on ‘the body’ as a space of protest 
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as all other means of raising attention of community grievances have failed. However, 
how effective this use of the body is as a means of protest for the community in Quetta 
is debatable given that limited concrete steps have actually been taken by the state to 
ensure the safety of Hazaras in the city.                 
 
Hazara protesters also demonstrated in April 2019 after a bomb blast killed over 
twenty civilians and left dozens wounded, again demanding greater security for the 
community in the city. At the time the BBC reported that, ‘Both the Pakistani Taliban 
and the Sunni militant group Islamic State (IS) said they had carried out the attack’105. 
While Reuters mentioned that Quetta Hazaras had organised a sit-in in response to the 
attack, which was blocking traffic in the city106. The Reuters article stated that at the 
protests crowds chanted “Stop killing Hazaras,” [and] “Down with terrorism and 
sectarianism”107, while also noting that, ‘One police official said there were about 200 
people taking part on Sunday, blocking the key arterial Western Bypass leading into 
Quetta’108. The assembly of the Hazara community in public in 2019 shows that several 
years from the bold community action of refusing to bury the victims of the 2013 
targeted attack on the community was undertaken, visible political mobilisation of the 
community has had no impact on the state’s ability or desire to go after the 
perpetrators of these repeated attacks.  
 
Having discussed multiple examples of Hazara collective action in Quetta, it is 
important to also engage with the work of Giorgio Agamben on biopower and 
biopolitics. In his book ‘Homo Sacer’ Agamben discusses sovereign power in relation to 
Foucault’s work on biopower and politics. Taking from the work of political theorist 
Carl Schmitt, Agamben states that, ‘For what is at issue in the sovereign exception is, 
according to Schmitt, the very condition of possibility of juridical rule and, along with 
it, the very meaning of State authority. Through the state of exception, the sovereign 
"creates and guarantees the situation" that the law needs for its own validity’ (1998: 
17), and in turn allows for the suspension of the law, which works to further justify a 
 




108 ibid.  
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particular state of exception. In the specific case of the Hazaras of Quetta it can be 
seen that the community is perceived as being outside of the normative and 
mainstream understanding of ‘who’ constitutes a Pakistani citizen, irrespective of what 
the Constitution has declared and the rights enshrined in law for every citizen, given 
the Hazara community’s marginal status as both a religious and ethnic minority, who 
do not belong to the county’s dominant community, Sunni Punjabis. The paradoxical 
nature of this specific state of exception is that the victims and protesters in this 
instance are in fact citizens of the state who are to be guaranteed state protection in 
law, but find themselves having to explicitly state that they are citizens who have a 
right to state protection, and in turn are not exceptions for the state to ignore, but 
that these calls for recognition are either repeatedly being ignored or are met with 
hollow declarations of sympathy and no state intervention. Here the following quote 
from Dr Katia Genel is also pertinent to note. She states that, ‘From the moment of the 
crisis of the nation-state, life no longer succeeds in appearing within the system. Life 
becomes the stakes and the problem of politics’ (2006: 55) and this is very relevant in 
the context of Pakistan (and Afghanistan also) in that in post-2001 Pakistan there was 
a dramatic increase in terrorism and sectarian violence, that the state either through 
incompetence or unwillingness was unable to curtail effectively, with a remnant of this 
particular crisis being the continued attacks on Hazaras in Quetta, which underscores 
Genel’s specific statement on ‘life’. Genel also mentions that, ‘Power is above all a 
decision on life in the form of a qualification of life, a decision on its value and 
therefore also its nonvalue’ (ibid: 56) which is an ever-present reality for Hazaras in 
Quetta and how the state chooses to, or not to, respond to sectarian violence in the 
city.     
 
Having discussed community responses to sectarian insurgent violence in Quetta it 
should be noted that this has not deterred the community from engaging in 
community events which promote the community’s culture and heritage. In spite of 
the violence inflicted on the community over the years the Hazara community in 
Quetta organised a ‘Hazara Culture Day’ Quetta in the summer of 2019. Several 
Pakistani papers published articles about the event, with many stating that the event 
was taking place again for the first time in twenty years. The Independent reported 
that the event was undertaken in order to ‘…celebrate and showcase [the Hazara 
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community’s] history, music and traditions’109, with Abdul Khaliq Hazara, the chairman 
of the HDP stating more generally that, ‘The community strives to keep its protests 
peaceful, despite unrest stirred up by militants looking to pit people of different sects 
against each other…’110. While images from the event show Hazara girls dressed in 
traditional Hazaragi outfits dancing on stage, a large crowd gathered at the Qayum 
Papa stadium in the Mariabad area of the city to listen to traditional Hazaragi music 
and a Hazaragi musical performance by Afghan Hazara singer Zahra Elham. The cultural 
event and the statements by the HDP chairman Abdul Khaliq show how the 
community will not be silenced in the face of continued adversity, and how 
maintaining peace is still central to the community’s political activism and collective 
action, years after the first targeted attack against the community, which feeds into 
the narrative of overcoming.      
 
In turn it can be seen that over the years the Hazara community in Quetta has engaged 
in multiple forms of protest in order to demand state action against the continued 
targeted attacks on the community in the city. However, the state response in each 
instance has been minimal, with very limited concrete action being taken against 
insurgent groups engaged in sectarian violence in the city and country as a whole. 
Therefore, the Hazara community in Quetta has not only occupied public spaces as 
part of their protests but has also engaged in more drastic forms of collective action, 
such as refusing to bury the deceased and undertaking hunger strikes. With the latter 
example, it can be seen that protesters have taken to using their bodies as sites of 
protest to further compel the state to intervene, which also shows how the narrative 
of marginality is still relevant to the circumstances of the community in Quetta. 
Similarly, as mentioned in the work of Agamben, Foucault and Genel, in this section, it 
can be seen that the state has failed in upholding a basic right of its citizens, the right 
to life. While at the same time the community has chosen to not let these attacks 
define the community, as the city saw its first major Hazara cultural day take place in 
2019, which acted as an outlet to showcase and promote the community’s culture, 
while also being a distraction from the precarious nature of daily life for the Hazara 




110 ibid.  
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narrative of overcoming is itself showcased through the act of organising such a 
cultural event.      
 
7.3 Afghanistan events: 
Having discussed political mobilisation, collective action and community events in 
Quetta in the previous section, this section will be focusing on several pivotal events 
since 2001 in Afghanistan, relating to the Hazara community. As noted in previous 
chapters, the history of the Hazara community in Afghanistan is central to the 
collective memory of the community, which underscores much of the political 
mobilisation and activism seen to be taking place by the Hazara community in recent 
years. A pertinent quote to note here is the following from Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi:   
 
 …the region, with its history of conquest and subjugation by the Afghan 
state, is central to the formation of Hazara ‘ethnoscape’ whereby, in the 
words of Smith, ‘community is thereby “naturalised” and becomes a part of 
its environment, its landscapes become conversely “historicised” and bear 
the imprint of the community’s peculiar historical development’ (2016: 639).  
 
The following political events which are to be discussed in this section of the chapter 
will show how Ibrahimi’s statement in relation to a Hazara ‘ethnoscape’ is ever-present 
in the collective action undertaken by the community, not just in Afghanistan, but 
globally. This is because Hazara collective action can be seen to be taking place among 
the diaspora too, where demonstrations against the Afghan government for its failure 
to protect its citizens, particularly Hazara citizens, is very acute. Similarly, in these 
transnational diaspora spaces the community has at times engaged with the domestic 
political framework, in order to raise awareness about the situation of Hazaras in 
Afghanistan and the neighbouring region. Furthermore, through engaging with the 
various state apparatuses available to them as citizens of Western democracies it can 
be seen that Hazaras in the diaspora are seeking to position themselves as bastions of 
liberalism and as model citizens, whose co-ethnics in Afghanistan are seen as a threat 
to the prevailing status quo due to their liberal ideals.   
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In turn the first case study to be examined here will be the controversial Shia personal 
status law of 2009, also known as the Shia marriage law, which was alluded to in 
previous chapters. At its core the law allowed Afghan Shia men to refuse basic 
provisions to their wives if they refuse to be intimate with their husbands. In some 
articles the law was referred to as a ‘marital rape law’, with Farzana Marie noting that 
a sizeable number of Hazaras were furious at the passing of the law which was seen as 
‘highly regressive’ by the community (2013: 89). While in a book on peace in 
Afghanistan by reporter and columnist Terry Glavin it was stated that, ‘Mohammad 
Mohaqiq, one of Afghanistan’s most influential Shia parliamentarians, called the law 
“an offence to the Hazaras”’ (2011: 5). This backlash to the passing of this law is 
significant to note on multiple levels. In the first instance it showed how Shias in 
Afghanistan are not a monolith, given that some Shia clerics in the country had 
supported this law, but that the public reaction to the law was mostly negative. This 
also relates to a broader point that the community does not want to solely be seen 
through Shia lens, as mentioned in Ibrahimi’s and Marie’s work. It also highlighted how 
the community was not willing to accept state endorsed and imposed legislation being 
thrust upon the community. Finally, as the earlier words of Mohaqiq have shown, 
certain segments of Hazara society were not going to accept association with a 
religious decree which was seen as antithetical to their liberal principles, which further 
relates to the narrative of overcoming, where the community is choosing to present 
itself as a community that values and supports human rights, women’s rights and 
democracy.          
 
In terms of community action, in a 2013 article for the Afghanistan Analysts Network 
Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi detailed a hunger strike which was undertaken by 
approximately eighty students from Kabul University in front of the Parliament, in 
relation to ‘discrimination against certain student groups and nepotism’ with many 
Hazara student protestors present, but with very little information available as to the 
actual nature of the discrimination. Although it was mentioned that in recent years the 
number of Hazara students has grown considerably at the university, but that Hazaras 
‘…remain underrepresented among its faculty members’, with Ibrahimi noting that: 
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Over the past few days, Afghans have taken a keen interest in the protest on 
social media websites such as Facebook pages featuring news and photos of 
the hunger strike…Most of them were also Hazara, but other students joined 
in, supporting demands for new teaching materials, a new library and reliable 
internet access at the university. The hunger strikers’ camp became quite a 
busy scene with visitors from Afghan civil society and members of parliament. 
Most were Hazara, too, but among them were also influential non-Hazara 
such as the speaker of parliament’s lower house, Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, an 
Uzbek, and the first deputy of the lower house Mirwais Yaseni, a Pashtun. 
Additionally, 250 Afghan writers, artists and university lecturers abroad and in 
Afghanistan signed a letter in support of the hunger strikers, including 
filmmaker and author Atiq Rahimi and writer Rahnaward Zaryab. 
 
Even though the validity of the claims being made by the protesters were ambiguous in 
this specific instance, this act is significant to note as it saw members of a historically 
marginalised community undertake their protest outside a building of significant 
importance, the Afghan Parliament, which is meant to uphold the rights of citizens and 
protect citizens. Therefore, purely on a symbolic level it was a very powerful message 
being sent from Hazara protesters that they will not tolerate or accept a regression to 
past forms of societal behaviour and discrimination. Similarly, in gaining the support of 
prominent Afghans who are not Hazaras, this incident further shows the impact this 
specific form of protest had among the wider community given the solidarity shown by 
non-Hazara Afghans towards those engaged in the hunger strike. Furthermore, it is also 
pertinent to note the work of Professor Asef Bayat here on the significance of ‘streets’ 
in his book titled ‘Life as politics’. Bayat states that: 
 
…the use of public space as a site of contestation between the actors and the 
authorities…makes the streets a political site is the active or participative (as 
opposed to passive) use of public space. This is so because these sites (side- 
walks, public parks, intersections, etc.) are increasingly becoming the domain 
of the state power, which regulates their use… (2010: 62-63). 
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This is important to note in relation to this specific protest outside the Parliament, 
given the wide reach it ultimately had, as it allowed those unfamiliar with the protest 
and its demands to access it by virtue of the fact that it took place out in the open, in 
an area that is accessible to the public.       
 
It is not just instances of discrimination that have resulted in Hazaras taking to the 
streets to protest, but also acts of violence targeted against the community which have 
also been the impetus for some of the community’s political mobilisation in recent 
years. In a book titled ‘Afghanistan: Politics and Economics in a Globalising State’ co-
authored by Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi and Professor William Maley, it is mentioned 
that: 
 
One of the largest such protests took place of 11 November 2015 in Kabul. 
The protest that became known as the Tabassum Movement was triggered 
by the abduction and subsequent killing of several civilian Hazaras in the 
southern province of Zabul. Among those killed in this incident were Shukria 
Tabassum, a nine-year-old girl and her parents. The protestors carried the 
coffins of the victims as they marched towards the presidential palace to 
demand that the government provide security against insurgent violence. 
During the previous months, the insurgents had launched a campaign of 
abducting civilian Hazaras along highways in the north and the south of the 
country (2020: 65-66).  
 
The Tabassum movement is a significant reminder of how the narrative of marginality 
is still significant in relation to Hazara collective action, given that this specific 
movement resulted from a grotesque instance of insurgent violence against the 
community. However, it should be noted that these abductions of Hazara civilians 
were not the first example of such insurgent violence, but were in fact ‘…part of a 
series of kidnappings of mostly Hazaras by insurgent groups along the highways in 
several provinces in 2015’ (Bose et al. 2019: 12). Furthermore, in spite of these 
targeted attacks against the community, Hazaras in Afghanistan did not stay quiet and 
took to the streets to protest against these attacks, insurgency in the country and the 
President. Therefore, although the motivation for this collective action was a tragic 
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incident, the community was defiant in the face of targeted attacks and channelled 
their grief into direct action.      
 
Another instance of collection action to consider is a protest which took place on the 
23rd of July 2016 in Kabul. Hazara protestors gathered in the Deh Mazang area of Kabul 
to demonstrate against the partial rerouting of the TUTAP project from Bamiyan to 
Salang, which has become part of a wider movement to demand greater development 
for the Hazarajat region. As has been mentioned in previous chapters the rerouting 
decision was not well-received by members of the Hazara community who saw it as a 
government ploy against the community, to deprive a Hazara-majority region of 
electricity and development, in spite of the official government justification that the 
move was necessary on the grounds of cost and as the new route was shorter (which is 
discussed in greater depth in the previous social media chapter). It should be also 
noted that President Ghani had personally addressed the issue of underdevelopment 
in Hazarajat, according to a 2016 journal article by Dr Niamatullah Ibrahimi on 
ethnicity and the 2014 Afghan elections. Ghani’s response to the issue of 
underdevelopment was negatively received by most of the Hazara community with 
Ibrahimi stating that: 
 
[A] phrase which Ghani used very frequently in his communication towards 
the Hazaras was zendan-e joghrafiaye or geographical prison. In his manifesto 
as well as the radio message, Ghani recognised the problem of ‘unbalanced 
development’ between different regions of the country, but pointed towards 
natural features of these regions such as mountainous terrain as the cause of 
their underdevelopment. Regardless of his intention, many interpreted it as 
his attempt to shift blame for underdevelopment from the Afghan state 
towards nature (2016: 646). 
 
However, it is important to also mention that distrust runs deeper than just with the 
Pashtun elite. The research for this thesis has shown that distrust also manifest 
towards high-profile Hazara politicians such as Mohammad Mohaqiq, Karimi Khalili 
and Sarwar Danish. While in work with Hazara civil society activists Dr Melissa Kerr 
Chiovenda noted that the same view is held of Hazaras involved with state institutions: 
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Hazara activists in Bamyan are equally distrustful of the locally elected 
provincial council. A Hazara who becomes affiliated with state institutions is 
in some way sullied, and most of the provincial council members are 
considered to have achieved their positions based on patronage networks, or 
as one informant told me, ‘’through the means of the mafia’’ (2018: 267).  
 
The TUTAP demonstration itself showed how the Hazara community, whose social 
capital has substantially increased since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, are no 
longer willing to accept being side-lined, in a way that has occurred multiple times in 
the community’s history. Here it is important to again note the work of Professor Asef 
Bayat on the politics of presence, as he states that, ‘The art of presence is ultimately 
about asserting collective will in spite of all odd, circumventing constraints, utilizing 
what is possible, and discovering new spaces within which to make oneself heard, see, 
and felt’ (2007: 202). This can be seen to have occurred during this protest as 
thousands of Hazara demonstrated in the country’s capital against the President and 
the TUTAP decision. Furthermore, the decision taken to organise a protest at the time 
was a particularly bold move on the part of the Hazara community because in the 
previous year IS-Khorasan had been blamed and claimed responsibility for attacks 
against Shias in Afghanistan, according to Dr Antonio Giustozzi (2018: 62). Giustozzi 
further notes that ‘…in January 2015, night letters bearing the IS logo appeared in the 
Hazara neighbourhoods of Kabul, denouncing Shi’as as infidels’ (ibid). However, it is 
important to note that since the 2016 bombing of the Hazara TUTAP demonstration 
the community has not engaged is such a large protest, given the huge increase in 
targeted attacks against Hazaras in Afghanistan.   
 
In relation to the Deh Mazang protest the ‘Youth Protest Movement in Afghanistan’ 
report by the United States Institute of Peace notes that, ‘According to International 
Crisis Group reporting, the Roshnayi protestors “alleged that the new route was yet 
another ‘deliberate attempt’ by Pashtun leaders ‘to systematically discriminate against 
Hazaras’ by depriving them of the benefits of an economic development project”’ 
(2019: 13). The TUTAP protests were a striking example of ‘the body’ being used as a 
space of protest, as the prior verbal appeals made by the Hazara community relating 
to the project had been dismissed, undermined or ignored. With diplomacy failing as a 
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tactic, Hazara youth took upon themselves the task of physically presenting 
themselves in a public space in the country’s largest city to show their disdain at the 
lack of action on the part of the government in relation to their requests. This again 
relates to Foucault’s work on biopower and biopolitics, which was discussed in the 
Quetta section of this chapter, as the Afghan state, similar to the Pakistani state, has 
also fallen short of upholding its duties towards its citizens, and in this example, the 
Hazara community. In the case of the Hazara community political mobilisation can be 
seen to be having a cyclical effect, as the community comes out to protest against a 
particular grievance and are met by violence or hostility which in turn fuels further 
resentment among the community, who again feel compelled to undertaken collective 
action against the state and insurgent groups.      
 
Having discussed instances of Hazara political mobilisation in Afghanistan it is also 
important to discuss a recently established cultural event which also relates to how 
the community seeks to position itself on the international stage post-2001. In relation 
to this new positioning of the community the ‘Bamiyan Dambora Festival’ is an 
interesting case study. The Bamiyan Dambora Festival first began in Bamiyan in 2017, 
and was initially promoted online by the Bamiyan Cultural Centre, (a community space 
currently under construction with financial support from the ‘Republic of Korea, the 
Government of Afghanistan and UNESCO’111). This cultural festival has been covered 
by TOLOnews, Khaama Press and VOA Dari. Online, the Bamiyan Dambora Festival has 
been used as a means to promote Hazara culture with many images of the event being 
circulated on Hazara social media, as well as to distinguish the community from non-
Hazara Afghans. Some comments online have done so by making claims that the 
regions populated predominately by Hazaras, like Bamiyan, are the only places where 
one would see such a music festival taking place, with no segregation of male and 
female performers, no compulsion in observing purdah112, and where no threats of 
violence would manifest. The further relates to the liberal community ideals that are 
being propagated online which state that the Hazara community is tolerant and open-
minded, which feeds into the narrative of overcoming. While at the same time, the 
 
111 The centre’s website states that the purpose of the project is to ‘…[establish] an anchor and model 
for what a creative hub can look like in the Afghan milieu, trying to integrate local communities as well 
as to identify Bamiyan’s rich cultural backgrounds’. See: www.bamiyanculturalcentre.org/about-us.  
112 A term used in Persianate and South Asian cultures in reference to veiling and modest dress.   
 221 
festival itself is now an example of a motivating and inspiring community event which 
has now become entrenched within the Hazara community as a community institution.         
 
In terms of how the community chooses to present itself online, in relation to such 
cultural events and other community initiatives, it is also important here to briefly 
discuss the dambora in relation to Hazara identity. This is because of the shift that has 
occurred among the community since the proliferation of Hazara ethnic consciousness 
since the 1980s, as the dambora is now a central pillar of Hazara cultural events and is 
now a symbol that is widespread on Hazara social media relating to the culture and 
cultural heritage of the community. The dambora as a symbol of Hazara identity was 
discussed in a journal paper by Dr Ali Karimi, titled ‘Medium of the Oppressed: Folk 
Music, Forced Migration, and Tactical Media’. Karimi mentions how a revered Hazara 
singer Sarwar Sarkhosh would make reference to the dambora in his songs in the 1970s 
and 1980s, as well as that in Quetta Hazara dambora folk music was popular at that 
time and was ‘…one of the last remnants of [Hazara] identity’ (2017: 736). Karimi notes 
that the dambora was not always seen as a positive element of Hazara culture and 
identity and was previously shunned by the community, as it is noted that ‘…oral 
poetry and folk singing were common among the Hazaras, but they maintained a 
negative view of instrumental music, considering it un-Islamic’ (ibid: 729), and that 
‘…the journey of dambora music from a stigmatised un-Islamic practice to a proud 
symbol of ethnic identity was long and rough’ (ibid). A fascinating parallel can be seen 
here between the dambora and Hazara ethnic consciousness in that an instrument 
which is now seen as a symbol of Hazara identity was previously viewed negatively by 
the community, much in the same way that a culture of self-loathing permeated within 
the community due to their Hazara ethnicity given the community’s historic 
subjugation, and prior, low socio-economic status, both of which have reversed with 
time and are now seen positively by the community and are promoted. This is similarly 
highlighted by Karimi who states that: 
 
…[T]oday, dambora music is not only socially acceptable among the Hazaras, 
but it has also become a popular symbol of Hazara identity. The journey of 
dambora music from a stigmatised un-Islamic practice to a proud symbol of 
ethnic identity was long and rough. It was, in a certain way, similar to the 
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journey of the Hazaras themselves from a voiceless, invisible, excluded 
community to one that, despite continuous persecution by state and nonstate 
groups, has been increasingly visible in Afghan politics and culture (ibid: 729-
730).    
 
This section has undertaken the task of discussing several high-profile instances of 
Hazara political mobilisation, collective action and community events among the 
community in Afghanistan, since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. A variety of 
examples were given relating to the narratives central to this study, that of marginality 
and overcoming. With the former narrative it can be seen that the community is now 
victim to targeted attacks in Afghanistan, which have become more prevalent since 
2015 with the presence of IS-Khorasan in the country. This also highlights the state’s 
inability to protect its citizens, which again shows a failure of the state in upholding its 
duty to its citizens, as per Foucault’s work on biopower and biopolitics. At the same 
time certain government policies and instances of institutional racism are leading 
members of the community to occupy public spaces in order to air their grievances, 
given limited governmental or institutional action against attacks and discriminatory 
practices, and this also shows how the narrative of marginality is also a contemporary 
reality for Hazaras in Afghanistan. While the increased civic gains of Hazaras in 
Afghanistan has seen the community engage in cultural events that would have been 
impossible to organise during Taliban rule. It can also be seen that these gains of the 
community are also leading the community to assert itself in very overt ways, given 
that the dambora itself, after which the Bamiyan dambora festival is named, is seen as 
a symbol of Hazara identity. These civic gains and community events also highlight how 
the narrative of overcoming also occurs parallel to the narrative of marginality for 
Hazaras in contemporary Afghanistan.    
 
7.4 Diasporic events:   
The previous two sections of this chapter have discussed collective action and 
community events undertaken by the Hazara community in Quetta and Afghanistan. 
However, it is not only Hazaras in this region who have engaged in political activism 
and the promotion of Hazara culture, as the diaspora is also active in working to raise 
awareness about the Hazara community in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given that the 
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Hazara diaspora also mobilises for the community back home, this section will explore 
a selection of transnational Hazara community action and community events.   
 
In April 2012 a protest was held in London against Hazara killings in Quetta. Although 
diaspora protests are not unusual among the Hazara community what was unique 
about this demonstration was that a British Member of Parliament, Alan Johnson, also 
attended the event in solidarity with the Hazara community. One news article noted 
that Johnson had the following to say at the demonstration: 
 
“I am here to stand in solidarity with Hazaras who face ethnic [cleansing] in 
Balochistan yet the government of Pakistan is showing no concern. In the last 
10 years more than 700 Hazaras have been killed which is a scandal. The 
government doesn’t seem concerned and has shown no interest in catching 
the killers,” said the former Home Secretary, who called on Interior Minister 
Rehman Malik, his former counterpart, to take action and not only rely on 
issuing statements113. 
 
The presence of Johnson at this protest is important to note as multiple research 
participants and non-Hazara Afghan acquaintances have mentioned that the Hazara 
community is very united when it comes to engaging in political mobilisation for 
Hazara causes. The linkages with MPs discussed in previous chapters in relation to the 
All-Party Parliamentary Group for Hazaras shows how the community manages to tap 
into its social networks effectively for collective action. This in turn can allow for 
worthwhile outcomes for the community, given that this particular demonstration had 
a senior politician present lending his support to the community and as a result raising 
greater visibility for the situation of the Hazara community in Quetta. However, this 
was not the only international solidarity demonstration that was held for the Hazara 
community in Quetta, because in relation to the 2013 burial refusal incident discussed 
previously in this chapter, Forbes reported that protests had be organised 
internationally in solidarity with the community in Quetta, and also stated that, ‘As the 





more are scheduled for the 14th in London, Birmingham, Canada, Norway (Oslo), and 
the U.S. in front of Pakistan Embassies’114.   
 
Here it is also important to discuss a small-scale, isolated protest which was instigated 
by a handful of UK-based Hazara activists. This specific incident relates to an event 
which took place in London in May 2016, when Afghan President Ashraf Ghani was 
delivering a talk as part of an ‘anti-corruption summit’ at the Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI). A video clip of this specific incident at the talk went viral on Hazara 
social media pages, and there were many debates and discussions in the aftermath of 
the video’s circulation. The incident relates to interruptions by two audience members 
five minutes into President Ghani’s speech at the venue. Both these audience 
members were from the Hazara community and the second Hazara audience member, 
Jafar Attai, declared that, ‘He [hates] Hazaras. He’s a racist!’, ‘he’ in reference to 
President Ghani. After Attai’s admonishment of the President, he was assaulted and 
dragged by Ghani’s security personnel at the event. In reaction to the treatment of 
Jafar Attai, multiple Hazara social media sites circulated a video of the attack claiming 
that it showed how Pashtuns still consider Hazaras as inferior, a century after the 
insurrection of Hazarajat. While according to a blog post by Hazara activist Saleem 
Javed another Hazara attendee at the event, Ahad Bahaduri, also interrupted the 
President to say that, ‘You are a liar. You lied to people of Afghanistan. And now you 
lie to the world’, and these were comments which were directed at Ghani himself115. 
Attai’s treatment at the event was used to rally for solidarity by the Hazara community 
in Europe, based on the claim that even in a democratic country like Britain Hazaras 
are still not safe from Pashtun aggression.  
 
The incident with Jafar Attai and President Ashraf Ghani is important to note, as there 
was a temporary shift in the power dynamics between the historically marginalised 
Hazaras and the dominant Pashtuns, as a Hazara was directly challenging and 
criticising the country’s president in a public setting. Although, this incident may have 





president-ashraf-ghanis-bodyguradsbodyguards/.   
 
 225 
fore the fact that a section of Afghan society feel that their community has been let 
down, time and again, by the country’s government. This was seen as an important act 
by members of the Hazara community as it gave members of the community a chance 
to challenge the Afghan ruling elite in an international setting, and raise awareness 
about the situation of the Hazara community in Afghanistan. While at the same time it 
further emphasised the confidence of the community to not be side-lined as has been 
done in the past, as the community will now vocally air their grievances when it is seen 
that the state has failed the community, and therefore a substantial number of 
Afghanistan’s citizens. In turn this incident relates to both the narrative of marginality 
and overcoming, in that the injustice of moving the TUTAP route was the motivating 
factor for this visible and open verbal attack on the President, but how members of 
community in engaging with more direct action and transnational solidarity over the 
years were willing to highlight an issue that does not directly impact Hazaras in Britain 
but is still seen as important given the implications it has for Hazaras in Afghanistan. 
Here it is important to briefly note the following quote from Dr Naysan Adlparvar who 
has carried out extensive research on inter-ethnic relations in Bamiyan, which can also 
be seen to apply to transnational Hazara communities: 
 
…the widespread oppression experienced by inhabitants of the Central 
Highlands also acted as a catalyst in the redefinition of sectarian and ethnic 
identities. They are still commonly recounted in the Bamyan Valley today. 
Numerous, and very emotive, examples of persecution and injustice were 
available that could be drawn upon to (re)construct these identities (2014: 
93).  
 
Having mentioned the RUSI incident involving President Ashraf Ghani another instance 
of political mobilisation related to the President took place in April 2017 in Australia. 
Online, it was reported that Australian Hazaras has organised a demonstration in 
Canberra against President Ghani’s state visit to the country. In a Guardian article on 
the protest it was mentioned that, ‘He is especially unpopular within the Hazara 
community, which argues he has failed to protect it from attack from anti-Shia 
insurgent groups, and over the Tutap powerline, a major electricity line which was re-
routed away from the Hazara-majority area of Afghanistan, and which would have 
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brought electricity and industry to Hazara communities’116. In a similar vein to the RUSI 
protest this protest is important to note as the President was being challenged in an 
international setting where the protesters knew that they could not be silenced and 
could in fact be very blunt and honest in their feelings towards the country’s ruling 
elite. Again, such a protest allowed the Hazara diaspora to raise awareness about the 
situation of the community in Afghanistan and diminished the authority of Ghani in a 
this specific international setting. This in turn relates to both the narratives of 
marginality and overcoming, in that it is the current circumstances of the Hazara 
community in Afghanistan which became the impetus of these demonstrations, while 
at the same time in choosing to protest in a diaspora space the community could 
confidently air their grievances knowing that they would not suffer harm for engaging 
in a peaceful political protest which they are entitled to do as citizens of Australia, 
which Ghani or no other Afghan politician would be able to stifle.           
 
Having highlighted several instances of political action in this section, it is also 
important to discuss a community cultural event that I attended during the course of 
the field research for this project, as it relates to the newfound confidence of the 
community, not only Afghanistan, but also in diasporic spaces. This specific event was a 
Nowruz celebration which was held in the town of Burton-upon-Trent, which is located 
approximately thirty miles outside of Birmingham. The Burton Nowruz event took 
place in March 2018 and was organised by the town’s local Afghan Hazara community. 
At this Persian New Year gathering Hazara women and girls were dressed in traditional 
Hazaragi117 outfits, which comprised of wearing either blue or green knee-length 
dresses with scarfs and trousers of the same colour. The dresses had silver, diamond 
shaped embroidery on the upper-half of the shirts. Some women were wearing 
traditional Hazaragi head-dresses and jewellery, which consisted of silver head pieces 
and thick chokers around the neck. Additionally, many men and boys at the event were 
wearing traditional Hazaragi hats, which commonly have diamond shapes sown in 




117 During the course of this research, through informal conversations, research interviews and 
attendance of community events, it has become apparent that the term ‘Hazaragi’ is not only used by 
Hazaras in reference to their specific dialect of Persian, but also in reference to Hazara culture and 
cultural items, such as traditional clothes, ornaments and musical instruments.   
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were wearing traditional waistcoats depicting the same diamond shape pattern in red, 
black and white embroidery. There was also a painting of Bamiyan displayed, which 
showed one of the iconic statues of the Buddha from the region, as well as a Hazara 
boy and girl in traditional Hazaragi dress. Alongside this image there was also a 
painting of women with headscarves in a mud-hut, cooking. A Hazara attendee at the 
Nowruz event explained to me that the painting depicted old, traditional Hazara 
houses. ‘Hazara culture’ was on display everywhere at this event, and further affirmed 
a larger transnational ethnic consciousness, where in this case, clothing, ornaments 
and musical instruments were of great importance.   
 
It was also mentioned to me on multiple occasions at the gathering how there is now 
growing pride in asserting a Hazara identity and promoting Hazara culture, which is 
extremely visible online, on Hazara social media pages. One research participate 
present at the event said to me that in the past the trend had been for Hazara women 
to where kuchi dresses to important, formal occasions, but that in recent years Hazara 
women are choosing to wear traditional Hazara outfits. Another guest at the Nowruz 
event also mentioned how singing in the Hazaragi dialect has become very popular in 
recent years, with many well-known Hazara singers choosing to sing in Hazaragi 
instead of standard Persian, and with more non-Hazara Afghan singers opting to do 
the same, such as the renowned Afghan singer Aryana Sayeed, who was born into a 
Pashto and Persian speaking family.  
 
The above examples were also noted alongside a trend of Afghans singers also 
choosing to wear traditional Hazaragi dresses and head-dresses, as has been worn by 
Afghan Pashtun singer Seeta Qasemi on multiple occasions, who also sings Hazaragi 
songs, alongside those in Pashto and Persian, and this was also noted by research 
participant Elaha Soroor who stated that, ‘Since Hazara singers have started singing in 
Hazaragi other non-Hazara pop-stars have started singing in Hazaragi too like Farhad 
Darya, and also Aryana Sayeed too’. Furthermore, a musician was also in attendance at 
the Nowruz event I that attended, and he sang old Hazaragi folk songs while playing a 
dambora. As noted earlier in this chapter, in recent years the dambora has become a 
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symbol of Hazara identity118, with images online expressing Hazara culture through the 
use of images of damboras. The reason I chose to give a brief description of this 
particular Nawroz event in this section is because the images, symbols and sounds I 
personally witnessed at this event further emphasise the growth of Hazara ethnic 
consciousness among the transnational Hazara community, and how these objects are 
now very visibly imbedded within community events.   
 
Having discussed both political and cultural events in this section, a key example of 
community engagement to consider to conclude this section is the Hazara community 
response to the Australian bushfires of 2019 and 2020. In January 2020 several 
Australian news articles mentioned the Hazara community’s response to the bushfires 
that had been ravaging the country for several months. These articles detailed how 
this refugee community from Afghanistan had been in engaged in multiple donation 
campaigns across the country in their local Hazara communities. In several of these 
articles Hazara community members who had been central to the fundraising efforts 
were interviewed. An SBS article reported that, ‘The Kateb Hazara Association, a large 
Sydney-based community organisation, was among the first groups to raise in excess 
of $18,000 for the [New South Wales] Rural Fire Service in mid-December’119. While in 
an article published by the ABC particular focus was given to a young Hazara 
community member, Murtaza Hussain, who at the time of the report was eleven years 
old and donated just over $200 to the bushfire appeal, which amounted to all the 
pocket money he had accumulated since moving to Australia at the age of four, as a 
refugee120. In this article it was noted that Murtaza had lost his mother and older 
brother at a young age in a terrorist attack and in turn his personal trauma ‘…helped 
instil a strong sense of compassion [within Murtaza]’121. While an article published by 
the Australian-based Settlement Services International organisation mentioned that 
Hazara communities across the country had raised over $100,000 for the Australian 
bushfire appeal122.    
 









An overarching theme of all these articles on the Hazara community’s response to the 
Australian bushfires was how reference was made to the suffering that these Hazara 
community members had themselves endured, either on an individual level or in more 
general terms, and how as a community which has endured so much hardship and loss 
Australian Hazaras could directly relate to the plight of Australians suffering due to the 
bushfires. Hence the heartfelt community response to the catastrophe which saw 
multiple articles written to highlight the Hazara community’s generosity towards their 
co-nationals. Again, the stories relayed in these news articles intertwine both the 
narratives of marginality and overcoming, as violence of the past, both underscored by 
personal and collective memories, have become the impetus for the community to 
work to assist their co-nationals. In one article published by SBS the focus was on a 
Hazara resident of western Sydney, Arif Nabizada, and his efforts to fundraise for the 
bushfire appeal. The article itself was titled, ‘I’m helping the bushfire appeal because I 
know what it’s like to lose everything’, with Arif further noting that, ‘We came from a 
fire zone country; that fire was in terms of bullets and guns and suicide attacks, here 
it’s a physical fire, but we know the pain of the people who lose their properties’123. 
While, Australian labor party MP Zoe Bettison in a parliamentary speech from February 
2020 thanked the Hazara community of South Australia for their fundraising effort, 
noting that, ‘The community saw it as their duty to stand with their Australian brothers 
and sisters during such a difficult time’124. In turn the charitable acts undertaken by the 
community, show that in spite of their past difficulties the Hazara community in 
Australia has been able to rebuild itself since seeking refuge in the country, and as a 
result Hazara community members are now seen as exemplary citizens among the 
wider community, which further relates back to both the narratives of marginality and 
overcoming.         
  
This section has shown how the transnational Hazara community and diaspora also 
engages in political, cultural and community events, both for the Hazara community in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan and non-Hazara co-nationals. The political protests described 




124 See: www.facebook.com/watch/?v=492427691703140.   
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diaspora countries to support the community’s cause and further raise awareness 
about the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and this in turn shows how 
the narrative of marginality continues to affect the Hazara community in the region. 
While diaspora spaces themselves allow for the community to challenge ruling elites in 
ways which may not be possible Afghanistan and Pakistan, which subsequently relates 
to the narrative of overcoming, as these diaspora Hazaras, most of whom were 
refugees themselves or whose parents were refugees, fled persecution and precarity 
to safety. While the cultural event discussed in this section that I attended shows that 
Hazara ethnic consciousness has proliferated far and wide and is now central to the 
cultural events the community organises, which also further emphasises the narrative 
of overcoming. Lastly, the case of the community activism undertaken in relation to 
the Australian bushfires shows how the history of the community frames the 
community’s collective action, while the opportunities afforded to the community in 
diasporic spaces has been the impetus for the community to positively engage with 
their co-nationals in a time of need.        
 
7.5 Conclusion:  
To conclude, it can be seen that the transnational Hazara community has taken part in 
multiple instances of collective action since the fall of the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan in 2001, which are underscored by the liberal ideals the community 
professes to support and promote. Communal gatherings have taken place for 
numerous reason in Quetta, Afghanistan and further afield in Europe and Australia. In 
Quetta it can be seen that the community has had to resort to collective action in 
order to get the state to respond to demands for protection and action against 
perpetrators of continued attacks and violence against the community in the city. 
Hazaras in Quetta have even had to resort to drastic action in order for senior 
government officials to take note and finally meet with the community. While the 
Hazara cultural day of 2019 shows that the community still seeks to strive for a 
semblance of normality in such precarious circumstances. Similarly, in Afghanistan the 
Hazara community has engaged in multiple forms of peaceful political action against 
acts that are deemed as prejudicial and discriminatory, by the state and other 
institutions, in order for the community to seek fundamental rights as advocates of 
liberalism, from a state system which undermines these fundamental rights. While at 
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the same time the annual dambora festival shows that large Hazara public presence is 
not just limited to politics, as the community is now choosing to present its culture and 
heritage to the world in a way that would not have been possible decades prior. In 
certain instances diaspora activism was undertaken in order to show solidarity with 
Hazaras in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the diaspora context it can be seen that 
demonstrations and solidarity protests have occurred in multiple cities and spaces. 
While at the same time political mobilisation was also undertaken to raise awareness 
about the situation of the Hazara communities in these countries. This diaspora 
activism shows that the transnational community seeks to work with, and utilise, 
liberal institutions in order to highlight the human rights situation of Hazaras in 
Afghanistan and the neighbouring region. In turn it can be seen that transnational 
Hazaras are seeking to use liberal ideals, specifically in relation to human rights, racial 
equality and gender equality, to raise awareness, demand greater rights and better 
protection for the community in Afghanistan and Quetta. While achievements within 
the community post-2001 highlights a new chapter in contemporary Hazara history 
which is underscored by liberalism and liberal values, where these gains are now 
recognised and accentuated with regards to the position of Hazaras in 21st Century 

















Chapter 8: Conclusion: 
 
At the start of this PhD research the aim had been to study how British Hazaras 
conceptualise their identity, relate to their Hazara heritage and what it means to be 
‘Hazara’. However, once I began engaging with existing literature on Hazaras and upon 
reflection on my own interactions with members of the community, it became 
apparent that there were two recurrent themes in the academic sources being 
consulted and informal conversations with community members, which required 
further investigation. These recurrent themes related to a Hazara past which centres 
on the insurrection of Hazarajat in the late 19th Century, and subsequent instances of 
discrimination against the community in Afghanistan, and the contemporary gains of 
Hazaras in the country since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. These two timelines 
of history, one spanning over one-hundred and twenty years, with the other less than 
twenty years old, were constantly relayed to me in interactions with members of the 
community, both young and old, in the years preceding this PhD. Therefore, within the 
first year of this PhD a decision was made to change the focus of this research to look 
at these two timelines of history, in order to understand what the contents of these 
two timelines are, how they are interacted with by members of the Hazara community 
and how they are personalised and propagated to the outside world.  
 
Chapter one of this thesis begins with an overview of this PhD research. This 
introduction chapter then moves on to looking at my research methodology and 
discusses the research methods used for my data collection. The main research 
method employed within this research were semi-structured interviews, which were 
undertaken by fifty Hazara research participants in the cities of London, Birmingham 
and Nottingham. Alongside conducting semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation was also utilised as a research method on several occasions, at Hazara 
political events and cultural events. Additionally, as this thesis has a chapter on Hazara 
social media, the ethics of social media research were also discussed here. The chapter 
further goes on to examine the shortcomings of the research methods and research 
interviews themselves, namely demographic representation in the fifty interviews. This 
is followed by several sections on the Hazara-specific narratives of marginality and 
overcoming and personalised articulations of these narratives. Here an overview of the 
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narratives is presented to illustrate how the narrative of marginality refers to both 
historic and current instances of oppression and discrimination, while also highlighting 
how the narrative of overcoming relates to the recent history of Hazaras in 
Afghanistan and their community gains since 2001.  
 
The introduction chapter is followed by the literature review. The reading and research 
for this chapter highlighted the lack of existing research on Hazaras in Europe. The 
literature review was divided into several sections, which consist of the following: 
‘ethnicity, identity and diaspora’, ‘on ‘imagined communities’’, ‘Hazara social 
networks’, ‘collective memory’ and ‘narrative and history’. Given that most literature 
on Hazaras refers to the community as a distinct ethnic group it was important to 
engage with discussions on the term ethnicity itself and understand its relevance and 
position in contemporary academic discourses. While the literature on identity in this 
chapter took as its focus academic research on Hazaras in Europe and Australia to 
show how these communities navigate between their home cultures and country of 
residence, and how the participants within these studies conceptualise their identity. 
Additionally, it was important to discuss and unpack the term diaspora within this 
chapter, as just over twenty research participants within my study constitute the 
Hazara diaspora, as they had come to the UK in early childhood, grew up in the country 
and subsequently acquired British citizenship. Here both essentialist understandings of 
the term diaspora and more contemporary, fluid definitions of the term are examined. 
This is followed by a section on the political scientist and historian Benedict Anderson’s 
seminal book on Imagined communities in order to explore his claims about the 
centrality of print media (referred to as print capitalism in his book), in constructing 
and promoting the idea of the nation and various nationalism since the 19th Century.   
 
The literature review then engages with research on ‘Hazara social networks’ to show 
how group identity and perspectives can be shaped or preserved through these 
networks, while also showing how these social networks help those within these 
networks in practical ways. In the literature on Hazara social networks it can be seen 
that social networks are vital tools for vulnerable communities such as Hazara refugees 
given the information and financial support they can provide to new arrivals overseas. 
This is followed by a section on collective memory focusing on the work of French 
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philosopher Maurice Halbwachs, to whom the concept of collective memory is 
attributed. It was important to discuss Halbwachs’ work on collective memory in this 
chapter given its relevance to both the narratives of marginality and overcoming, and 
how collective memory as a concept relates to Hazara community members’ personal 
conceptualisations of identity, community and history. Discourses on narrative and 
history were also pertinent to discuss within this chapter, to show how accounts of the 
past are personalised and framed by individual themselves.              
 
Political events in Afghanistan from the 1960s onwards and Hazaras migration to 
Europe is detailed in chapter three. This first few sections of this chapter discuss a 
handful of significant political events in the country from the 1960s to the early 2000s, 
which contextualise the destabilisation of the country and the subsequent wars that 
resulted in several waves of migration out of Afghanistan to the neighbouring region, 
and further afield to Europe. These sections on history within the chapter are 
necessary to include as they allow for an understanding as to why and when Afghans 
fled the country. This chapter then analyses the situation of Hazaras in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and Iran. They in turn allow for an understanding of the history of the 
community in these countries and their present circumstances, which is 
overwhelmingly defined by precarity. In Afghanistan it can be seen that since the fall of 
the Taliban regime in 2001 Hazaras have made significant gains in the country. 
However, the community is still victim to targeted attacks, which in recent years are 
most commonly attributed to IS-Khorasan. Therefore, in spite of the collective gains 
made by the community in recent years they are still vulnerable in Afghanistan. While 
the section on Hazaras in Pakistan showed how historically the community excelled in 
the country, as they easily acquired legal status as citizens of the state. Presently, the 
community has become the target of sectarian violence, which has resulted in them 
becoming ghettoised and confined to two areas of the city where the community 
predominately resides, Mariabad and Hazara Town. While for Hazaras in Iran it is 
noted that the religious and linguistic commonalities of Hazaras and Iranians made Iran 
an appealing destination for Hazaras fleeing the country since the late 1800s. 
Nonetheless, the last few decades have been very difficult for the community in Iran 
given that they are denied legal status as citizens and are trapped in low-paid menial 
jobs.   
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The final section of this chapter explores Hazara migration to Britain. The earlier 
phases of the war in Afghanistan are detailed here and how Hazaras migrated to places 
where they already had long-standing social networks, namely Quetta and Mashhad. 
However, since the 1990s Hazaras have been migrating in greater numbers to Europe. 
In turn, the main purpose here is to present a timeline of Hazara migration to Britain as 
there is limited academic literature on Hazaras in Europe and very little information 
about the community’s presence in the Britain and when this migration began. A key 
source in constructing this timeline has been the oral histories of research participants 
where personal migration histories were shared. These personal histories of migration 
helped to pinpoint key periods in Hazara migration which correlated with instances of 
increased violence and instability in Afghanistan. Within this timeline several periods 
emerged as pivotal years in the migration of Hazaras to Britain. Alongside these 
personal migration histories, these periods of migration also fell in line with the 
available literature on Afghans in Britain. Subsequently, the time periods in which 
Hazaras migrated to Britain were the mid-1990s, the late 1990s, the early 2000s and, 
lastly around 2007-2008, with migration to the country since then being minimal.     
 
The oral history of Hazara consciousness is the focus of chapter four. Taking from 
French philosopher Michel Foucault’s work on genealogy, the aim of this chapter is to 
look at how the narratives of marginality and overcoming change with time within the 
Hazara community. Here the themes of history and memory are analysed in order to 
understand the extent to which they intertwine, while also underscoring how history 
and memory are central themes in relation to the Hazara-specific narratives of 
marginality and overcoming. The work of Maurice Halbwachs on collective memory is 
drawn upon again, as well as literature by the French historian Pierre Nora and French 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur, both of whom have written about history and memory. 
Hazara historiography is also addressed within this chapter to show the shift within the 
community from their historic, marginal status to becoming assertive citizens working 
to improve the conditions of their community and country. At the core of this chapter 
are the responses provided through the semi-structured interviews conducted with 
Hazara research participants. The quotes discussed in this section of the chapter on 
marginality and overcoming over time take a departure from examining existing 
literature to show how community members themselves relate to both these 
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narratives, what the contents of these narratives are for research participants, and 
how these narratives come together in these personalised articulations.  
 
The research interviews discussed here show the awareness the community has about 
their history of suppression, and how ‘to be’ Hazara was perceived negatively, both 
externally and internally, but that in recent years the perception and circumstances of 
the community are changing. These interviews also showed how the narrative of 
overcoming is also underpinned by liberal ideals that some literature on the 
community has also alluded to. In these interviews it is stated that Hazaras are now 
pursuing education in greater numbers, are excelling at school and university, and are 
now a highly educated community who are gaining confidence through education. 
These quotes show how liberal values are now part and parcel of a particular Hazara 
community narrative. The following section deals with the themes of experience, 
memory and narrative to show how personal lived experiences and collective 
memories are central to the narratives Hazaras choose to propagate about the 
community. This chapter concludes with a discussion on Abdul Ali Mazari and Hazara 
consciousness. The focus on Mazari as a figure within this chapter is due to the 
profound impact Mazari’s words and actions have had on the community, and given 
how the community has memorialised Mazari through annual commemorative events 
in March of each year, which mark his death anniversary. These quotes highlight how 
by and large, Mazari and his legacy are viewed positively by the community and he is 
seen as a central figure who worked to elevate the status and position of Hazaras in 
Afghanistan, as well as promoting Hazara identity. This section also shows how for a 
small segment of community Mazari is viewed as a problematic figure, given his 
position as the leader of an armed faction during the country’s civil war, which is seen 
as being at odds with the community’s liberal ideals. In turn, Mazari relates to both the 
community narratives of marginality and overcoming. However, the discourses the 
community articulates about community figures may at times be at odds with how 
such figures are perceived internally by some members of the community.     
 
A genealogy of religion and secularism among transnational Hazaras is discussed in 
chapter five. This chapter looks at how research participants perceive and relate to 
religion, while also analysing to what extent religion is central to both the narratives of 
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marginality and overcoming. The chapter begins with an overview of the Shia 
orientation of Hazaras and what effect this has had on the community, as a religious 
minority in Afghanistan. Here it is noted how belonging to this minority sect of Islam 
(in the context of Afghanistan and Pakistan) is particularly dangerous for the 
community at present, given the increase in attacks by IS-Khorasan in Afghanistan and 
sectarian violence in Quetta. This section ends by briefly discussing literature related 
to Hazaras and religion to show how religion is personalised within the community, but 
also at the same time how it is not used to mould a Hazara identity given that not all 
Hazaras are Shia Muslims. This chapter subsequently assesses explicit discourses on 
religion with reference to the semi-structured interviews conducted for this research. 
The responses from these interviews show that for some interviewees religion is seen 
as being very important within their daily lives. While for others, religion is perceived 
as being central to the construction of a Hazara identity, as an ethno-religious identity, 
with both religion and ethnicity being key components of what it means to be Hazara. 
A number of research participants also noted that to be Shia-Hazara or Hazara-Shia is 
just a lived reality and fact of life for the community without necessarily being viewed 
as having positive or negative connotations. However, not all research participants 
were particularly fond of the notion of a hybridised ethno-religious identity as it is seen 
as exclusionary given that some Hazaras belong to the Ismaili and Sunni sects of Islam.   
 
This chapter then presents a genealogy of Hazara political theology before and during 
Soviet war, in order to show to what extent religion played a role within the Hazara 
political movements and organisations present at the time. The movements and 
organisations established between the 1960s and 1980s had various political 
ideologies, both leftist and religious. For some of the secular groups Maoism was a 
guiding force, while for other groups the Iranian revolution and Ayotollah Khomeini 
were greatly influential. The political theology of Ayotollah Khomeini and sociologist Dr 
Ali Shariati were also highlighted in this section, as some of the Hazara groups present 
in the late 1970s and 1980s took inspiration from the work of these two figures. In 
discussing Khomeini and Shariati it can be seen that their views on religion relate to 
both the narratives of marginality and overcoming, since there an emphasis within 
Shi’ism on oppression being overcome by the oppressed themselves. Here the work of 
political theorist Carl Schmitt is also important to note, given he claims that at the core 
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of the modernising project are religious theological ideas. The final section of this 
chapter looks at genealogies of secularism in contemporary Hazara life to show how 
secular, liberal ideals are now being propagated by the community both in public 
spaces through political protests and community events but also online, through 
Hazara social media pages and websites, with the focus here being three distinct cases 
studies: a change.org petition demanding that a Western online news publication refer 
to the community as Hazara and not as Shia, the community’s reaction to the Shia 
personal status law of 2009, and the liberal vision of the General Council of Sunni 
Hazaras. 
 
Chapter six examines online spaces, with an emphasis on Hazara social media and its 
use among transnational Hazaras. Social media has been a vital tool within this 
research as it has allowed for an understanding of community sentiments on various 
issues, while also helping in establishing to what extent the narratives of marginality 
and overcoming are propagated online. In having a chapter on Hazara social media 
within this thesis, Hazara historiography can also be explored given that many Hazara 
websites and Hazara social media pages are documenting Hazara history on their 
platforms and creating an indigenous timeline of Hazara history. The content of these 
online sources present a history that was formerly marginal, from a Hazara lens. This 
section takes as its focus two popular Hazara websites both of which also have 
corresponding Facebook pages and Twitter accounts, ‘Hazara.net’ and ‘Hazara 
International’. Within the contents of these websites it can be seen that the narratives 
of marginality and overcoming are also relayed online. These websites make reference 
to massacres and genocides committed against the community, while also noting 
multiple instances of community accomplishments, such as prominent Hazara women 
in the fields of politics, sports and community service, and the nationalist Hazaristan 
movement.  
 
The chapter then discusses Hazara solidarity and mobilisation beyond borders to show 
how social media is also being used as a tool to coordinate and organise collective 
action, globally. In this section multiple instances of community action are examined to 
highlight how events in Afghanistan shape diasporic activism. This chapter ends with 
an analysis of Hazara social media use in order to underscore the importance of this 
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online space for the community and for the Hazara historiography project. The work of 
historian Alun Munslow and Haitian anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot are 
mentioned here. This is in order to illustrate the reasons as to why we are now seeing 
an online Hazara historiography project unfold, which is due to the fact that dominant 
discourses of history mostly neglect marginal histories and the lived realities of 
marginal communities, and this is especially pertinent in relation to the Hazara 
community given that the most prominent sources on Afghan history do not 
adequately chronologise a Hazara past. In turn Hazara social media is an alternative 
information source to academic literature on Afghanistan, as it allows for us to engage 
with Hazara sources and a Hazara timeline of the community’s history.              
 
Chapter seven examines political mobilisation, collective action and community events 
among transnational Hazara communities. The sections within this chapter assess 
political mobilisation at the city level, national level and transnational level. At the core 
of this chapter is the work of Michel Foucault on biopower and biopolitics, and Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s supplementary literature also on the same topic. 
Biopower and biopolitics are central to this chapter given that these notions relate to 
how power manifests and the application of power. At the city level I take Quetta as 
the focus to show how Hazaras in the city have become the victims of targeted, 
sectarian attacks for over a decade and a half. This section details how the continuing 
failure of the state to protect its citizens is resulting in the community undertaking 
drastic measures to be seen and heard, and be afforded the right to life. In Quetta 
specifically we can see how the body is now a site of protest, given that hunger strikes 
are now employed as a form of protest by some Hazaras in the city. Yet this extreme 
form of protest has not resulted in any meaningful state intervention to protect the 
community in Quetta from targeted attacks. However, the community in Quetta does 
not allow itself to be defined by these instances of violence as the Hazara cultural day 
organised in the city last year shows that the community still strives to live a peaceful 
and dignified life in spite of the daily precarity they endure.  
 
On a national level this chapter looks at Afghanistan. Here it can be seen that protests 
not only occur in the country when the community is targeted due to sectarian 
violence by groups such as IS-Khorasan, but that the community has also mobilised to 
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protest against multiple instances of discrimination, with a very well-known example 
being the protests against the rerouting of the TUTAP project from Bamiyan to Salang. 
However, similarly to how the community in Quetta is striving to maintain a sense of 
normalcy in their daily lives, the Bamiyan Dambora Festival which has been taking 
place in Bamiyan for the last few years shows that the Hazara community in 
Afghanistan are also not allowing instances of violence or discrimination to define the 
community or be side-lined.  
 
Lastly, in terms of transnational mobilisation, it can be seen that the community has 
come together on multiple occasions to protest against human rights violations against 
Hazaras in Afghanistan, in both Europe and Australia. The diaspora community has also 
effectively mobilised to gather political support for their cause, with an example of this 
being when a senior British parliamentarian joined and spoke in solidarity with Hazaras 
at a 2012 demonstration in London. The community outside of Afghanistan are again 
not allowing themselves to be defined as victims, but are also striving to be active 
citizens in their host societies. A very stark example of this is the 2019-2020 Australian 
bushfires, and its aftermath. At the time that the bushfires were ravaging the country 
multiple Australian news outlets noted the generosity of the Hazara community, given 
that various Hazara community organisations raised donations in the tens of 
thousands of Dollars. Subsequently, these examples of political mobilisation and 
community action show how marginality and overcoming are narratives that still, at 
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